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For many years, I had one foot in the world of education, and the other 
in the world of high-precision manufacturing. I was responsible for a 
business with manufacturing facilities across the world, including in 
India, China, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and South America. We 
had suppliers and clients across 25 countries. In the period that I was 
involved with that business, it grew manifold. That brought equivalent 
growth to our suppliers. But the growth in employment was a fraction of 
the volume growth in the entire supply chain. This was not because there 
was underutilized capacity. In fact, in this period there was substantial 
capacity addition across the entire supply chain. 
It was simply because all our decisions, whether about product, process, 
production engineering, or machine design, were such as to minimize 
the labour component. This was not driven by any fear of draconian 
labour laws or shortage of trained labour, but simply because of the 
quality, productivity, and safety of such automated systems. The story 
was identical across other industries where I had friends and colleagues. 
So when the story of ‘jobless growth’ in India became hot news a few 
years ago, it was not a surprise to me. I had played a small role in that 
phenomenon. 
Nine years ago I put both my feet in education. This gave me the privilege 
of travelling to the beautiful nooks and corners of our diverse country, 
seeing schools, meeting teachers and students, in villages and kasbas. I 
was quickly disabused of the notion that the problem of employment and 
livelihood was anything much to do with education. 
Even if one is to focus only on those students who ‘do well’ in schools 
and colleges, it does not matter. Because the pie of employment and 
livelihood opportunities is so small and growing so slowly (if at all) that 
it is an intense struggle for everyone. Enough opportunities are just 
not there for even the best educated. Education must be improved for 
all in this country, but that will not solve the issue of employment and 
livelihoods. 
Foreword
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Since I could not understand this, no matter how hard I tried, I wanted 
the experts to tell me what was going on in this vast country of ours on 
the matter of employment and livelihoods. The many honest experts 
that I came across gave fascinating insights. They also said that they 
did not know what needed to be done, at any level of actionable and 
comprehensive detail, though they did have high level ideas. They all felt 
that a huge amount of detailed on-the-ground research was required. 
As it was dawning on me that we have frustratingly limited understanding 
of this absolutely crucial matter, Amit and Arjun came up with the idea 
of a regular report on the State of Working India, which could potentially 
enable many of the terrific people working on this matter to come 
together and explore the details. And also possibly develop a road map 
of a few steps forward for the country, to create just and sustainable 
employment for all.     
      
With the first Azim Premji University State of Working India report, that 
initial idea has become a reality. It is quite clear that this is a very small 
step forward. Our understanding may have improved a bit with this 
effort, but we are far away from any real solutions. So we should now 
get working on the second report, and so on, till we have some real 
actionable solutions, even if for small regions of the country. 
Anurag Behar
September 14, 2018, Bengaluru
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India is one of the world’s fastest growing economies. To 
be a stable and prosperous democracy, this growth must 
be accompanied by the creation of meaningful, secure and 
remunerative employment. Realising this goal requires a 
grounded and comprehensive overview of the state of labour 
markets, employment generation, demographic challenges and 
the nature of growth. 
The State of Working India (SWI) brought out by the Centre 
for Sustainable Employment (CSE) at Azim Premji University is 
envisioned as a regular publication that delivers well-researched, 
analytically useful information on India’s labour market, by 
bringing together researchers, journalists, civil society activists, 
and policymakers interested in labour and employment issues. 
The report is based on the research of CSE staff, as well as on 
background papers which are available online. 
SWI conceives of India’s ongoing structural transformation 
as composed of two processes - movement of workers from 
agriculture to non-farm occupations (the Kuznets process) and 
from informal activities to formal ones (the Lewis process). But 
it adds crucial considerations of social equity and ecological 
sustainability to this standard framework. In the 21st century, 
Lewis and Kuznets have to meet Ambedkar and Gandhi.
In this Executive Summary we highlight key findings and end with 
some reflections on employment policy.
Executive summary
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Figure 1 : Growth Creates Fewer Jobs than It Used To
Sources and notes: 1972-2011 from Misra and Suresh (2014); 2011-15 our calculations.
1. Growth creates fewer jobs 
than it used to.
A 10 per cent increase in GDP now 
results in less than 1 per cent increase in 
employment.
Even as GDP growth rates have risen, the 
relationship between growth and employment 
generation has become weaker over time. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, when GDP growth was 
around 3-4 per cent, employment growth was 
around 2 per cent per annum. Since the 1990s, 
and particularly in the 2000s, GDP growth has 
accelerated to 7 per cent but employment 
growth has slowed to 1 per cent or even less. 
The ratio of GDP growth to employment growth 
is now less than 0.1(Figure 1).
Between 2013 and 2015, total employment 
actually shrank by seven million. More recent 
data from private sources show that the 
absolute decline has continued past 2015.  A 
recent study claims, to the contrary, that the 
economy generated 13 million new jobs in 
2017. Unfortunately, this optimistic conclusion 
depends on selective use of data and 
unjustified assumptions (Box 2.1, page 37).
As a result the rate of unemployment 
among the youth and higher educated has 
reached 16 per cent.
It used to be said that India’s problem is not 
unemployment but underemployment and low 
wages. But a new feature of the economy is a 
high rate of open unemployment, which is now 
over 5 per cent overall, and a much higher 16 
per cent for youth and the higher educated. 
The increase in unemployment is clearly visible 
all across India, but is particularly severe in the 
northern states (Figure 2).
Figure 2 : Unemployment Has Risen in Almost All States across India
2011 2015
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2011 and LB-EUS 2015. Employment is defined as per usual 
principal status. Scale indicates per cent values. Note that the following outlying states have 
been placed in the top bracket: 2011- Kerala (9), Tripura (14.5), and Nagaland (25.6). 2015 – 
Nagaland (8.5), Arunachal Pradesh (8.9), Goa (9.6), Himachal Pradesh (10.6), Kerala (12.5), Sikkim 
(18.1) and Tripura (19.7). See Appendix Table A2.1 online for data.
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Adjusted for inflation, wage rates have 
grown in most sectors at 3 per cent per 
annum or more.
But 82 per cent of male and 92 per cent of 
female workers earn less than ₹10,000 a 
month.
Between 2010 and 2015, wages, adjusted 
for inflation, grew at 2 per cent per annum 
for organised manufacturing, 4 per cent for 
unorganised manufacturing, 5 per cent for 
unorganised services, and 7 per cent for 
agriculture (for the last, growth has collapsed 
since 2015). Since 2000,  real wages have grown 
at around 3-4 per cent in most sectors, with the 
exception of agriculture. As this rate real wages 
double every two decades.
India’s low earnings problem continues 
despite wage growth in the recent past. 
Nationally, 67 per cent of households 
reported monthly earnings of up to ₹10,000 
in 2015. In comparison, the minimum salary 
recommended by the Seventh Central Pay 
Commission (CPC) is ₹18,000 per month. This 
suggests that a large majority of Indians are 
not being paid what may be termed a living 
wage, and it explains the intense hunger 
for government jobs (Figure 3). Even in the 
organised manufacturing sector 90 per 
cent of the industries pay wages below the 
CPC minimum. The situation is worse in the 
unorganised sector.
A field study in West Bengal shows that even 
multiple informal occupations do not fetch 
women a living wage. For example, one woman 
undertook tailoring, brick kiln work, daily labour, 
and mid-day meal cooking to earn ₹2700 a 
month while another performed brick kiln work, 
daily labour, sand mining, and agricultural work 
to earn ₹6800 (Box 5.1, page 120). Another study 
in Rajasthan shows that skilled stone cutters 
earn significantly less than the already low state 
minimum wage, for highly hazardous work in an 
export-oriented industry (Box 4.3, page 99).
2. Wages are rising but they 
continue to be well below 
the Seventh Central Pay 
Commission minimum.
Figure 3 : 82 per cent of Male and 92 per cent of Female Workers Earn Less than Rs. 
10,000 a Month
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015.
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3. There is a slowdown in 
the replacement of workers 
by machines but work is 
becoming more precarious in 
the organised manufacturing 
sector.
Number of jobs supported by one crore 
rupees of fixed capital in organised 
manufacturing has leveled at around 10.
In the early 1980s, one crore rupees of real fixed 
capital (in 2015 prices) supported around 90 
jobs in the organised manufacturing sector. By 
2010, this had fallen to 10 (Figure 4). Moreover, 
increasing capital intensity has been a feature 
of nearly every manufacturing industry, 
whether it is relatively more capital intensive 
or labour intensive. However, this ratio is no 
longer falling as rapidly, coinciding with the 
rise in employment in this sector. The last 
ten years have been good for the sector, and 
most industries have performed well on either 
the wage or the employment front. A few big 
employers, like knitwear, plastics, and footwear, 
have posted strong employment growth as well 
as strong wage growth.
But contract workers are nearly 30 per cent 
of all workers in organised manufacturing.
An increase in employment in organised 
manufacturing was an opportunity to provide 
decent, remunerative, and stable employment. 
But instead, the share of contract work and 
other precarious forms of labour have grown 
since the early 2000s (Figure 5). Field studies 
reveal many categories of contract, trainee, 
and apprentice workers who perform the work 
of permanent workers at a fraction of their 
wages (Box 4.2, page 98). This is one way in 
which labour laws are being circumvented by 
manufacturing firms. Another way is via under-
reporting of workers. In 2011, an estimated 
54 million workers were in manufacturing as 
per household surveys. The estimate based on 
firm surveys was much smaller at 47 million. 
And the discrepancy can almost entirely be 
attributed to the organised sector.
Figure 4 : The Labour-Capital Ratio Has Reached a Floor in Organised 
Manufacturing
Figure 5 : Contract Workers Have Increased Sharply in Organised Manufacturing in 
the Past Two Decades
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years. Labour-capital ratio = Number 
of employees / Real fixed capital.
Sources and notes: ASI factory-level data, various years.
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4. Productivity has 
increasingly diverged from 
wages.
Labour productivity in organised 
manufacturing increased by six times over 
the past three decades but wages increased 
by only 1.5 times.
One might expect that as labour productivity 
grows, wages will grow in tandem. In neither the 
organised nor the unorganised sector is this the 
case. The divergence is stark in the organised 
sector. Labour productivity is over six times what 
it was in 1982, but production workers’ real wages 
have grown by only about 1.5 times (Figure 6). 
Even the growth of managerial and supervisory 
salaries is much slower than productivity growth. 
As a result of this, the labour share of income in 
organised manufacturing has collapsed to around 
10 per cent.
5. ‘Surplus Labour’ industries 
still dominate as ‘new’ service 
economy grows slowly.
‘Surplus labour’ based industries account 
for more than 50 per cent of service sector 
employment.
Despite the improved performance of 
organised manufacturing, the sector as a whole 
has failed to increase its employment share 
substantially. It has been proposed that the 
service sector may be able to lead the structural 
change process in India. Employment in the 
new service sector, including IT and modern 
retail, increased from 11.5 per cent in 2011 to 
15 per cent in 2015. However, more than 50 per 
cent of service sector employment is still made 
up of petty trade, domestic services and other 
types of small-scale and informal employment 
(Figure 7). Further, it is possible that the current 
downsizing in IT-BPM is not a temporary 
phenomenon but reflective of structural shifts, 
posing further challenges to the narrative of 
service-led structural change (Box 3.3, page 85).
Figure 6 : Productivity and Managerial Compensation Have Risen Much Faster than 
Workers’ Wages in Organised Manufacturing
Figure 7 : ‘Surplus’ Industries Account for More than 50 per cent of Service 
Sector Employment
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years. Wages and salaries deflated by 
CPI-IW and GVA deflated by WPI (manufactured products). 
Sources and notes: RBI-KLEMS 2016, LB-QES 2016. ‘Surplus’ industries refer to industries 
dominated by self-employment and petty production. Education, health, and public 
administration are considered to be ‘Social’ industries. Finance, IT-BPO, and organised retail 
are defined as ‘New’ service industries. Numbers do not sum to 100 due to exclusion of some 
industries.
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Figure 8 : Share of Women in Manufacturing
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004, LB-EUS 2015. Reference line indicates overall share of 
women in the manufacturing or services workforce respectively, in 2015.
6. Gender disparities are 
still high but are reducing in 
some cases.
Women are 16 per cent of all service 
sector workers but 60 per cent of domestic 
workers.
And overall women earn 65 per cent of 
men’s earnings.
The Indian economy remains heavily gender 
segregated. Occupationally, women are under-
represented among senior officers, legislators 
and managers. The situation has worsened 
with the proportion falling from 13 per cent in 
2011 to 7 per cent in 2015. On the other hand, 
female representation is on par with their 
overall presence in the workforce in relatively 
high-paying professional jobs. The caveat is 
that the paid workforce is still heavily male-
dominated in general. Women constitute just 
22 per cent of manufacturing, and an even 
lower 16 per cent of service sector workers. 
Female workers remain concentrated in a 
few industries such as textiles and garments, 
tobacco, education, health, and domestic 
services (Figure 8).
The gender wage gap varies widely. Women 
earn between 35 and 85 per cent of men’s 
earnings, depending on the type of work 
and the level of education of the worker. But 
disparities have reduced over time (Box 5.2, 
page 122). In the organised manufacturing 
sector, the gap narrowed from 35 per cent in 
2000 to 45 per cent in 2013. The disparity is the 
largest among own-account women workers 
and the least among the higher educated and 
regular workers.
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While only 20 women are in paid 
employment for every 100 men in UP, this 
number is 50 in Tamil Nadu and 70 in the 
north-east.
And government programmes are crucial.
The percentage of working age women who 
are either employed or looking for work is low 
in India compared to many other developing 
countries. And it has been declining over 
time (Box 2.3, page 47). But the southern and 
north-eastern states show much higher rates 
of participation by women than the northern 
and western states (Figure 9). The ratio of male 
to female labour force participation rate varies 
from less than 0.2 in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab 
to 0.5 in TN and AP, to a more than 0.7 in 
Mizoram and Nagaland.
Programmes such as MGNREGA, anganwadis, 
ASHA, and so on have played a crucial role in 
increasing women’s participation in the paid 
workforce. Field studies suggest that lack of 
available work, rather than social restrictions, may 
be preventing women from entering the labour 
force (Box 5.1, page 120, and Box 5.2, page 122).
Male Female
7. Women’s participation in 
the paid workforce is low but 
some states perform much 
better than other.
8. Caste disparities remain 
large but public policy is 
effective in reducing them.
Scheduled castes are 18.5 per cent of all 
workers but 46 per cent of leather workers.
Caste-based segregation and disparities persist, 
but have reduced in some areas. SC as well as 
ST groups are over-represented in low paying 
occupations and severely under-represented in 
the high paying occupations, a clear indication of 
the enduring power of caste-based segregation 
in India (Figure 10). On the other hand, both SC 
and ST groups are much better represented in 
public administration indicating the success of 
reservation policies over the years.
Figure 9 : LFPR, Particularly for Women, Is Higher in the South and the North-East
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. LFPR values are out of 1000. Note that scales differ.
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The caste earnings gap is larger than the 
gender earnings gap.
SCs earn only 56 per cent of upper-caste 
earnings. The figure is 55 per cent for STs and 72 
per cent for OBCs. The SC gap narrows to around 
0.7 when level of education is taken into account. 
But there is need for much more empirical 
work, especially at the jati level, to reach a better 
understanding of caste disparities.
9. Crafts remain big 
employers and are central to 
the rural non-farm economy.
With over 500 officially listed arts and 
crafts, the sector represents immense 
cultural value, ecological positives, and 
millions of jobs. 
Workers leaving agriculture are mainly moving 
to construction. The craft sector can provide 
much needed rural employment that is 
ecologically less destructive, and that enhances 
existing skills instead of destroying them. 
But for this to happen the sector must be 
treated on par with other industries and given 
infrastructural support.
10. Towards a ‘National 
Employment Policy’
India’s structural transformation has been 
slower than desired. There is an urgent need 
to think comprehensively about employment 
policy that can deliver this transformation. 
Though this year’s SWI does not delve 
too deeply into policy matters per se, the 
Conclusion offers some reflections on this 
important issue. In particularly we wish to 
highlight that a focused National Employment 
Policy is needed and that it should take the 
following into account.
Figure 10 : SC and ST Groups Are Over-Represented in Poorly Paid Occupations 
while Upper Castes are Over-Represented in Well-Paid Ones
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Representation Index = (% in occupation/% in workforce). 
Numbers indicate average monthly earnings for a given occupation.
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1. There is a growing popularity of 
employment guarantee across the 
world, including in OECD countries. With 
MGNREGA, India has been a leader in this 
trend, and it should build on its experience. 
2. The last few years have seen a renewed 
interest in industrial policy and the 
emergence of policies such as wage 
subsidies and incentives for skilling 
workers. 
3. There is a need to look closely at successful 
state-level employment policies and learn 
from the diversity of experiences across 
states. 
4. There is adequate availability of fiscal space 
at the Central and State levels. 
5. Public investment is urgently needed in 
agriculture to raise the income floor in the 
economy. 
6. There are many advantages to a Universal 
Basic Services (UBS) programme that 
invests in education, health, housing, and 
public transport and safety to create jobs, 
human capital, and public goods. 
7. Job creation can be fruitfully tied to 
investments in green energy and climate 
adaptation efforts. 
8. The falling female labour force 
participation may be due to lack of 
available work, not just social restrictions 
on women, or increasing enrollment in 
educational institutions. 
9. Government programmes are very 
powerful in reducing social disparities.  
10. There is an urgent need to address data 
lacunae especially with respect to unpaid 
work and establishment-level data.
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Introduction
Chapter 1
India’s employment situation and the state 
of its labour statistics system are both 
subjects of national news. The performance 
of the present government on job creation 
is also expected to be a key issue in the 
upcoming general elections in 2019.
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India is one of the world’s fastest growing economies. To be a stable and prosperous democracy, this growth must be 
accompanied by the creation of meaningful, 
secure and remunerative employment. 
This imperative is widely shared across the 
political spectrum and by observers of the 
Indian economy. Realising this goal requires 
a grounded and comprehensive overview 
of the state of labour markets, employment 
generation, demographic challenges and the 
nature of growth. 
The State of Working India (SWI) brought out 
by the Centre for Sustainable Employment 
at Azim Premji University is envisioned as 
a regular publication that delivers well-
researched, analytically useful information 
on India’s labour market by bringing together 
researchers, journalists, civil society activists, 
and policymakers interested in labour and 
employment issues. 
The first SWI comes at a time when India’s 
employment situation and the state of its 
labour statistics system are both subjects of 
national news. The performance of the present 
government on job creation is also expected to 
be a key issue in the upcoming general elections 
in 2019. SWI intervenes in this debate with a 
careful analysis of the available data. However, 
it also goes considerably beyond an analysis of 
the quantity of employment in the economy. 
We analyse evidence from many different 
official surveys as well as field studies to present 
a picture of the contemporary Indian labour 
market. How many are unemployed? Who are 
the unemployed? Where are the jobs? Which 
states are performing better? Is job quality 
improving? What is happening to the caste and 
gender disparities? Such questions and many 
more are addressed in the following pages.
Others have countered that the problem is not 
the quantity of employment but its quality. Less 
than the desired number of ‘good jobs’ have 
been forthcoming. The term ‘jobless growth’ has 
been used for both these problems, with little 
agreement over how to define or measure it.
A clear indication that all is not well on the 
employment front is the emergence of 
large social movements for the expansion 
of reserved quotas in government jobs for 
traditionally dominant castes, such as Jats, 
Patels, and Marathas. Another related symptom 
is the extent to which even the lowest paid 
government jobs attract large numbers of 
overqualified applicants.
The enormous demand for government jobs 
comes as no surprise once we take a look at 
the numbers on job quality as well as quantity. 
According to the Employment-Unemployment 
Surveys of the Labour Bureau (LB-EUS), the 
total volume of employment in the Indian 
economy shrank between 2013 and 2015. That 
is, more jobs were destroyed than created. 
On the quality front, the same data reveal that 
workers receiving a regular salary account 
were less than 20 per cent of all workers. A 
household earning over ₹1 lakh per month is 
in the top 0.2 per cent of income earners in 
the country. 67 per cent of households report 
monthly earnings of ₹10,000 or less (Ministry of 
Labour and Employment 2016). Meanwhile, the 
lowest government salary under the Seventh 
Central Pay Commission is much higher at 
₹18,000 (Ministry of Finance 2015).
The debate on jobs, especially in the past two 
years, has suffered from lack of up-to-date, 
reliable data. As of the writing of this report, 
no official survey data at the national level 
are available after LB-EUS 2015. This is all the 
more unfortunate given that two policies, the 
demonetisation of high-value currency notes 
in 2016, and the introduction of the Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) in 2017, had a major 
impact on the labour market in general and the 
informal sector in particular. 
In the absence of government data, the 
only source for national level employment 
A clear 
indication 
that all is not 
well on the 
employment 
front, is the 
emergence of 
large social 
movements for 
the expansion 
of reserved 
quotas in 
government 
jobs.
1.1 / The Jobs Question 
The past few years have seen a vigorous 
debate over both the quantity and the quality 
of employment generated in the economy. 
It has been claimed that the total volume of 
employment generated has been inadequate. 
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In the absence 
of government 
data, the only 
source for 
national level 
employment 
numbers is 
the Centre for 
Monitoring 
the Indian 
Economy.
1.2 / Structural Change: 
Lewis-Kuznets Meet 
Gandhi-Ambedkar
numbers is the new survey series started by the 
Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy in 
collaboration with the Bombay Stock Exchange 
in 2016 (BSE-CMIE 2017). The news from 
these surveys is not good. They also show an 
absolute fall in the size of the workforce, or in 
other words, net job destruction.1
On the quality front, the official response to 
the allegation that not enough formal jobs are 
being created has been to redefine formality. 
A task force of the top economic policymaking 
body – the NITI Aayog – charged with reviewing 
the state of employment data recommended 
that formal employment be redefined more 
‘pragmatically’ to include workers covered under 
various provident funds, insurance, or pension 
schemes as well as workers subject to tax 
deduction at source (NITI Aayog 2017, p.16). This 
was suggested since written contracts are rare 
in India. This definition increases the size of the 
formal workforce to 15-25 per cent instead of 
the usually quoted figure of 7-10 per cent. 
Subsequent to this redefinition, data on 
worker enrolment from the Employee 
Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) have been 
used to argue for robust job creation in the 
formal economy (Ghosh and Ghosh 2018). 
This method too has come under criticism. 
We review this controversy in Chapter Four. 
In fact, there is no agreed upon definition 
of ‘formal work’, and as we show, the size of 
the formal workforce can vary enormously 
depending on the definition adopted.
Definitions and data issues aside, however, it is 
clear that the jobs question has emerged into 
national consciousness as a salient social and 
political issue.
1  A recent study has challenged these findings (Bhalla and Das 2018), but the study suffers from critical flaws in method that render 
its conclusions invalid (see Box 2.1).
success to show. The first forty years of 
independent India saw the foundations laid for a 
modern economy and solving the employment 
question was central to these efforts. Since the 
2000s, India’s growth has accelerated. However, 
many difficult tasks still lie ahead, principally that 
of achieving structural change. 
In an economy with a large agricultural as well 
as a large informal sector, structural change 
has two aspects to it. The first is the movement 
of the workforce away from agriculture towards 
manufacturing and services. Since this stylised 
fact of the development process is often 
associated with the economist Simon Kuznets, 
we refer to it as the Kuznets Process (Kuznets 
and Murphy 1966; Ghose 2016). Owing to 
factors such as lack of formal education as well 
as other barriers to entry in the formal sector, 
the movement is most often into informal 
manufacturing or services.
A developing economy is thus a dual economy. 
It has a sector consisting of relatively larger 
firms that hire labour in accordance with 
considerations of profitability and growth. In 
India, this is known as the ‘organised sector.’ But 
the economy also has a second sector where 
the amount of available work is distributed 
among workers willing to work. In other words, 
labour demand adjusts to labour supply and the 
market always ‘clears’. In this sector, there is no 
unemployment, only underemployed. This is the 
‘unorganised sector.’
The second aspect of structural change is 
thus the movement of the workforce from the 
unorganised to the organised sector. This is the 
Lewis Process, named after Arthur Lewis who 
first put forth the concept of ‘unlimited supply 
of labour’ (Lewis 1954; Ghose 2016). The Lewis 
Process involves eliminating underemployment 
not only in agriculture but in the unorganised 
sector in general by the creation of adequate 
work in the more productive and regulated 
organised sector.
The two processes of structural change are 
closely related to each other. But as we elaborate 
below, it is useful to separate them analytically.
In 1947, the newly independent India inherited 
an economy ravaged by decades of British 
colonial rule. Seventy years on, there is much 
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In the standard model of structural change 
from the mid-twentieth century growth needs 
to occur in those sectors that can create more 
jobs per unit increase in output (that is, sectors 
that have a high employment elasticity) with 
skill requirements that match the skill profile 
of the workforce. These are usually labour-
intensive manufacturing industries.
But with the exception of a few economies, the 
Lewis-Kuznets Process has not unfolded in the 
expected manner. The ‘benchmarks’ for the 
process are the East Asian ‘late’ industrialisers 
such as  Japan, followed by Korea and Taiwan, 
and finally China, who managed to create mass 
employment through increasing manufacturing 
activities. This required a judicious mix of 
industrial and trade policies that tied import-
substitution to export-promotion, and 
protection from foreign competition alongside 
fostering of domestic competition (Wade 1988; 
Amsden 1992; Chang 2006). It also required a 
favourable international climate in the form of 
export markets and geo-political stability.
This path is more difficult today. Not only do 
firms in these countries have to compete with 
a much larger number of more productive 
competitors, but also their governments have, 
or think they have, fewer options with respect to 
trade and industrial policies. Added to this is a 
turn towards protectionism in the industrialised 
countries that further limits export prospects. 
As a result, in many developing countries 
across Asia and Africa, the manufacturing 
share of employment is declining instead 
of growing. Instead of industrialisation, we 
observe ‘premature deindustrialisation.’ That 
is, manufacturing reaches its peak share in 
output and employment at much lower levels of 
national income when compared to economies 
that underwent the transition earlier (Rodrik 
2016; Amirapu and Subramanian 2015).
In India too, structural change has been slower 
than desired. The transition from an agrarian 
and subsistence-oriented informal economy 
of self-employed micro-entrepreneurs to a 
growth-oriented industrial and service economy 
consisting of large firms and regulated 
employment has been delayed.
But even this does not adequately capture 
the challenge. Two new dimensions need to 
be added to the conventional understanding 
of structural change. The first is the question 
of social equity: for whom are the new jobs 
and new opportunities created? The second 
is the question of ecology: does the transition 
improve our chances of surviving on the planet 
or make them worse? In India, in the twenty-
first century, Lewis and Kuznets have to meet 
Ambedkar and Gandhi. 
How has India fared on these tasks? This question 
is complex and cannot be answered in the space 
of this Introduction, or indeed even the entire 
report. We only initiate this exercise here.
1. The Kuznets Process is slowly underway:  
A key aspect of diversifying the economy, 
raising incomes and making them less volatile, 
is the creation of non-farm employment. This 
process is under way, albeit more slowly than 
was expected or may be desired. The result 
is that just under half of the workforce is still 
in agriculture, forced to share less than 20 
per cent of the national income. Further, the 
failure to create adequate, decent employment 
in manufacturing and services for those 
leaving agriculture has meant an explosion of 
employment in the construction sector. 
 
There is a need for employment policy to 
balance two objectives: rapid generation 
of decent non-farm employment and 
improvement of farm incomes. These need 
not be opposed to each other. Rather, they 
can act in concert. Rapid improvement in farm 
incomes will not only have immediate welfare 
implications for half the workforce, but it will 
improve working conditions in the rest of the 
economy as well.
 
In India, in the 
twenty-first 
century, Lewis 
and Kuznets 
have to meet 
Ambedkar and 
Gandhi.
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2. The Lewis Process is underway but there 
are contradictory forces at work:  
Ghose (2016) estimates that around 100 million 
workers are either employed in very poor quality 
jobs or are out of the labour force because 
of unavailability of work. These are ‘surplus 
workers’ available to be pulled into the economy 
if jobs can be created. Another estimate of the 
surplus workforce that can be more productively 
employed elsewhere is the percentage of those 
employed in unorganised petty services such as 
retail, domestic work, and so on. As of 2016, this 
is estimated to be 78 million. 
 
While the organised manufacturing sector 
has increased its share of employment at 
the expense of the unorganised sector, this 
has taken place via an informalisation of its 
workforce complicating the Lewis Process. 
Indeed, the understanding that structural 
change would mean larger enterprises, 
and larger enterprises would mean more 
formal and regulated employment has been 
challenged on both fronts: first, because of a 
dispersal of production from larger to smaller 
units, and second, because of the creation 
of an informal workforce subject to fewer 
regulations, within the organised sector. As a 
result, the share of formal employment has 
been increasing very slowly and the majority of 
the wage workforce is still informal. In addition, 
own-account workers constitute nearly half the 
total workforce. Thus, over 80 per cent of the 
Indian workforce remains informal. 
3. Building equity into the 
Lewis-Kuznets Process:  
The maturing of democracy in India both in 
the parliamentary and the social movement 
space over the past few decades has imposed 
welcome constraints on the traditional 
understanding of the Lewis-Kuznets Process. 
The traditional model is in some ways a model 
with ‘empty places.’ It does not specify who 
occupies which position in the new economy. 
But it is no longer possible to speak about 
structural change without asking if the process 
creates opportunities for marginalised, 
excluded, or oppressed sections of society. 
 
This is a result of strong grassroots movements 
that have pushed equity considerations 
into the centre of the development process. 
While progress has been made in the form 
of lowering  educational and earnings gaps, 
these remain high and significant occupational 
and industrial segregation also persists. Two 
examples will illustrate: one, the vast majority 
of workers who are outside the labour force 
but are willing to work are women, and two, the 
Scheduled Castes are vastly over-represented 
in the leather industry. 
4. Building ecology into the  
Lewis-Kuznets Process:  
People’s movements have also arisen all 
over India (and the world) questioning 
models of development that do not take 
ecological constraints seriously. Resistance 
to displacement and dispossession as well 
as contestation over the use of land, forest, 
water, mineral, and other resources is now the 
norm. These movements have also brought 
the Eurocentric epistemic foundations of 
conventional development thinking into 
question. As with equity, a welcome trend is 
that we can no longer treat these issues as an 
add-on to the ‘core’ development process. This 
has the potential to overturn our notions of 
‘industry’, ‘efficiency,’ and ‘development’. 
 
Naturally, each of these aspects requires a 
fuller treatment than we can give in a report 
of this nature. But this year’s SWI begins the 
process to be continued in future editions.
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1.3 / Overview of This 
Year’s Report
The State of Working India is discussed under 
four broad headings: who is looking for work, 
where is the work, how good is the work, and 
who does the work.
Chapter Two (Who is looking for work?) is 
an analysis of the supply side of the labour 
market. A key finding here is the increase in the 
level of open unemployment since 2011, and 
its high incidence among young educated men. 
The chapter also analyses the issue of a low 
and falling rate of labour force participation, 
primarily among female workers. To the extent 
that low labour force participation is the result 
of young people taking up higher education, 
we point out that this defers the employment 
problem but also makes it more challenging 
as higher-educated workers will eventually 
look for jobs that are commensurate to their 
education and training. Lastly, we comment on 
the skill question, and propose that it is time to 
rethink our understanding of skill and how it 
can be provided, when most training happens 
on the job.
Chapter Three (Where is the work?) documents 
that the period between 2011 and 2015 was 
very different from the period between 2004 
and 2011 in terms of structural change, with far 
slower generation of non-farm employment. 
We also discuss state-level variations in the 
Kuznets process. On the Lewis Process, we note 
that the organised manufacturing sector has 
shown a strong turnaround in the past decade 
in terms of its employment generation capacity. 
However, job growth in this sector has come 
at the cost of unorganised sector employment 
and the overall share of manufacturing in 
employment has not increased. Declining 
labour intensity is observed in almost every 
manufacturing industry, but it is unlikely that 
labour laws are responsible for the substitution 
of workers by machines. Evidence suggests 
that firms have continued to hire workers 
by circumventing the laws. We also identify 
manufacturing industries that have performed 
well in both job creation and wage growth. 
Chapter Four (How good is the work?) delves 
into the issue of quality by looking at levels 
of formality and informality as well as growth 
in wages and productivity. There is large 
variation in formality across states but also 
some evidence for state-level convergence in 
levels of formality. There is a narrowing of the 
formal-informal wage gap due to faster growth 
of wages in the informal sector. Real wages 
have risen at the rate of 2-5 per cent depending 
on the sector. The significant exception is 
agriculture where, apart from an anomalous 
period from 2010 to 2014, real wages are 
mostly stagnant. Despite growth, however, 
wage levels remain far below the lowest 
recommended salary in the Seventh Central 
Pay Commission. In organised manufacturing, 
far more rapid increases in productivity 
compared to wages have led to a collapse of 
the labour share of income. 
Chapter Five (Who does the work?) addresses 
the issue of labour market segmentation and 
discrimination. We show that the raw gender 
and caste earnings gaps have declined over 
time, but are still substantial at 65 per cent 
and 56 per cent respectively. The gaps vary 
considerably across types of employment, 
levels of education and sectors. They are larger 
for self-employment, for intermediate levels 
of education, and in the unorganised sector. 
Many manufacturing industries are over 80 
per cent male and segregation has actually 
worsened in the past 10 years. On the other 
hand, segregation has reduced in services 
and female over-representation in poorly paid 
industries such as domestic work has reduced. 
Reservation or policies in public administration 
and education have had the desired effect of 
reducing caste segregation. Large caste-based 
movements for job quotas currently underway 
all across the country need to be seen in the 
context of this achievement.
Chapter Six, the concluding chapter reflects on 
the future of work and discusses the prospects 
for a National Employment Policy.
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1.4 / A Note on Data and 
Definitions
Well-formulated policies rely on good-quality 
data. There are significant lacunae in India’s 
labour statistics system that need urgent 
attention. The need for reliable, representative, 
high-frequency employment data has been 
repeatedly expressed in policy reports, 
academic literature, as well as in the popular 
and business press. The government has also 
admitted the lack (NITI Aayog 2017).
Since 2017, the National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO) has initiated a Periodic 
Labour Force Survey (PLFS). This is a welcome 
development because the PLFS will be 
conducted quarterly in urban areas and 
annually in rural areas. However, it is unclear 
if the PLFS is intended as a substitute for the 
detailed, quinquennial NSS employment-
unemployment survey (NSS-EUS). Further, two 
significant gaps remain:
1. Annual establishment surveys for all 
major sectors of the economy, namely, 
organised manufacturing, unorganised 
manufacturing, organised services, and 
unorganised services. Currently, only the 
first sector is surveyed annually by the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). 
2. Time-use surveys conducted at least every 
5 years. In addition to yielding valuable 
information on underemployment and 
unpaid work, these can assist greatly in a 
re-examination of the systems of defining 
and measuring work so that women’s 
unpaid work is also included in our 
System of National Accounts. The NSSO is 
reportedly working on such a survey and 
plans to conduct it in 2019.  
3. A skill survey to be done at least every 5 
years. Such a survey is needed to arrive 
at an accurate understanding of kinds of 
skills, methods of formal and informal 
training, and areas of deficit. 
Finally, in the past year there have been 
studies that use databases such as those of the 
Employee Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) 
or the Employee State Insurance Corporation 
(ESIC) to study employment trends. The use 
of such administrative and other ‘big’ data 
is welcome. But it must be kept in mind that 
such data cannot substitute for household or 
establishment surveys.
We now list the data sources used in this 
report. Details are available in the chapter on 
Methods. A recent review of India’s labour 
statistics system can be found in Papola (2014).
Unit-Level Survey Data:
Data from Published Reports
1. Quinquennial Employment-Unemployment 
Surveys of the NSSO (NSS-EUS): 1993-94 
to 2011-12. As of the writing of this report, 
there are no data from this source after 
2011-12. 
2. Annual Employment-Unemployment 
Surveys of the Labour Bureau (LB-EUS): We 
use the 2nd Round (2011-2012) and the 
latest 5th Round (2015-16). The Methods 
chapter discusses the comparability of the 
LB and NSS surveys. 
3. Quinquennial unincorporated or 
unorganised enterprise surveys of the 
NSSO: There are several firm-level surveys 
of the unorganised sector with slightly 
differing criteria and coverage available 
from the 1990s. The most recent one was 
in 2015-16. 
4. Annual Survey of Industries (ASI): Annual 
data on the organised manufacturing 
sector are available from 1982 to 2016 at 
the industry level, and from 2000 onwards 
at the factory level.
1. Labour Bureau Quarterly Employment 
Surveys (LB-QES): There are no large-
sample data available for organised 
services. To analyse employment in this 
sector we use the new series of the LB-QES 
(since 2016). 
2. Reserve Bank of India data on Rural Wage 
Rates: These data are used to arrive at 
growth rates of rural wages. It is available 
at http://dbie.rbi.org.in/.
The need 
for reliable, 
representative, 
high-frequency 
employment 
data has been 
repeatedly 
expressed.
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1.5 / SWI Background 
Papers 2018
3. Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy 
(CMIE): The CMIE, in collaboration with 
the Bombay Stock Exchange, has been 
publishing reports called ‘Unemployment 
in India: A Statistical Profile’ since 2016. 
Three reports are published per year. 
4. Reserve Bank  of India – Capital, Labour, 
Energy, Material, Services (RBI-KLEMS)  
database: These are internationally 
comparable data on employment and 
output available at https://rbi.org.
in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.
aspx?prid=43504 
5. International Labour Organisation statistical 
database (ILO-STAT): For international 
comparisons, we draw on this data. 
We adopt the convention of using ‘million’ when 
discussing the labour force or the workforce 
and ‘crores’ when discussing rupee amounts. 
One crore is equivalent to 10 million. Surveys 
conducted over a fiscal year are referred to by 
the first of the two calendar years. For example, 
a survey conducted in 2011-12 is referred to by 
the year 2011.
Finally, it is important to note that in a 
country like India, where wage work accounts 
for only around half of the workforce and 
the labour force accounts for only a third 
of the population for women, the concepts 
of employment as well as work have to be 
different from those prevailing in developed 
countries. We discuss the implications of this 
as appropriate in the text.
A team of scholars, journalists, activists, and 
policy-makers has produced a set of 18 high 
quality background papers for this year’s SWI. 
The present volume draws on these studies as 
well as original work carried out at the CSE, in 
addition to bringing together relevant recent 
research and policy material. The background 
papers, listed below, will be published 
separately as Volume Two of this year’s report.
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Who Is Looking for Work?
Labour Force Participation, Unemployment and Migration
Chapter 2
Through sheer repetition, the belief has 
taken hold that one million are joining the 
labour force every month. However the 
fact is that after 2004, this number has 
been 2 to 2.5 million per year.
-Mehrotra (2018)
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Has the Indian economy been able to create enough employment for everyone looking to work? What is the profile of 
the average job seeker today? In this chapter 
we address these questions. We find that even 
though unemployment has traditionally been 
thought of as a problem of developed societies, 
not of much concern in poor societies like India, 
this is now changing rapidly. Unemployment 
levels have been steadily rising, and after 
several years of staying around 2-3 per cent, the 
headline rate of unemployment reached 5 per 
cent in 2015, with youth unemployment being a 
very high 16 per cent. 
We will examine how certain categories of the 
population, other than the youth, are more 
likely to be unemployed and whether or not 
economic growth has reduced unemployment. 
We will also discuss the population that is not 
looking for work and look at its demographic 
composition. Finally, we will discuss issues 
of education, skill and migration that are 
connected to understanding and addressing 
the issue of unemployment.
We rely primarily on the most recent official 
Employment-Unemployment Survey (EUS) 
conducted by the Labour Bureau (LB) in 2015. 
Hence the last year in our analysis is 2015. 
Most trends are analysed for the four year 
period between 2011 and 2015. Since no data 
from the National Sample Survey (NSS) rounds 
are available after 2011 we have to compare 
the 2011 NSS-EUS data with the 2015 LB-EUS 
data. We believe this comparison is justified 
and give our reasons (as well as caveats) at 
the end of the report in the Methods chapter. 
After 2015, the only nationally representative 
household employment data are from a private 
source, the Bombay Stock Exchange-Centre 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (BSE-CMIE) 
survey. We make use of these data but it 
should be kept in mind that these data are not 
strictly comparable to the Labour Bureau or 
NSS surveys.
We begin by defining some key labour statistics. 
The working age population consists of all 
people aged 15 years or more. Sometimes an 
alternative definition of ages 15 to 59 is also 
used. However, we prefer the former, since 
in the Indian context, a large fraction of the 
workforce has no official retirement age and 
continues to work beyond 60 years of age. 
The total working age population in 2016 was 
estimated to be around 926 million. In 2011 
it was around 834 million (see Methods for 
calculations). This corresponds to an annual 
growth rate of 2.7 per cent.
The labour force is defined as people of working 
age who are either in paid employment or are 
actively seeking such employment. This excludes 
people who are in educational institutions, 
are doing unpaid domestic work, or do not 
wish to undertake paid work for any other 
reason. The workforce consists of people in 
paid employment of any kind including self-
employment, casual labour, salaried work as well 
as unpaid work performed in the production of 
goods and services sold in the market. 
In the Indian economy, most of the workforce 
does not have regular work all year round. 
Hence it is conventional to measure 
employment in two ways. Being employed in 
‘principal status’ means having work for at least 
six months in a year. ‘Subsidiary status’ refers 
to a person’s employment status between one 
and six months of the year. We start with an 
analysis at the aggregate level using principal 
and subsidiary status employment. For detailed 
analysis we will consider the principal status 
definition, and in section 2.1.3 we will discuss 
some characteristics of the people who are 
employed under subsidiary status but not under 
principal status. 
2.1 / How Many Are Looking 
for Work? How Many Have 
Work? 
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Two key parameters needed to determine the 
amount of employment in the economy are 
the labour force participation rate (LFPR) and 
the unemployment rate (UR). The LFPR is the 
percentage of working age people who work 
or want work. The UR is the percentage of 
those in the labour force who want work but 
do not have it. Finally, the worker population 
ratio (WPR) is the proportion of working age 
people who have work. Household surveys 
such as those conducted by the NSS and the 
LB give us estimates of these key ratios. The 
absolute number of people employed are 
calculated by taking the LFPR and UR reported 
by sample surveys and applying these to 
estimates of the working age population 
projected from the Census. 
It is important to keep in mind that these are 
rough estimates that can vary depending on 
the projected population. Different surveys may 
give slightly different estimates of the same 
ratios. For example, both the NSS and the LB 
conducted surveys in 2011. Table 2.1 gives the 
key ratios as measured by both these surveys 
for the same year. The observed differences 
are small, but since the size of India’s working 
age population is very large, small percentage 
differences can mean large absolute changes. 
Box 2.1 discusses another such instance 
of disagreement between surveys and the 
implications thereof.
Year
Population 
> 15 years 
(millions)
LFPR (%) Labour force (millions) UR (%)
Unemployed 
(millions)
Workforce 
(millions)
2011 (NSS) 850.2 51.6 438.7 2.7 11.8 426.9
2011 (LB) 850.2 52.9 449.8 3.8 17.1 432.7
2012 883.6 50.9 449.7 4.7 21.1 438.6
2013 900.4 52.5 472.7 4.9 23.2 449.5
2014 917.2 - - - - -
2015 926.0 50.3 465.8 5 23.3 442.5
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2011, LB-EUS various years.
Table 2.1 : Key Labour Market Indicators, 2011 - 15
As of September 2018, there are no nationally 
representative official survey data on employment 
since the Labour Bureau (LB) survey of 2015-16. Data 
from the new Periodic Labour Force Survey of the 
NSS are expected shortly. The news from private data 
sources such as the Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE) is not good. They report a decline in 
employment over the past two years, continuing the 
trend of declining employment observed since 2013 in 
government data (see Table). 
Box 2.1 / The State of Job Creation Since 2016
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A recent study by Bhalla and Das (2018) claims that the 
economy generated 13 million new jobs in 2017. If true, 
this goes against the declining employment story from 
CMIE and would indicate a much better performance 
than we have witnessed over the past several years. 
Unfortunately, this optimistic conclusion depends on 
selective use of data and unjustified assumptions.
Bhalla and Das argue that key parameters such as the 
LFPR and the UR estimated by the CMIE surveys are 
wrong and hence so are their workforce estimates. 
Indeed there is a large difference between the last 
available government numbers in 2015 and the CMIE 
numbers in 2016 and 2017 (see Table). According to 
the LB, 23 per cent of working age women were in the 
labour market in 2015. This number in 2017, according 
to CMIE, was 12 per cent. While female LFPR has been 
declining in India over the past several years (see Box 
2.3), such large changes are not in keeping with the 
general trend. But we have no independent way of 
verifying whether the differences are due to survey 
method or some genuine reason.
However, Bhalla and Das deal with this issue arbitrarily 
by assuming that the rate of change in LFPR from 2013 
to 2014 persists into 2014 to 2016. For 2017, they use 
the same number as for 2016. This gives them a much 
higher LFPR of 49.9 per cent for 2017 rather than the 
CMIE’s 43.9 per cent.
The justification they provide for assuming a higher 
LFPR than revealed by the data is that economic 
conditions were much improved in 2017 as indicated 
by a falling unemployment rate in CMIE data. This is a 
very selective use of the data. In fact not only did the 
unemployment rate fall in this data, so did the LFPR.
The treatment of the unemployment rate is even 
less satisfactory, being dismissed in a few sentences 
towards the end of the paper. Unlike the LFPR, the 
actual UR used for calculations is not even discussed. 
Based on their reported workforce for 2017 (464.3 
million) and the estimated labour force of 482.6 million 
for the same year, the implied unemployment rate 
comes to 3.8 per cent. This is much lower than 4.5 per 
cent that the CMIE survey finds. 
In other words, Bhalla and Das simply assume a higher 
LFPR and a lower UR. If we assume that the percentage 
of people looking for jobs or having jobs has increased, 
and the percentage of unemployed has decreased 
then, by definition, we arrive at a robust job creation 
scenario. This method assumes away precisely that 
which needs to be established, namely, what the 
LFPR and the UR are in reality. This is even more 
critical for the past 2 years when policy measures 
such as demonetisation and GST have impacted the 
labour market in a big way. In times like these, simple 
projections from 2015 are likely to be wrong because 
economic conditions have changed vastly.
Bhalla and Das Estimates CMIE Estimates
Year Employment (millions) LFPR (all) LFPR (M) LFPR (F)
Employment 
(millions) LFPR (all) LFPR (M) LFPR (F)
2011 447.9 52.6 80.4 23.2 - - - -
2013 443.3 51.3 75.6 25.5 - - - -
2015 442.7 50.4 76 23.4 - - - -
2016 450.8* 49.8* 76.5* 21.6* 403.5 46.7 72.6 12
2017 464.3* 49.9* 76.5* 21.6* 404.9 43.9 74.6 15.5
Sources and notes: 2011- National Sample Survey; 2013 and 2015 – Labour Bureau; 2016 and 2017 – CMIE. 
* - Estimates based on assumed (not measured) LFPR.
Sources and notes: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/did-the-indian-economy-create-nearly-13-million-jobs-in-2017/story-
2UJHNBwwAkC0rpLv65xFZI.html
Total Employment and Labour Force Participation Rates 
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In addition to the two estimates for 2011, 
Table 2.1 gives the numbers for the past few 
years till 2015. Between 2011 and 2015, the 
estimated labour force (as per the principal 
status definition) increased from 438.7 million 
to 465.8 million, an increase of 27 million or 6.7 
million a year. If we compare only LB surveys for 
both years, the increase is around 16 million or 4 
million a year on average. However, the number 
does not capture the year to year fluctuations 
reported in Table 2.1. The large variation also 
indicates that survey numbers, particularly for 
the recent LB estimates, should be interpreted 
with caution. Taking a longer period of time we 
see that over the past two decades the Indian 
labour force has grown by around 1.2 per cent 
per year on average (Basu 2018). 
There has been a controversy in recent years 
over the number of new entrants to the labour 
force every year. A common statistic that is 
seen in the media is that a million people 
join the labour force each month. Mehrotra 
(2018) shows that this number is based on 
earlier rounds of the NSS where the labour 
force increased by 12 million per annum from 
2000 to 2005. However, between 2005 and 
2011, this number was much lower at 2 million 
new entrants per annum. Since 2011 this has 
increased, but still remains much below 12 
million per year. 
Since such numbers have important policy 
implications, often used as targets for 
government policies, it is important to keep 
the margins of error as well as fluctuations in 
mind. A singular focus on the overall quantity 
of employment is also undesirable because 
it limits the attention of policy makers to just 
the aggregate number of jobs, rather than 
how good these jobs are, and the sector or 
demographic category to which they cater. For 
example, Mehrotra (2018) shows that from 
2011 to 2015, while the labour force in the 
15-29 year age group grew by 40 million, the 
labour force older than 29 years shrank by 30 
million. This dramatic shift in the age profile of 
the labour force must be taken into account 
while making policy.
Let us now come to the workforce, or that 
fraction of the labour force which is currently 
employed. Over the same period that the 
labour force grew by 1.2 per cent per annum, 
the workforce or quantity of employment grew 
by 1 per cent. If we break this down further 
into approximately five year periods, we see 
that the labour force and the workforce have 
roughly kept pace with each other in all but 
the most recent period (Basu 2018 Table 1). Of 
course, this sets aside the question of which 
sector has been driving job creation, as well as 
the issue of the quality of work. We will return 
to these questions in later chapters. 
In terms of the aggregate amount of 
employment, the period after 2011 is striking. 
In this period, while the labour force, as per 
principal status, increased at the compounded 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 0.8 to 1.5 per 
cent (depending on the survey chosen), the 
workforce grew much slower at a CAGR of 0.5 
to 0.9 per cent. Between 2013 and 2015, the 
workforce actually shrank by 7 million driven by 
a decrease in the labour force and an increase 
in unemployment (Abraham 2017). More recent 
data from the BSE-CMIE surveys shows that the 
absolute decline has continued past 2015. But 
these data have been contested as we discuss 
in Box 2.1 (Bhalla and Das 2018).
Table 2.1 shows two trends, both worrying. 
First, a smaller fraction of people are choosing 
to participate in the labour market, as seen 
by the falling overall LFPR, and second, out 
of those people, an even smaller fraction is 
finding employment, as seen by the rising 
unemployment rate. The second trend is 
much more unambiguously problematic. The 
traditional wisdom was that India’s problem 
was not unemployment but low wages. Low 
wages are still a problem. But if the 2011-2015 
performance is not an exception, we may have 
a new challenge on our hands — that of rising 
unemployment.  
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2.2 / Who Are the 
Unemployed? How Many 
Are They?
The rising aspirations of India’s youth, about 
which much has been written, of course arise 
from higher education, as discussed previously, 
and the rapid increase in national income. 
Unfortunately, even as GDP growth rates have 
risen, the relationship between GDP growth 
and employment growth has become weaker 
over time. The growth elasticity of employment, 
or the per cent change in employment for 
every per cent change in GDP, captures the 
effectiveness of GDP growth in delivering 
employment growth. It is important to keep 
in mind that there is no absolute standard 
Figure 2.1 : Growth Creates Fewer Jobs than It Used To
Sources and notes: 1972-2011 from Misra and Suresh (2014); 2011-15 our calculations.
against which to evaluate this number, unlike 
the relation between labour force growth and 
workforce growth where the two must match 
each other to prevent a rise in unemployment. 
It is also worth noting that a rise in the 
productivity of labour, or the amount of value 
generated per worker, also implies a faster 
increase in GDP than in employment. If this is 
accompanied by rapid job creation as well, it 
means that greater output per person is shared 
among a larger pool of workers. However, the 
last ten years have been exceptionally poor 
at overall job creation (Table 2.1 and Figure 
2.1).  Simply put, higher growth has raised 
aspirations but has failed to generate the kind 
of jobs that will allow people to fulfill those 
aspirations.
Higher growth 
has raised 
aspirations 
but has failed 
to generate 
the kind of 
jobs that will 
allow people 
to fulfill those 
aspirations.
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Figure 2.2 : Unemployment Has Risen in Almost All States across India
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2011 and LB-EUS 2015. Employment is defined as per usual principal status. Scale indicates per 
cent values. Note that the following outlying states have been placed in the top bracket: 2011- Kerala (9), Tripura (14.5), and 
Nagaland (25.6). 2015 – Nagaland (8.5), Arunachal Pradesh (8.9), Goa (9.6), Himachal Pradesh (10.6), Kerala (12.5), Sikkim (18.1) and 
Tripura (19.7). See Appendix Table A2.1 online for data.
The unemployment rate, as mentioned 
earlier, is the share of the labour force that 
is not part of the workforce. By the principal 
status criterion, these are persons over 15 
years of age who are looking for work but do 
not have at least six months of employment. 
This proportion in 2015 was 5 per cent, up 
significantly from the much lower 2.7 per cent 
as per NSS and 3.8 per cent as per the Labour 
Bureau in 2011. This rate of unemployment is 
the highest seen in India in at least the last 20 
years. If we use the more lenient subsidiary 
status definition of employment to include 
those employed at least for a month, then the 
unemployment rate is 3.7 per cent, which has 
also grown from 2.1 per cent in 2011.
What do more recent data say? High frequency 
data on unemployment are available from 
the BSE-CMIE surveys. As per these data, the 
employment rate in June 2018 stood at 5.7 
per cent.1 While these data cannot be directly 
compared to LB or NSS data, the high rate 
of unemployment is nonetheless worrying, 
especially in the face of a declining LFPR. This 
implies that although the proportion of the 
working age population that is looking to work is 
falling, a larger fraction of those looking are not 
finding work. This raises the possibility that as 
the labour force participation rate stabilises, the 
unemployment rate may shoot up even more.
Figure 2.2 shows the unemployment rates 
across states according to the principal status 
criterion in 2011 and in 2015. The increase 
in unemployment rate is evident. With the 
exception of a few states like Chhattisgarh, 
Gujarat and Karnataka, the situation has 
worsened everywhere, with the problem being 
particularly acute in the northern states (see 
online Appendix Table A2.1 for data).
2011 2015
1  From https://unemploymentinindia.cmie.com/ accessed on 8th July, 2018.
8.1 - 30.0 7.1 - 8.0 6.1 - 7.0 5.1 - 6.0 4.1 - 5.0
3.1 - 4.0 2.1 - 3.0 1.1 - 2.0 0.0 - 1.0
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Who were these roughly 23 million people 
who said that they were actively searching 
for jobs but did not have even six months 
of employment? We provide detailed tables 
showing the demographic characteristics 
of this group in the online Appendix (Tables 
A2.2). 9 million, or more than one-third of the 
people in this group have graduate or higher 
levels of education. Since there are 55 million 
people in the labour force with graduate or 
higher degrees, this says that almost one in 
six of them is unemployed. Figure 2.3a plots 
a ‘representation index’ of each educational 
category. This index is a ratio of the share of 
each category among the unemployed to their 
share in the working age population. The ratio 
being more than one implies that that category 
is over-represented in the unemployed group. 
As is evident from the graph, this ‘representation 
index’ increases with an increase in education 
level. Graduates are more than a third of the 
unemployed but less than 10 per cent of the 
working age population.
The number of people with a graduate or higher 
degree who are looking for a job is roughly equal 
Figure 2.3 : The Crisis of the Educated Unemployed
a) Over-Representation of the Educated among the Unemployed
b) Unemployment Rate among the Educated is Three Times the National Average
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Reference line indicates average.
The number 
of people with 
a graduate or 
higher degree, 
who are looking 
for a job, is 
roughly equal 
to the entire 
population 
of the city of 
Bengaluru.
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Figure 2.4 : Youth Unemployment
a) The Youth Are Over-Represented among the Unemployed
b) The Youth Unemployment Rate Is Three Times the National Average
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Reference line indicates average.
to the entire population of the city of Bengaluru 
(population 8.5 million according to the 2011 
census). Unemployment among this population 
is three times the national average (Figure 2.3b).
These highly educated unemployed people 
also overwhelmingly report that the reason for 
unemployment is that they did not find a job 
that matched their skills. This obviously points 
to the issue being not only one of job creation, 
but of the creation of decent and desirable 
jobs. This aspect of the quality of jobs will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
There is also the other side of the issue which 
is to do with the quality of education and the 
employability of college graduates. We will deal 
with this issue later in this chapter.
The unemployed are also disproportionately 
young. More than 60 per cent of them are 
in the 15-25 year age group. In contrast, this 
group constitutes only 30 per cent of the total 
working age population. Also, they are largely 
male (60 per cent of the unemployed are men). 
So, what we have is a larger than ever before 
population of educated young unemployed 
men, which is a cause for concern. Figure 
2.4a shows the representation index along 
age categories and again it is evident that 
the young are highly overrepresented in the 
unemployed population.In fact, if we look at 
the unemployment rate in just the 15-25 year 
group, it is much higher at 17 per cent, similar 
to the rate amongst the college-educated 
(Figure 2.4b). 
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This phenomenon of mass unemployment 
among educated, young men is manifested 
in various ways. Consider the fact that almost 
every public sector recruitment drive is 
massively over-subscribed. For example, in 
early 2017, the West Bengal government held 
an examination for 6000 jobs in the Class IV 
or Group D category, the lowest category of 
permanent employment in government service. 
2.5 million appeared for the exam, many of 
them holders of graduate and postgraduate 
degrees. In 2015, 2.3 million applied for around 
400 Class IV jobs in Uttar Pradesh, of them 
150,000 graduates2. Such examples may be 
multiplied.
Another way the clamour for jobs has 
manifested is in mass youth rallies across the 
country demanding reservations in government 
jobs. Strikingly, these have been mostly led by 
youth from traditionally dominant agricultural 
castes such as Patels, Marathas, Jats, and so on. 
Even a relatively better performing state such 
as Karnataka saw a major political campaign 
on the jobs issue in the lead up to its 2018 
assembly elections (see Box 2.2). 
Finally, with respect to the characteristics of 
the unemployed, the distribution along the 
dimensions of caste and family income is not 
very different from the overall working age 
population. The conventional wisdom has been 
that people with social or economic support 
can afford to stay unemployed. In the case of 
family income, the issue could be the large bin 
sizes in the LB-EUS (₹11,000 and ₹20,000 are 
in the same category) that flatten most of the 
variation. But this still leaves the caste issue, 
which is worthy of further research.
Although the headline rate of unemployment in 
Karnataka is lower than the rest of the country, the 
type and quality of jobs leave a lot to be desired. The 
recent assembly elections of 2018 saw the emergence 
of a ‘No Jobs, No Votes’ campaign conducted by a 
group called Karnataka for Employment. In their 
Youth Manifesto, the organisers noted that, as in 
most of the country, 80 per cent of workers in the 
state were either self-employed or worked as contract 
and casual labour. Further, the majority of the self-
employed earned less than ₹7,500 per month, as 
per the Labour Bureau, suggesting that this is a form 
of distress employment, in the face of lack of other 
regular/formal opportunities. The resulting demand 
for the security of a government job is reflected in the 
fact that 1.8 million applicants applied for less than 
2,500 jobs in the 2015 state public service commission 
examinations. 
The movement’s aim was to hold the government 
responsible and demand policies that directly lead 
to job creation by putting public pressure on the 
contesting political parties. The parties were asked 
to adopt the key points of the Youth Manifesto. The 
fact that such a campaign was able to attract support 
in Karnataka, which is one of the few states where 
unemployment has not increased significantly, shows 
that there are increasing chances of such organised 
action happening in the rest of the country.
Box 2.2 / The ‘No Jobs, No Votes’ Campaign by Karnataka for Employment
2  https://www.hindustantimes.com/kolkata/job-drought-2-5-million-candidates-vie-for-6-000-group-d-posts-in-west-bengal/story-
nkkUP8gQhxBHSqnVDSCcyH.html and https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/23-lakh-apply-for-368-peon-posts-in-
uttar-pradesh/article7660341.ece.
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2.3 / Who Participates in the 
Labour Force?
In a developing economy, the LFPR is 
determined by a series of complex economic, 
institutional and cultural factors. It registers 
an increase as more people enter the labour 
market looking for paid work, and spend less 
time in subsistence activities producing for their 
own consumption. But it registers a decrease if 
people, especially those of school and college 
going age, choose to attend educational 
institutions rather than work. Similarly, it is 
possible that with economic growth women 
could either enter or leave the labour force 
depending on cultural preferences. In India, the 
LFPR has been either stagnant or declining over 
the past few years. As per the Labour Bureau, 
in 2015 the LFPR was 50.3 per cent. For 2011, 
we have two estimates, one from the NSSO 
(51.6 per cent) and one from the Labour Bureau 
(52.9 per cent). 
Thus, as pointed out earlier, the labour force 
is growing at a much slower rate than the 
working age population. Most of the difference 
appears to be due to more young people 
taking up higher studies. Of course, while this 
reduces the growth of the labour force today, 
these people will join the labour force after 
finishing their studies and are going to expect 
jobs commensurate to their level of education. 
Some of this can already be seen in the 2015 
data, as discussed in the previous section.
India’s labour force participation rate is low by 
international standards, driven mainly by very 
low participation of women. Figure 2.5a shows 
the relationship between male and female 
LFPR using data from the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). Almost all the countries in 
the dataset lie below the dotted line of equality 
indicating a universal tendency for female rates 
to be below male ones. Countries below the 
blue line of best fit are the ones where female 
LFPR is below average given their male LFPR. 
India (IND, in red) appears at the bottom right 
along with other South Asian countries like 
Pakistan and several middle eastern countries.
Among comparable large developing countries, 
India’s female LFPR stands out as one of the 
lowest (Figure 2.5b). In addition, it has been 
declining over the past few years. This has 
given rise to a large literature, some of which is 
discussed in Box 2.3. 
In summary, while men are openly 
unemployed, women are not even part of 
the labour force. These constitute distinct 
challenges for employment policy.
It is somewhat misleading, however, to discuss 
female LFPR at the national level, because 
this average hides large state-level variation. 
Labour force participation in general is higher 
in southern states, but the difference is 
even more stark for women (Figure 2.6). The 
female LFPR varies from a low of 11 per cent 
for Punjab and UP to over 50 per cent for the 
north-eastern states and Chattisgarh. The wide 
variation in gender disparity of labour force 
participation can be gauged from the male to 
female LFPR ratio which varies from less than 
0.2 to greater than 0.7 (Figure 2.7). 
Among 
comparable 
large 
developing 
countries, 
India’s female 
LFPR stands 
out as one of 
the lowest. In 
addition, it has 
been declining 
over the past 
few years.
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b) ...Comparable Developing Countries
Sources and notes: ILOSTAT (2017). Female LFPR = (number of women in the labour force/number of working age women).
Figure 2.5 : Female Labour Force Participation Rate in India Is Much Lower than Comparable Developing 
Countries
a) ...the Global Average
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India’s female labour force participation has declined 
precipitously over the last two decades. As per the 
International Labour Organisation’s international 
database, ILOSTAT, India ranks 121 out of 131 countries 
in this respect. This period saw an average GDP growth 
rate of 6 to 7 per cent per annum, a fertility rate decline 
from 3.9 in 1990 to 2.6 in 2011 and an increase in the 
years of schooling among females. In many other 
countries, all these factors have led to an increase in 
female labour force participation. 
Various studies have pointed to a negative income 
effect, increase in women’s education, and husband’s 
education as the major drivers of the decline (Das et 
al. 2015; Klasen and Pieters 2015; Sorsa et al. 2015; 
Afridi, Mukhopadhyay, and Sahoo 2016; Mehrotra and 
Sinha 2017). Increase in husband’s income has driven 
households to withdraw women from the labour force. 
Women working outside the household are seen as a 
negative status symbol in a patriarchal society and they 
are used as reserve labour force to be used only in times 
of distress (Himanshu 2011). 
Increasing women’s education, surprisingly, has 
worsened the decline. Several studies have observed 
a U-shaped relationship between own education and 
labour force participation (Das and Desai 2003; Afridi, 
Mukhopadhyay, and Sahoo 2016). LFPR is lowest for 
women with secondary education and increases for 
those who are college-educated or have a graduate 
degree. A large proportion of Indian women now have 
secondary education, but a small fraction have higher 
education. Educated women might be dropping out 
of the labour force as their productivity in household 
work – specifically raising children – increases. Another 
argument is that secondary educated women do not 
want to jobs requiring ‘menial’ physical labour but do not 
have the skills to do other white collar jobs in the service 
sector. Marriage and having children also reduces the 
likelihood of women participating in the labour market. 
Women workers have also had a difficult time moving 
out of the rapidly shrinking agricultural sector and 
obtaining other non-agricultural jobs (Chand and 
Srivastava 2014; Kapsos, Silbermann, and Bourmpoula 
2014; Chatterjee, Murgai, and Rama 2015). This is 
because female-friendly labour-intensive jobs have seen 
less growth in India, especially in rural areas. The lack 
of shift in the Indian economy towards manufacturing 
and the low share of women in the manufacturing 
sector have hurt the chances of women finding paid 
work outside agriculture (Lahoti and Swaminathan 
2016). Displacement from agriculture and lack of 
opportunities in the non-farm sector have thus acted 
together (Mehrotra and Parida 2017). Also agricultural 
work provides flexibility for women to manage work, 
household and care responsibilities, which other jobs 
(if available) do not provide. In a patriarchal society with 
little sharing of household responsibilities between men 
and women, the lack of flexibility in non-agriculture 
jobs acts a big deterrent for women to go outside the 
household and work (Rani and Unni 2009). 
The low level of female participation in the workforce 
and the decline in their participation rate can and must 
be reversed through policies promoting female-friendly 
sectors in the economy, reducing educational and 
occupational segregation and tackling the social stigma 
associated with women working outside the house.
Rahul Lahoti is Assistant Professor of Economics, Azim Premji University.
Box 2.3 / The State of Working Women in India
Rahul Lahoti
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Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. LFPR values are out of 1000. Note that scales differ. See Appendix Table A2.3 online for data.
Figure 2.6 : LFPR, Particularly for Women, Is Higher in the South and the North-East
Overall
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Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Refer Table of Abbreviations for state codes.
Figure 2.7 : Gender Disparity in Labour Force Participation Varies Significantly across States
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As discussed earlier, we have only considered 
workers who were employed for 6 months or 
more. But there is also information on people 
who were employed for at least 1 month but for 
less than 6. Three-fourths of these are women, 
more than 80 per cent of whom are engaged 
in domestic duties as their principal activity. 
Amongst the men, a little less than 60 per cent 
report seeking work as their principal activity, 
that is, they will be part of the labour force but 
are unemployed according to the principal 
status definition of employment. Another 24 per 
cent are in educational institutions. 
The people of working age who are not in 
the labour force, that is, they are neither 
working nor actively seeking employment, 
could be engaged in studying or in unpaid 
work like care work, among other things. The 
age profile of the group is interesting. There 
is a disproportionate representation of the 
youngest and the oldest age groups, that is to 
be expected. More people older than 60 years 
would drop out of the labour force because of 
age and more people younger than 25 years 
would choose to stay out of the labour force to 
study (Table A2.4 of online Appendix).
The key thing to note is that this group is 
overwhelmingly female and is largely engaged 
in household work. When we look at men and 
women separately, the difference in activities 
becomes quite clear. More than 60 per cent 
of the men of working age who are not in 
the labour force are attending educational 
institutions. They are also much younger, with 
more than two-thirds being in the 15-25 age 
group. The picture is quite different for women. 
More than three-fourths of them are engaged 
in domestic duties only. And their age profile 
is quite similar to that of the overall working 
age population, indicating that there is no age-
specific selection out of the labour force among 
women. Indeed, if we take into account unpaid 
work, then the picture changes dramatically. 
Mondal et al. (2018) contend that to account for 
the work women do in India, the definition of 
work needs to be revisited (Box 2.4).
In their SWI background paper, Mondal et al. (2018) 
contend that to account for the work women do in India, 
the definition of work needs to be revisited. Economic 
definitions of work invariably link it to production of goods 
and services. There is disagreement on whether or not 
to include work such as domestic work and care work in 
this definition. The authors argue that these do need to 
be included in the definition of work, and employment 
defined as work for pay or profit is only a subset of this 
larger definition.
Changing the definition of ‘work’ also has an impact on 
measurement of the participation of women in the labour 
force (see Box 2.3). Currently, the NSS employment-
unemployment surveys categorise the following types of 
individuals as being outside the labour force: attended 
educational institutions, attended to domestic duties only, 
attended to domestic duties and was also engaged in free 
collection of goods (vegetables, roots, firewood, cattle 
feed, etc.), sewing, tailoring, weaving, etc. for household 
use, rentiers, pensioners, remittance recipients, etc., not 
able to work owing to disability, others (including beggars, 
prostitutes, etc.), did not work owing to sickness (for 
casual workers only), children of age 0-4 years.
The study argues that workers who performed domestic 
work (NSS status code 92) and/or other subsistence 
activities (code 93) as their principal occupation, should 
be considered as working. On including these three 
codes, the authors find that not only is women’s labour 
force participation higher than that of men, but also that 
there is no difference in the trends over time. In fact, an 
increase in the proportion of women reporting that they 
are engaged in activities corresponding to codes 92 and 
93 compensates for the decline in the proportion in paid 
employment.
Box 2.4 / Defining Work from the Perspective of Women Workers
Sources and notes:  Mondal et al. (2018) 
STATE OF WORKING INDIA 2018
50
As with the unemployment data, there does not 
seem to be any change in the caste or family 
income distribution of this group, either overall 
or by gender, when compared to the total 
working age population. 
The distribution of activities of this group shows 
no evidence of ‘discouraged workers,’ that is, 
those who are educated but have dropped 
out of work force because they could not 
find jobs. But this may be due to the fact that 
the surveys do not probe deep enough into 
reasons for being out of the labour force, and 
also do not elicit data on previous attempts 
at getting employment. It is also possible that 
what appears as an increase in workforce in 
agriculture, (details in Chapter Three) that is 
counter to the trend, represents disguised 
discouraged workers unable to find work 
elsewhere.
2.4 / Education and Skill
As we have seen above, one of the reasons for 
the slow growth of the labour force is that more 
youth are remaining in education. In recent 
years there has been a steep increase in India’s 
higher education gross enrolment ratio (GER), 
that is, the percentage of youth of the age 18-23 
years enrolled in a higher education institution. 
After increasing slowly for several decades to a 
level of around 12 per cent in 2005, the ratio has 
climbed to 21 per cent in 2011 and then to 24.5 
per cent by 2015 (see reports of the All India 
Survey on Higher Education). Between 2011 and 
2015, the GER rose by 3.7 percentage points. 
Evidently, this explains the slow increase in the 
labour force as compared to the working age 
population. 
There is also a substantial state-level variation 
in this number (Table A2.5 of online Appendix). 
States like Kerala, UP and Jharkhand have 
seen an increase of 7 percentage points or 
more compared to the all-India number of 3.7 
percentage points. States with already higher 
enrolment ratios, like Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh and Telangana, need to plan ahead in 
terms of adequate employment generation for 
emerging graduates. Both caste and gender 
dimensions of higher education are clearly 
visible here. Enrolment ratios for SC and ST 
populations, and for women within each section, 
are much lower than the overall ratio. 
With the proliferation of higher education 
institutions as well as rapidly growing enrolment, 
the major question in policy circles as well 
the popular press has been the quality of 
education being delivered: specifically, whether 
it is preparing the youth for a rapidly changing 
job market. There have been periodic small 
surveys, often carried out by ‘head-hunting’ or 
recruitment firms, that assess the employability 
of recent graduates. Mostly these have reached 
pessimistic conclusions. A recent study of 
150,000 engineering graduates by a Delhi-based 
employment-solutions company, found that 
barely 7 per cent were suitable for engineering 
jobs. Another, by the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of India, also found that around 7 per 
cent of the thousands of graduates emerging 
from the country’s 5,500 business schools 
each year were employable.3 Employers are 
increasingly finding it necessary to run training 
programmes of several months or longer in 
order to bridge the gap between college training 
and ability to work. 
There are now no takers for nearly half of 
all available seats at engineering colleges 
nationwide. And there is a general prevailing 
sense of panic among policy-makers as well as 
the public that there is a large ‘skill deficit’ in the 
Indian labour force. Recently, large government 
efforts have been made to upskill the workforce 
through schemes such as Skill India (officially 
Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana or PMKVY). 
 
Unfortunately, however, there are no large-scale, 
representative surveys that assess either the 
preparedness of Indian college graduates for 
jobs or the effectiveness of skilling programmes 
in making youth employment-ready. This is a 
large lacuna in the data ecosystem.
Looking beyond the world of college education 
or other formal higher education programmes, 
there is also a need to rethink the concept of 
‘skill’ itself. Field surveys indicate that substantial 
skill acquisition as well as updating occurs 
3  https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/featurephilia/story/engineering-employment-problems-329022-2016-07-13 and http://
www.assocham.org/newsdetail.php?id=5651.
In recent years 
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increase in 
India’s higher 
education gross 
enrolment 
ratio (GER) 
from 12 per 
cent in 2005 to 
24.5 per cent in 
2015.
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In her SWI background paper, Srija (2018) discusses the 
potential impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on 
the Indian labour market. 
In LB-EUS 2015, 58 per cent of graduates and 62 per cent 
of postgraduates who are actively looking for jobs cited 
non-availability of jobs matching with their education, 
skill, or experience as the reason for unemployment. 
This shows that the challenge is not just to create jobs 
but the right kind of jobs. Srija argues that the fast 
changing technological environment may offer an 
opportunity to do just that.
More than 1 lakh gram panchayats out of a total of 
around 2 lakh have been connected through optical 
cables as of March 2018. About 24 per cent of the 
population of the country has access to the internet 
through their mobile phones, with the number 
increasing every year. Increased connectivity has also 
been accompanied by collection of a huge amount of 
data from the users of these services. Srija argues that 
this presents an opportunity for creation of jobs in firms 
that use the connectivity as well as ‘Big Data’ to provide 
innovative services to consumers. She gives the example 
of Byju’s learning app that has become a ‘unicorn’ – a 
term used to refer to startups that are valued at over 1 
billion US dollars - within 3 years of its launch.
But to tap into these new opportunities, a workforce 
with the right kind of knowledge and skills would be 
required. Despite the improvements in the area of 
primary education over the last few years, there are still 
some major problem areas that need to be addressed. 
Srija identifies three main ones –
1. Problems of access: Although access to primary 
schools has improved substantially and is nearly 
universal, the same is not true for upper primary 
and secondary schools. In rural areas, just 36.7 per 
cent of the households have access to a secondary 
school within a distance of 1 km. 
2. Problems of dropout: While enrolment in primary 
education is near universal, a large number 
of students drop out by the time they reach 
secondary or higher levels of education. For 
example, in the 5-15 age group the proportion 
of students dropping out is 60.3 per cent in 
rural areas and 43.3 per cent in urban areas. 
The reasons given for dropping out included 
employment in economic activities, financial 
constraints and lack of interest in education. 
3. Choice of educational stream: The proportion 
of students in higher education who opt for 
professional/technical courses was 12.6 per cent 
and those going for vocational courses was 2.4 per 
cent in 2014. Srija argues that this compounds the 
earlier problems as out of even the few students 
who reach the level of higher education, 85 per cent 
opt for streams that do not give them the skills that 
would increase their employability in these areas.
A number of government schemes are attempting to 
solve these problems but the sheer scale of the challenge 
means that a lot more needs to be done. Policy measures 
suggested include stipend-driven courses, night classes, 
and on-the-job classes of re-skilling and up-skilling along 
with a job market oriented curriculum.
informally and ‘on-the-job’ (Basole 2015b). It is, 
therefore, a serious mistake to confuse skills 
with years of formal education. More creative 
policy approaches that draw directly on the vast 
store of informally acquired knowledge and 
skills, the ‘lokavidya’ of the Indian workforce are 
needed (Basole 2018). 
In this regard, programmes such as ‘Recognition 
of Prior Learning’ (RPL) that confer official 
certification on existing skills are worthy of 
support, and much can also be learnt from other 
countries that have experimented with subsidies 
for apprenticeships in the informal sector. While 
RPL is indeed part of India’s skill ecosystem, it 
does not occupy a position of much importance 
Box 2.5 / The Fourth Industrial Revolution
Sources and notes:  Srija (2018)
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2.5 / Migration
The study of economic migration in India is 
afflicted with the standard problems of scarcity 
of reliable data. But unlike other processes, it is 
also tinged with a normative ambiguity about 
the appropriate policy response to it. One view 
is that migration should be encouraged to 
further structural change, while the other view 
is that it is a symptom of severe rural distress 
and hence needs to be addressed so as to allow 
people to find employment without the stress 
generated by migration in both sending and 
receiving locations.
The Economic Survey of 2016-17 (Ministry of 
Finance 2017) presented a comprehensive 
analysis of inter-state migration. Census 2011 
counts the number of self-reported economic 
migrants as 51 million, which had increased at 
the rate of 4.5 per cent a year from the 2001 
number of 33 million. This number is around 10 
per cent of the labour force, increasing from 8 
per cent in 2001. But there are two key problems 
with the Census numbers. First, it only captures 
long-term migration and does not include the 
substantial numbers of short-term migrants 
who undertake what is sometimes referred 
to as ‘circular migration.’ Second, the status of 
women migrants is frequently underreported 
because when they migrate with their family for 
economic reasons, they may state the reason as 
‘marriage’ or ‘moved with household.’ 
To correct for at least the second problem, 
the Economic Survey adopts a different 
methodology. First, it uses the difference in 
the population of 10-19 year olds in 2001 and 
that of 20-29 year olds in 2011, corrected for 
mortality rates, as a measure of net migration 
(and similarly for 1991-2001). This leads to 
an estimate of 55 million, which is clearly 
an underestimate as only net migration is 
accounted for. But the inter-state differences 
are interesting. Bihar and UP, unsurprisingly, 
are the major sending states. But Maharashtra 
and Delhi have been replaced by Tamil Nadu 
and Kerala as the major receiving states, 
signalling a geographical shift in where the net 
demand for workers lies. 
The survey also uses rail ticketing data to 
estimate net migration at an annual level, thus 
it is more likely to capture short-term migrants. 
The average yearly migration between 2011-12 
and 2015-16 is estimated at 9 million. 
Perhaps a more important indicator of the 
changes in the economy is the state of rural-
urban migration. While most studies agree 
that the rate of out-migration of men from 
rural areas is around 5 per cent (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig 2016), there is disagreement 
about whether this is high or low. Munshi and 
Rosenzweig compare this to the rural-urban 
migration rate in Brazil which was 13.9 per 
cent. Tumbe (2016) compares it to similar rates 
in the Age of Mass Migration in nineteenth 
century Europe. Munshi and Rosenzweig 
contend that the migration rates are low 
despite urban wages being substantially higher 
than rural wages because of caste-based 
insurance networks in villages that potential 
migrants do not want to move away from. 
Tumbe argues that it is not just the quantity 
of migration that matters. As the migrants are 
mostly male, it creates a situation of ‘missing 
men’ in the source regions which has important 
implications for the women left behind. 
Large scale distress migration is not desirable 
and programmes like the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) have been shown to reduce 
such migration (Imbert and Papp 2018). This 
noted, a long term permanent shift of workers 
from surplus sectors like agriculture to either 
manufacturing or services is inevitable in an 
economy undergoing structural change. The 
question is: can it be achieved by creating jobs 
in different regions and in rural areas?
(Mehrotra 2014). Policy focus has been 
mostly dominated by short-term skilling and 
certification programmes whose ability to 
deliver marketable skills is questionable. The 
2016 Sharda Prasad report on the PMKVY is 
particularly critical of this model (Ministry of Skill 
Development and Entrepreneurship 2016). 
While most 
studies agree 
that the rate of 
out-migration 
of men from 
rural areas is 
around 5 per 
cent, there is 
disagreement 
about whether 
this is high 
or low.
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The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is the largest programme 
of its kind in the world and has undoubtedly had 
a major effect on the lives of millions of people in 
the country. A survey of the entire literature on the 
programme is beyond the scope of this report (see 
Sukhtankar (2016) for a survey of the economics 
research on the programme). Here we will try and 
present a broad picture of the importance of the 
programme.
As of 2014-15, more than 121 million households 
were registered under the programme and more 
than 2 billion person days of jobs were generated. 
Over the last decade of its existence, MGNREGA has 
led to an increase in market wages and a decrease 
in short-term migration. It has provided insurance 
against rainfall shocks and offered higher than 
market wages to women  (Imbert and Papp 2015; 
Imbert and Papp 2018).
However, there are important problems in the 
implementation that are reducing the potential gains 
that could be obtained from the programme. The most 
important one is that despite the programme having 
been designed as demand-driven and to provide work 
to whoever demands it, it is actually supply-driven. 
This implies that jobs are given as and when funds 
are available, or when the administration is able to 
implement projects. This leads to rationing of jobs, 
that is, the provisioning of jobs to only a fraction of 
the people who demand it. The proportion of job 
applicants who did not get a job has been estimated to 
be as high as 40 per cent (Dutta, Murgai, and Ravallion 
2012). This does not include under-provisioning where 
the number of days of employment provided was less 
than asked for.
The supply-driven nature of the programme leads to 
other problems. The budget for the programme has 
been reducing. In real terms, the budget in 2018-19 
was less than that in 2009-10.  Further, wages are 
no longer linked to the Minimum Wages Act and 
are now lower than the statutory minimum wage in 
many states in violation of the Act (Narayanan and 
Pothula 2018). Variability of job provision has reduced 
the impact it could have had on wages (Bahal and 
Shrivastava 2016). And as with any other government 
programme, this programme too has been afflicted 
with corrupt practices of various kinds (Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar 2013).
Narayanan, Dhorajiwala, and Golani (2018), in their 
SWI background paper, examine one particular 
problem that has a huge impact on the beneficiaries 
of the programme, namely, delay in payment of 
wages. The paper finds in its analysis of more than 9 
million transactions over 10 states that only 21 per 
cent of payments were made on time. According to 
the Act, a compensation for delay in payment needs 
to be paid if the delay is beyond 15 days. Narayanan 
et al. show that the mechanism for the payment of 
this compensation is flawed at multiple levels. The 
compensation amount is a paltry 0.05 per cent of 
the wage for each day of delay and there is arbitrary 
power to accept or reject the compensation amount 
in the hands of the Programme Officer at the block 
level. Out of all the payments that were delayed, the 
compensation was calculated only partially in 47 per 
cent of the cases whereas it was not calculated at all in 
32 per cent of the transactions. 
The MGNREGA has played, and is still playing, a 
very important role in the lives of rural workers in 
the country. The direction in which the government 
decides to take the programme has to be keenly 
observed and critically analysed at every stage.
Box 2.6 / The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
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2.6 / Conclusion
The key point that surfaces in this chapter is the 
level of unemployment, and its high incidence 
among young educated men. This situation 
becomes more grievous as it occurs along with 
a low and falling rate of labour participation. 
Evidently the GDP growth of the country has 
not been able to create enough jobs, so this 
calls for other measures specifically targeted 
at creating employment. A starting point could 
be to have a clear employment policy for the 
country. We will discuss this and some other 
possible measures in the concluding chapter of 
the report.
The labour force participation rate is low in 
India, primarily due to the low participation 
of female workers. This is worrying by itself 
as working outside the house leads to better 
bargaining power for women that in turn 
produces better outcomes for children. 
Irrespective of what is causing this low 
participation rate, an improvement in this 
seems critical for the country to benefit from 
its demographic dividend in the form of a large 
working age population.
Another reason for low labour force 
participation is that increasing numbers of 
young people are taking up higher education. 
This defers the employment problem but 
makes it more challenging as these graduates 
would eventually look for jobs that are 
commensurate to their education and training. 
The employability of these graduates remains 
questionable and the government is making a 
number of efforts to provide ‘skills’ to workers 
to increase their employability. It may be time 
to rethink our understanding of skill and how it 
can be provided when most training happens 
on the job. Recognition of prior learning and 
stipend-driven or night classes could be some 
policy options to be considered.
Migration is a reality of the modern 
development process and a clear employment 
policy, that deals with it either by creating more 
jobs in rural areas or by providing support to 
urban migrants to reduce some of the negative 
effects on the migrants as well as those 
remaining behind, is required.
In the next chapter we analyse the current 
patterns of employment across sectors, states, 
and industries to assess the nature of the 
structural change that India is undergoing. 
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Where Is the Work?
Employment across Sectors, Industries and States
Chapter 3
Almost the entire increase of 
manufacturing employment between 1993 
and 2004 was in the unorganised sector. 
On the other hand, between 2004 and 
2011, increase in organised employment 
accounted for most of the net increase in 
manufacturing employment. 
- Thomas and Johny (2018)
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The question of job creation is closely connected to the question of structural change. Aggregate employment cannot 
be the only focus of employment policy in 
a country like India, which is undergoing a 
transformation from an agricultural economy 
to an industrial economy. 
We can think of structural change in terms 
of two interrelated processes— the Kuznets 
process (named after Simon Kuznets) and the 
Lewis process (named after Arthur Lewis). The 
first entails the movement of workers away 
from agriculture and related occupations, 
to manufacturing and service activities. The 
second involves the linked movement of the 
workforce from micro and small-scale informal 
or unorganised economic activities where 
labour is underemployed, to larger, formal 
or organised ones. This leads, eventually, 
to a depletion of surplus labour and rising 
wages. These two transitions have historically 
been the route towards a modern economy 
and sustained per-capita income and wage 
growth. To this traditional understanding 
of development, we must add important 
considerations of equity and sustainability. 
In this chapter we primarily address the 
Kuznets process and assess the extent of 
decline in the agricultural workforce and the 
extent of increase in the total non-agricultural 
3.1 / Taking Stock of the 
Kuznets Process
3.1.1 / 2004-2011 versus 2011-2015
Agriculture and allied activities still support 47 per 
cent of the labour force even though their share 
in GDP has fallen to 18.5 per cent. On the other 
hand, services account for more than 50 per cent 
of GDP but only 30 per cent of employment . The 
mismatch between share of employment and 
share of output across the three main sectors is 
a long-standing feature of the Indian economy. 
It points to big differences in labour productivity 
or the amount of value added per worker, and 
hence also to differences in wages and living 
standards across sectors. A long standing goal 
of economic policy has been to increase labour 
productivity in agriculture and ensure movement 
of workers away from this sector to eliminate this 
mismatch. However, the mismatch has persisted 
because the economy has not performed up to 
expectations on either front.
workforce.  We also ask which sectors 
are expanding in terms of employment, 
across different states, to what extent the 
agricultural labour force has transitioned into 
manufacturing, construction, or service sector 
occupations, and which industries have been 
relatively better at creating opportunities for 
non-agricultural employment. 
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Figure 3.1 : Structural Transformation over Two Decades
a) Employment
b) Gross Domestic Product
Sources and notes: Employment- NSS-EUS various rounds and LB-EUS 2015. GDP- Table 1.3A ( for 1993-1999, 1999-2004, 2004-
2011) and Table 1.3B ( for 2011-2015) of Economic Survey 2016-17 Statistical Appendix.
Even though the share of the workforce 
engaged in agriculture and allied activities is 
still relatively high, it is also true that it has been 
steadily falling since Independence. Until 2005, 
the rate of decline was small enough that the 
absolute numbers engaged in this sector did 
not fall, rather there was an increase. Since 
2005, the Indian economy has embarked on 
a new phase. Between 2005 and 2011 the 
absolute number of workers in agriculture fell 
by 37 million. This corresponds to a large fall in 
the share of agriculture in total employment in 
this period (Figure 3.1).
While this was generally welcomed as a sign of 
structural change picking up pace, it should be 
noted that the Census of India and the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) give differing accounts in 
Since 2005 
the Indian 
economy has 
embarked on 
a new phase. 
Between 2005 
and 2011 
the absolute 
number. of 
workers in 
agriculture fell 
by 37 million.
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A discrepancy has been observed between the Census of 
India and the NSS as regards the change in the number 
of workers in the agricultural sector between 2000-2001 
and 2011-2012. While the NSS data registered a decline, 
the Census data showed that the population engaged 
in agriculture increased. For example in Bihar, NSS data 
show a decline of 2.4 million workers while the census 
data show an increase of 5.4 million.
This may be because the Census and the NSS have slightly 
differing definitions of who is a worker. The Census 
categories of ‘main’ and ‘marginal’ worker are similar, but 
not identical, to the NSS categories of ‘principal status’ 
and ‘subsidiary status.’ A main worker is someone who 
works for at least six months of the year, while a person is 
considered to work in principal status if he or she worked 
for a ‘relatively large’ part of the year.
Due to this ambiguity and due to an increase in the 
incidence of multiple occupations, particularly farming and 
construction, among the rural poor, it is possible that the 
same workers could have been classified as agricultural 
workers in the Census and construction workers in the 
NSS. Relatedly, the authors note that the states with 
the largest discrepancies are states such as Bihar and 
Jharkhand, who also have a high rate of migration. Male 
migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and 
Odisha who migrated in search of employment numbered 
8.2 million, 4.5 million, 2.5 million, and 1.8 million 
respectively in 2008. Many such migrants are construction 
workers for a few months of the year and are engaged in 
agriculture during the peak seasons. Thus, it is possible 
that the discrepancies between the Census and the NSS 
were a result of this fluidity in occupations. Of course, this 
is only a hypothesis in need of further investigation.
Box 3.1 / Did India’s Agricultural Workforce Really Decline between 2005 and 2012?
Sources and notes: Thomas and Jayesh (2016)
this matter. The number quoted above is from 
the NSS. According to the Census, the number of 
workers in agriculture actually increased during 
this period. It is possible that this discrepancy 
arises from classification errors due to extensive 
overlap between agricultural workers and 
construction workers (see Box 3.1). 
As per the Labour Bureau’s Employment-
Unemployment Survey (LB-EUS), which follows 
the NSS approach, the number of workers in 
agriculture has continued to fall and it fell by 
10 million between 2011 and 2015, the most 
recent year for which data are available. But 
this is a much smaller drop than in the previous 
period. In general the degree of structural 
change is smaller in this period than in the 
preceding one. Part of the explanation may lie 
in the unprecedented high rate of agricultural 
wage growth between 2010 and 2014 (see 
Chapter Four). 
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Another well-known aspect of India’s 
experience is clear in Figure 3.1b. The falling 
share of agriculture in output has largely been 
compensated by a rise in the share of services. 
The secondary sector (Industry) has failed to 
increase its share substantially.
Workers looking for jobs in the non-agricultural 
economy come from three distinct sources. 
First, those who are leaving agriculture to look 
for work elsewhere; second, those who are 
entering the labour force for the first time; and 
third, those who are outside the labour force, 
but are not in education, and would be willing 
to work if work was available. The third group 
consists primarily of women engaged in unpaid 
care and subsistence activities. 
Assuming that the entire working age 
population apart from those in educational 
institutions may be available for work, Thomas 
(2014) has calculated that India’s ‘potential 
workforce’ in industry and services grew by 14.7 
million a year between 2004 and 2011. This 
consists of 10.3 million new workers (additions 
to the working age population annually minus 
those in schools and colleges) and 4.4 million 
who left agriculture.
Was the economy able to create enough 
non-agricultural jobs to accommodate these 
workers? The answer is no. During that same 
period, employment was created in the non-
agricultural sector at the rate of 6.5 million 
a year. Thomas argues that this mismatch 
between the supply of potential workers 
and demand for them is the reason women, 
in particular, have been discouraged from 
entering the labour market. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
labour force participation rate for women 
is comparatively low in India and has been 
falling. Secondary data alone do not allow us 
to address the reasons for this because it does 
not distinguish sufficiently between women 
who are not in paid employment because of 
social restrictions or disproportionate burden 
of unpaid work, or because paid work is not 
available in sufficient quantity. Field studies 
are needed to address this question. The SWI 
background study by Talwar et al (2018) points 
to insufficient work as an important reason (see 
Chapter Five).
However, if we leave the third group of 
potential workers aside, and only consider 
new additions to the labour force and workers 
leaving agriculture, then we find that there was 
a close match between this number on the 
supply side and increase in the non-agricultural 
employment on the demand side. Agricultural 
employment decreased by 37 million, and 14 
million new workers were added to the labour 
force between 2004 and 2011. The workforce 
in the non-agricultural sector increased by 52 
million in the same period. Of course, a large 
part of this is accounted for by the construction 
sector: a point we return to later in the chapter.
The situation looks very different in the past 
few years. Between 2011 and 2015, while the 
number of those leaving agriculture was 12.6 
million and the labour force increased by 14 
million, total employment in the economy 
(all sectors) increased only by 12 million (all 
numbers as per principal and subsidiary status). 
This clearly indicates an inability to create non-
farm employment in the required numbers. 
An indicator of this crisis of employment in the 
non-farm sector is that the number of youth in 
agriculture, that had fallen between 2004 and 
2011 — from 87 to 61 million — has increased 
again to 85 million after 2011 (Mehrotra 2018). 
The fact that total employment in agriculture 
fell while the number of youth increased, 
means that it is mostly older workers who 
left agriculture to take up other work. It is 
possible that this has occurred because youth 
are reluctant to take up menial work. Taken 
together with rising levels of formal education 
and rising aspirations for non-agricultural 
work, this points to a serious problem in the 
immediate future.
Between 2011 
and 2015 while 
the number of 
those leaving 
agriculture 
was 12.6 
million, and 
the labour force 
increased by 14 
million, total 
employment in 
the economy 
increased only 
by 12 million.
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3.1.2 / From Agriculture 
to Construction
3.1.3 / The Continued Importance 
of Agriculture
The second major concern as regards the 
transition from agriculture to the non-
agricultural economy is that the sector that has 
proved most effective in creating employment is 
neither manufacturing, nor services, but rather 
construction. Between 2004 and 2011, while the 
share of manufacturing in total employment 
increased marginally from 11.7 to 12.6 per cent, 
and that of services from 23.4 to 26.8 per cent, 
the ‘non-manufacturing’ section which consists 
of construction and utilities increased its share 
from 6.4 per cent to 11.7 per cent. Today, 
construction employs almost as many workers 
as the entire manufacturing sector — around 
50 million. But unlike manufacturing, it affords 
seasonal and non-steady employment.
In fact, both in employment as well as output 
terms, the rise of construction has been 
spectacular. Growth rate of output in this sector 
was around 4 per cent in the 1970s and 1990s. 
Between 1993 and 2004 it shot up to 8 per cent 
and reached 11.5 per cent between 2004 and 
2011. As a result of this increased growth, as 
well as a high employment elasticity of output 
(that is, and large proportionate increase 
in employment with an increase in output), 
employment in construction sector increased 13 
times during the past four decades. Its share in 
rural employment has gone from 1.4 per cent in 
1972 to 10.7 per cent in 2011 (Mehrotra 2018). It 
is the largest rural employer after agriculture.
However, there was a considerable slowdown 
in employment growth in this sector after 
2011. This is an important reason behind the 
general slow growth of employment in the non-
agricultural sector during this period, that we 
have commented on previously. 
The most recent data from the Central Statistical 
Organisation for the first quarter of 2018 
indicate a revival of growth in this sector as well 
as in manufacturing. The employment effects 
are expected to be positive but job data are not 
yet available at the time of writing this report.
It cannot be emphasised enough that in the short 
to medium-run, the single largest employer in 
India will continue to be agriculture. With this 
in mind, the current government had made a 
promise to double farm incomes by 2022. This 
calls for increased public support in the form 
of infrastructure and extension services as well 
as implementation of other recommendations 
of the National Commission on Farmers 
(Swaminathan 2006). The large-scale protests by 
farmers in 2017-2018 as well as the continued 
electoral potency of farm-loan waivers, and the 
Minimum Support Price issue point to importance 
as well as the urgency of raising farm incomes.
The crisis in agriculture manifesting ultimately 
in the tragic phenomenon of farm suicides, is 
very well-documented. Its principal causes are 
also well-known and have been known for years: 
ever decreasing size of holdings, predictably 
rising costs of production, unpredictable output 
prices, political economy of the value chain, and 
a woeful lack of public investment. Further, it 
appears that Indian agriculture has now entered 
an era of surpluses, which has brought its own 
share of problems including periodic glut and 
collapsing incomes.
In the early 1990s public investment in agriculture 
was around 3.8 per cent of GDP. Since then it has 
steadily fallen. The 2005-06 budget noted that it 
had fallen from 2.2 per cent in the late 1990s to 
1.7 per cent in 2004-05. While the share in GDP 
has gone up from its 2005 low, it is still well below 
the level reached in the early 1990s.
Given the extensive Swaminathan Commission 
report as well as many other studies, our 
problem is not lack of knowledge on what needs 
to be done to revive the rural economy. The 
really important issue is reimagining agriculture 
as a sector that can create remunerative, 
environmental-friendly jobs. This has two parts to 
it. One is the movement of part of the agricultural 
workforce to other sectors. The other equally 
important leg of the two-legged approach is 
better public support to this sector. We return to 
this issue in the concluding chapter of the report.
Construction 
employs 
almost as 
many workers 
as the entire 
manufacturing 
sector - around 
50 million.
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3.2 / State-Level 
Structural Change
Indian states differ vastly in their experiences of 
structural change. Figure 3.2 shows the share 
of a state’s workforce (by principal status) in 
four major sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, 
construction, and services. Note that the scale 
on each map is different since shares differ 
widely across sectors. 
While  the general picture is perhaps an 
expected one, there are some surprises also. 
For example, Punjab, often thought of as 
a primarily agricultural state has a smaller 
proportion of its workforce in agriculture than 
any other state in north and central India. With 
respect to manufacturing, the presence of 
West Bengal in the same category as Gujarat 
and Tamil Nadu may come as a surprise. The 
explanation is that West Bengal has a large 
Figure 3.2 : Share of the Workforce in Various Sectors across States
66 - 75 56 - 65 46 - 55 36 - 45
26 - 35 16 - 25 5 - 15
26 - 30 21 - 25 16 - 20
11 - 15 6 - 10 0 - 5
66 - 75 56 - 65 46 - 55
36 - 45 26 - 35 15 - 25
36 - 40 31 - 35 26 - 30 21 - 25
16 - 20 11 - 15 6 - 10 0 - 5
Agriculture Manufacturing
Construction Services
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Scale indicates per cent share. See Appendix Table A3.1 online for data.
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unorganised manufacturing sector. Kerala, 
Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and 
Goa are leaders in service sector employment. 
Finally, major states like Maharashtra, Madhya 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar as well 
as several of the smaller north-eastern states 
still report the majority of the workforce in 
agriculture, bringing to fore the urgency in policy 
interventions that raise incomes in this sector.
Interestingly, there is large variation in the 
construction share of the workforce also, 
indicating that the rise of construction is not a 
national story. In Maharashtra, only around 5 
per cent of the workforce reports construction 
as the principal activity while the figure is closer 
to 20 per cent in Odisha, Bihar, UP, MP, Kerala 
and Rajasthan.
The maps communicate the sense that 
different states are likely to be very different 
in terms of the level of diversification of the 
workforce across the four sectors. In order 
to understand how effective the process of 
structural change has been across states, we 
need to examine the changes in the pattern 
of employment over the past decade. Recall 
that at the national level, the period between 
2011 and 2015 was one of much weaker 
employment generation in the non-agricultural 
sector compared to the previous period. Hence, 
we break the period from 2004 to 2015 into two 
periods, determined by survey availability, 2004 
to 2011 and 2011 to 2015. 
We calculate the compounded annual growth 
rate (CAGR) of employment in agriculture and 
in non-agriculture for the two periods, across 
all states. Figure 3.3 shows this data as a scatter 
plot with the CAGR for agricultural employment 
on the x-axis and the CAGR for non-agricultural 
employment on the y-axis. Data for the 2004-
2011 period are in red and those for the 2011-
2015 period are in blue. Only the large states 
are shown since small states post very large 
growth rates due to small base effects.
Figure 3.3 : Expected Movement of Workers Away from Agriculture Was Seen across All States between 2004 and 
2011 (Red) but Not between 2011 and 2015 (Blue)
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004, 2011, LB-EUS 2015. 2004 to 2011 in red and 2011 to 2015 in blue. Growth rate is calculated as 
the compounded annual rate of growth. Refer the list of state codes. Union Territories have been excluded.
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3.3 / Employment 
Performance of the 
Manufacturing Sector
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the 
manufacturing sector, with special attention to 
its employment creation capacity.
Two questions are important with respect to 
the industry-profile of employment in India. 
First, which are the industries that account for 
most of the employment. And second, which 
industries have been the loci of rapid job 
creation in the recent past. This data needs to 
be interpreted in the context of productivity in 
the different industries. Ideally, one should see 
productivity gains alongside employment gains, 
combined with the sharing of productivity gains 
in the form of rising wages. This will lead to 
rapid increases in employment as well as wages 
and output.
Industries which generate high and inclusive 
growth patterns in most countries tend to be 
those that achieve high levels of productivity 
and which expand the use of inputs in 
tandem. In historical examples of successful 
industrialisation led by export growth, these 
inputs have also reflected the comparative 
advantage of the country. When this has not 
been the case, employment expansion has 
instead been in sectors with low productivity, 
while rapid GDP growth has occurred in 
industries with a low employment elasticity.
Based on several recent studies, cited below 
in context, the following stylised facts can 
be highlighted in the Indian manufacturing 
sector: rising capital intensity of production 
across all industries, low output elasticity of 
employment (around 0.5 or less), growing 
divergence between real wages and labour 
productivity, falling labour share of income, and 
rising proportion of contract workers. Strikingly, 
the first four features are to be found in the 
organised as well as the unorganised sectors. 
The first two have implications for the quantity 
of employment and we discuss them here. The 
other issues are discussed in Chapter Four.
The most salient point to note, from an 
employment perspective, is that this sector 
has failed to expand its employment share 
significantly over the past twenty-five years, 
remaining in the range of 10-13 per cent of 
the workforce. This is low compared to other 
developing countries with similar levels of 
per capita income (Ghose 2016). This poor 
performance has been attributed to distortions 
in labour, capital and land markets, poor 
infrastructure, and inappropriate specialization 
away toward skill intensive activities that do not 
generate jobs commensurate with the nature of 
the labour force (Amirapu and Subramanian 2015).
Notice that in the first period all the states 
are in the top left quadrant, that is, they 
experienced a decline in agricultural 
employment and an increase in non-
agricultural employment. In the second period 
there is much greater variation. Some states 
such as Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana 
and Kerala have seen large decreases in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural workforces. 
At the other extreme Bihar and Assam saw 
an increase in both. But the most worrying 
states are ones that saw large declines in non-
agricultural workforce and small increases in 
agriculture, such as Punjab, Maharashtra, and 
Andhra Pradesh.
Thus it appears that the period from 2004 to 
2011 was much better from the point of view 
of aggregate employment as well as structural 
change than the period from 2011 to 2015. As 
mentioned earlier, the latter period also saw 
higher than average growth of agricultural 
wages. This, together with a slow-down in the 
construction sector may have been responsible 
for a reduced  movement of workers away from 
agriculture.
The period 
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the period from 
2011 to 2015.
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3.3.1 / A New Trend: Rapid Rise in 
Share of Organised Employment
As with the rest of the economy, the 
manufacturing sector is also typically divided 
into organised and unorganised components. 
Organised manufacturing consists of those 
establishments that are large enough to be 
registered under the Factories Act (1947). These 
are typically establishments that employ 10 or 
more workers with electricity, or 20 or more 
workers without electricity, as per the official 
definition. The unorganised subsector is simply 
the residual sector consisting of establishments 
that are not registered under the Factories Act. 
The related distinction between ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ employment (as opposed to 
enterprises) is used to distinguish between 
workers whose jobs are subject to labour 
regulation alongside access to job security 
versus those who have no such access. We 
discuss these distinctions in greater detail in 
Chapter Four.
Traditionally, it is the organised or factory 
sector that has been considered the engine 
of structural change, driving both the Kuznets 
and the Lewis processes by creating mass 
employment in large firms. The conventional 
wisdom in India, until around a decade ago was 
that this sector was mostly stagnant in terms 
of employment. Whatever manufacturing jobs 
were being created, were in the unorganised 
sector. Thomas and Johny (2018) note that 
total manufacturing employment in India 
(according to NSS household surveys) increased 
by 23 million (from 32.2 million to 55.2 million) 
between 1983 and 2004. But organised sector 
employment was mostly stagnant in this 
period. 
The pattern of employment growth from the 
mid-2000s onwards has been very different 
from the pattern observed during the 1980s 
and 1990s. It is the organised component that 
has been increasing sharply even as share 
of the unorganised sector employment has 
shrunk. Enterprise level surveys from NSS 
and factory level data from ASI reveal that 
between 2011 and 2015, both unorganised 
and organised manufacturing employment 
has grown by around 1 to 1.5 million each 
(from 35 to 36 million and from 12.2 to 13.7 
million respectively). As a result, the share of 
the organised sector in total manufacturing 
employment, which was stagnant at around 18 
per cent had shot up to 27.5 per cent by 2015. 
Household surveys also show similar trends 
albeit with differences in the absolute numbers, 
a phenomenon that we comment on later (see 
Table 2 and Figure 1 of Thomas and Johny 
(2018)). Before we take this as a measure of 
success for the Lewis process, note that the 
new jobs were not necessarily formal jobs. 
This was a period of rising contract work in 
manufacturing (see Chapter Four). 
Increasing employment in the organised sector 
does have implications for employment in the 
unorganised sector as well because the two 
are connected to each other via subcontracting 
relationships. Typically, larger factories 
outsource jobs to smaller workshops. Across 
states, the aggregate data show a positive 
relationship between factory employment as 
recorded in ASI and unorganised manufacturing 
employment as recorded in the NSS enterprise 
surveys. Figure 3.4 shows a scatter plot of the 
relationship between share of the organised 
sector and the share of the unorganised sector 
in total non-agricultural employment in 2015. 
The positive relation, which is statistically 
significant, shows that states with a larger 
organised sector also tend to have a larger 
unorganised sector. This relationship can be 
beneficial to the unorganised sector if it creates 
jobs and upgrades technology. However, it 
may also result in ‘sweatshop’ conditions and 
pressure on smaller units to compete for 
jobs by depressing wages (Basole, Basu, and 
Bhattacharya 2015).
The pattern of 
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Figure 3.4: States with a Large Organised Manufacturing Sector Tend to Have a Larger Unorganised 
Manufacturing Sector
Sources and notes: NSS Unincorporated Non-Agricultural Enterprises Survey 2015, ASI Principal Characteristics 2015. Refer list 
of state codes. Union Territories have been excluded.
The departures from the average trend in 
Figure 3.4 are also of interest. For example, 
Odisha and Delhi have the same share of 
factory employment (2 per cent) but Delhi has a 
much higher share of unorganised employment 
in manufacturing. Similarly, Gujarat is also an 
outlier in having a larger than expected share 
of unorganised manufacturing. Sikkim and 
Himachal Pradesh, on the other hand have 
a larger organised share than unorganised. 
This is perhaps expected, given the substantial 
presence of large pharmaceutical, food and 
beverage processing units in those states.
We now analyse the trends in organised 
manufacturing more closely. Figure 3.5 
shows the trend in total factory employment, 
including production workers, supervisors, 
managers, administrative workers, and working 
proprietors, over a 33-year period between 
1982 and 2016. 
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Figure 3.5 : Employment in Organised Manufacturing Has Increased Rapidly in the Last Decade
Sources and notes: ASI NIC-2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years. All employees including supervisory, managerial and 
administrative staff as well as working proprietors have been counted.
It is clear that the experience or performance 
of the organised manufacturing sector over 
the last three decades is not homogeneous. 
Neither can it be cleanly divided into 
pre-reform and post-reform experience (if 1991 
is taken as the reference year for reforms). 
Rather the analysis of aggregate trends reveals 
three distinct sub-periods in the entire period 
from 1983 to 2016. The first period till 1996 is 
characterised by positive employment growth 
(albeit weak), the second period (1996 to 2006) 
displays negative growth and the third period 
(2006 to 2016) shows strong employment 
generation.
What factors may be relevant in explaining 
these differences? Here we can only offer some
initial speculative remarks that need to be 
investigated further (see Basole and Narayan 
(2018) for a more detailed discussion). It is true 
that the early 1980s was a period of declining 
employment and the subsequent increase 
in jobs was weak, leading to the earliest 
discussion on ‘jobless growth’ (Nagaraj 2000). 
However, the transition that took place in 
the mid-1990s is much larger. This decline in 
employment is not an artefact of the coverage 
changes in ASI around this time. Our analysis 
excludes the industries that were dropped from 
coverage and even industries such as apparel, 
that show strong employment growth over the 
entire period, stagnated during this period. 
So far as we know, there is no satisfactory 
explanation for this decline in the literature.
Rani and Unni (2004) analysed output and 
employment trends in three sub-periods from 
1984-85 to 1999-2000, namely 1984-85 to 
1989-90, 1989-90 to 1994-95 and 1994-95 to 
1999-2000. They find employment growth to 
be small but positive in the final period. The 
authors attribute weak employment growth in 
this period to labour law reforms that allowed 
firms with more than 100 workers to retrench 
more easily and to public sector downsizing. 
They also note that by the mid-1990s import 
tariffs had been reduced in most industries 
including consumer goods. Vashisht (2016) also 
discusses the gradually increasing nature of 
trade liberalization in the 1990s, and notes that 
the manufacturing sector downturn became 
more pronounced when quotas on imported 
consumer goods were removed.
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The increase in job creation that started in 
2005-06 has also been widely noted in the 
literature. It is possible that relaxation of 
labour laws over the 1990s and early 2000s 
resulted in a shift away from subcontracting 
work to small firms in the unorganised sector 
to production in-house with contract workers. 
It should also be noted that the growth in 
employment pales in significance when 
compared to the rise in output in the same 
period, indicating a large increase in labour 
productivity. Basole and Narayan (2018) show 
that while employment roughly doubled in this 
period, output went up nearly 15 times. Thus 
the growth elasticity of employment, or per 
cent increase in employment for every per cent 
increase in output, has been low in this sector. 
The average annual elasticity over the entire 
period from 1983 to 2016, excluding two years 
of exceptionally low elasticity (2001, elasticity -5 
and 2013, elasticity -10) was 0.1.
Finally, it is possible that incentives to hide 
workers have reduced and more factories 
are reporting accurate data on number of 
workers. This explanation would suggest that it 
is not more employment but only more visible 
employment that lies behind the trends.
3.3.2 / Analysing an Old Trend: Falling 
Labour Intensity
capital invested in production, has been falling 
steadily in Indian manufacturing over the past 
few decades. Moreover, this trend is observed 
in the unorganised sector as well, even in 
very small firms, such as those operated by a 
single worker or a family. Table 3.1 shows the 
number of jobs created per one crore rupees 
of fixed capital invested in the unorganised 
sector and in the factory or organised sector. 
Family-based enterprises tend to be the most 
labour intensive, followed by own-account 
enterprises (OAEs). This is consistent with the 
view that employment in such businesses 
is a form of income sharing, and that hiring 
decisions are not based on considerations of 
profitability. Establishments, that is, small firms 
that hire a few wage workers each, tend to be 
the least labour intensive in the unorganised 
sector. Once again, this is expected. However, 
it is worth noting that the factory sector differs 
substantially from the unorganised sector as 
a whole and is around 20 times more capital-
intensive than the establishment sector. 
Of course, the biggest takeaway from these 
data is the sharp decline in labour intensity 
regardless of firm type. In fact, the largest 
percentage decline is observed in the family 
enterprise sector, where labour capital ratio for 
2016 is a mere 15 per cent of the ratio in 1995. 
This is followed by the factory sector (24 per 
cent), the establishment sector (28 per cent) 
and finally the OAE sector (42 per cent).As is well-known, labour intensity, or the 
number of workers employed per rupee of 
Year OAE Family Enterprises Establishments Factory
1994 1559 4615 877 33
1999 1525 2157 679 16
2005 1784 2320 544 16
2010 968 1073 382 11
2015 656 702 248 8
Sources and notes: NSS informal and unincorporated enterprise surveys, various rounds (see Methods for details),  ASI various 
years. OAE – own-account enterprise. Fixed capital has been deflated by WPI for machines and machinery (base 2015).
Table 3.1 : Workers per One Crore Invested Capital in Unorganised and Organised Manufacturing
The average 
annual 
elasticity of 
employment 
for the period 
from 1983 to 
2016, excluding 
two years of 
exceptionally 
low elasticity 
was 0.1.
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Figure 3.6 : The Labour-Capital Ratio Has Fallen Continuously in Organised Manufacturing
a) All Industries
b) Selected Industries
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2-digit (EPWRFITS), various years. Labour-capital ratio has been log transformed to display 
trends across industries with different inital values.
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years. Labour-capital ratio = Number of employees / Real fixed 
capital.
In case of the factory sector, the ASI data offer 
a high frequency annual series to examine 
the trends in labour intensity. We see that 
this sector has experienced a secular fall 
in the labour capital ratio from around 90 
workers per one crore of investment (2015 
rupees) in 1983 to 8 workers in 2016 (Figure 
3.6). A rapid decline in the 1980s and 1990s is 
followed by a slower decline in the 2000s. It is 
possible that a ‘floor’ of sorts has been reached 
in the substitution of capital for labour at the 
aggregate level.
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The decline in labour intensity at the aggregate 
level can be due to a decline within each 
industry. But it can also be a result of relatively 
more rapid output growth in more capital 
intensive industries. The latter mechanism is 
suggested by both Kannan and Raveendran 
(2009) and ILO (2009) as a mechanism for 
jobless growth. The argument is that rising 
inequality results in greater demand for 
manufactured commodities that are products 
of relatively more capital-intensive as well 
as more import-intensive industries. These 
include metal and chemicals-based products, 
electronics, or vehicles. The resulting growth of 
such industries causes a shift in the aggregate 
capital-labour ratio. Of course, the two 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and 
both may occur at the same time. 
Several studies indicate that the first 
mechanism  is the dominant one. For one, 
the capital labour ratio has increased in 
capital intensive as well as labour intensive 
industries (Kapoor 2015; Sen and Das 2015). 
Figure 3.7b shows the decline in the labour-
capital ratio for a range of labour and capital 
intensive industries. Basole and Narayan 
(2018) perform a shift-share decomposition 
analysis that separates the falling labour 
capital ratio into two components: fall in the 
ratio within an industry (at 3-digit level of the 
National Industrial Classification or NIC) and 
relatively faster growth of less labour intensive 
industries. They find that the within-industry 
component dominates for almost every year 
in the sample. This means that the decline in 
labour intensity at the aggregate level is due 
to its falling within each industry rather than 
due to faster growth of more capital intensive 
industries.
As with the analysis of falling labour intensity 
across the unorganised and organised sectors, 
this global fall points to macroeconomic 
changes that have created incentives to 
mechanise across industries and sectors.
3.3.3 / Labour Law Debate: Missing 
Firms or Missing Workers?
The question of employment in the 
manufacturing sector has been dominated by 
the long-standing debate over whether India 
has an overly restrictive labour law regime that 
incentivises firms to substitute workers with 
machines and thereby impedes job creation. 
The argument is that costs of compliance with 
labour laws create incentives for firms to adopt 
machines instead of workers, or to refrain from 
expanding and hiring workers in order to stay 
below the relevant threshold where a particular 
set of legislation starts applying. Thus rising 
capital intensity as well as the preponderance 
of small firms is often attributed to inflexibility 
in labour laws that raise the costs of hiring and 
firing labour. The result is a large number of 
very small firms at one end, followed by large 
firms at the other end with the least density 
of firms in the middle, where labour laws start 
to apply. This ‘missing middle’ has become 
a widely accepted stylised fact of Indian 
manufacturing.
Just over 50 per cent of firms in the organised 
manufacturing sector have 20 workers or less 
as per ASI data. Since large firms (>300 workers) 
pay 76 per cent higher wages than small firms 
(10-19 workers) the size distribution has welfare 
implications. On the other hand, small firms 
are commonly considered to be engines of job 
creation. But contrary to the view that small 
firms create more jobs per rupee invested 
than large firms, Kapoor (2018) finds that it is 
relatively new firms that create jobs. To the 
extent that new firms tend to be small, an age 
effect appears as a size effect. Older small firms 
do not create more jobs than older large firms. 
This finding forms a case for setting up larger 
firms rather than banking on firm growth. 
71
WHERE IS THE WORK?
Indeed, the dominance of small firms in the 
ASI data indicates that the transition from 
a small to a medium to a large enterprise is 
difficult. Or that firms choose to remain small 
due to inbuilt incentive to remain undersized. 
Thus, understanding what holds back Indian 
enterprises of different size groups from 
expanding is critical insofar as the goal of 
generating better paying jobs is concerned.
But are Indian firms really that small and is this 
because of labour legislation? A counter-point 
comes from internationally comparable firm 
surveys such as the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey. The survey shows that while the 
average Indian firm is indeed much smaller 
than an average firm in Bangladesh, India 
is not an outlier when compared to other 
developing countries. This is true for both the 
number of workers per firm and the proportion 
of employers that cite labour legislation as a 
problem (Table 3.2).
Economy Workers per firm
Firms citing 
labour 
regulations as 
problem (%)
Bangladesh 
(2013) 184.9 3.4
Brazil (2009) 37.4 63.2
China (2012) 62.7 1.2
India (2014) 52.4 11.2
Indonesia 
(2015) 21.6 9.9
Kenya (2013) 48.7 20.8
Nigeria (2014) 16.3 3.4
Pakistan (2013) 85.8 12.9
South Africa 
(2007) 51 5.9
Sri Lanka 
(2011) 36.6 12.7
Sources and notes: World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 
various years.
Table 3.2 : Average Firm Size and Percentage of  
Firms Citing Labour Regulations As a Problem across 
Developing Countries
Further, as Sen and Das (2015) point out, the 
level of labour intensity can be accounted for 
by labour regulations but they cannot account 
for falling labour intensity. For this, laws would 
have to become more pro-labour over time, 
which has not happened.
Nagaraj (2018) raises the issue of compliance 
and implementation. He notes that laws may 
be strict on paper but the reality is widespread 
avoidance or evasion of factory registration 
as well as under-reporting of number of 
workers employed. For example, in 1981, as 
per Economic Census, 52 per cent of factories 
employing 10 or more workers that legally 
came under the purview of the Factories Act 
were not registered under the act (Nagaraj 
1999). The ratio went up to 57 per cent in 1991, 
and to 66 per cent in 2013. Thus the proportion 
of firms that avoid getting registered under 
the Factories Act has increased over time and 
smaller firms tend to be more prevalent among 
these (Nagaraj 2018).
There are two related issues here with 
implications for the quality of data on firm size 
and inferences drawn from there. First, firms 
with more than 10 workers who should register 
do not do so. So they do not appear in the ASI 
database since appearance in the sample frame 
is contingent on registration. Second, those 
firms that have more workers than a particular 
threshold number (such as 10, 20 or 100) 
understate their size or hire workers off the 
books. So real size may be substantially higher 
than reported size and actual employment 
higher than employment observed in the data. 
Field studies as well as anecdotal evidence 
support this hypothesis. In other words, it is not 
firms that may be missing so much as workers. 
One important distinction should be made 
here, that between plant or factory size and 
firm size. The ASI data reports the former and 
not the latter. This distinction is important 
because it is possible that a firm will choose to 
grow ‘horizontally’ by setting up a number of 
small factories rather than a large factory, to 
avoid legislative compliance. This is because 
Labour laws 
may be strict 
on paper but 
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laws are based mostly on factory size and not 
firm size. The issue is more important in the case 
of industries where the production technology 
does not display large increasing returns to 
scale, for example, garments and textiles.
If it is indeed the case that there are missing 
workers in manufacturing, then a comparison 
of household-based employment surveys 
with establishment surveys should reveal 
a higher number of workers in the former 
than the latter. The assumption is that unlike 
employers, workers would have no incentive 
to lie about being employed. Table 3.3 shows 
total employment in the manufacturing 
sector (in millions) as well as employment 
disaggregated by organised and unorganised 
sectors from household (NSS-EUS) as well as 
enterprise (NSS and ASI) data. As can be seen, 
estimates of employment derived from the 
household survey are much higher than from 
the enterprise survey. Further, this difference 
arises mainly from the organised segment. The 
organised sector accounted for 75 per cent of 
the undercounting in 2006 and 67 per cent in 
2012 suggesting that ‘missing workers’ may be 
more of an organised sector problem.
It is possible that the phenomenon of ‘missing 
workers’ can partly be explained by the fact 
that a given position in an enterprise may 
be occupied by more than one worker over 
a period of time, resulting in more workers 
than jobs. However, it is more likely due to the 
underreporting of workers on part of firms. 
Another well-known way in which firms have 
adapted to the labour law regime has been to 
expand employment in categories other than 
that of permanent workers, that is, categories 
to whom labour laws do not apply (see Box 3.2). 
For example, the share of contract workers has 
increased sharply during the same period that 
factory employment expanded rapidly. It now 
stands at close to 30 per cent. Contract workers 
accounted for 44 per cent of the additional 
employment between 2000 and 2014.  Firms 
use non-permanent workers to stay below 
the threshold size and thereby avoid costs 
attributed to larger firm size. The intensity in 
the use of contract workers is highest for firms 
in the 50-99 size group (Ramaswamy 2013). We 
take up the implications of this for quality of 
work in Chapter Four.
Two SWI background papers take a close look 
at labour regimes in Indian manufacturing. 
Thomas and Johny (2018) examine the 
garment industry in Bangalore, while Amit 
and Nayanjyoti (2018) undertake extensive 
fieldwork on labour relations in the Gurgaon-
Manesar industrial belt.
Karnataka has the highest number of factory 
employees in the garment industry among all 
Indian states. Within Karnataka, the largest 
concentration of garment factories is in 
Bangalore Urban District, with an employment 
of almost 400,000 workers employed in 
the formal sector. There were 750 garment 
factories in Bangalore’s urban and rural districts 
combined in 2015-16. The number of workers 
per factory ranges from 10 (the smallest as 
per the requirements to register a factory) 
to 9500. Garment factories in Karnataka are 
larger compared to the rest of India with 
respect to the size of employment. In 2014-15, 
the average number of workers per garment 
factory was 471 in Karnataka compared to 
national average of only 112.
Household Enterprise
Year Total Organised Unorganised Total Organised Unorganised
2004/2005 47.7 14.9 32.7 45.2 8.8 36.4
2010/2011 54.3 19.1 35.2 47.1 12.2 34.9
Sources and notes: NSS EUS, Enterprise Surveys, various years, and ASI, various years. All numbers in millions.
Table 3.3 : Comparison of Employment in Manufacturing Estimated from Household and Firm Surveys
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The authors find that employers have different 
ways of circumventing labour regulations, the 
enforcement of which is also weak. None of the 
employers in the study found inspections from 
labour officers as a major cause of concern. 
For example, as per contract, workers have 
to be paid Provident Fund (PF) and gratuity. 
They are eligible for gratuity if they complete 
five continuous years with a single employer. 
However, workers reported that the employers 
encouraged them to terminate their current 
contract and claim PF benefits just before 
completing five years. The workers rejoin the 
same factory within a week or so on a new 
contract. This significantly reduces the labour 
bill for employers. The authors also found that 
the law mandating public holidays is being 
flouted. Workers are required to work on 
Sundays to compensate for a public holiday.
Informalisation of work in the formal sector 
like automobiles has shifted the burden 
of production from permanent to various 
categories of temporary workers. Permanent 
workers have been a small minority of 
workforce. Their union, thus, has less control 
over production. The new categories of 
workers like Diploma trainee, Student trainee, 
Diploma Apprentices are not even recognised 
as ‘workers’ and thus have minimal connection 
with the union process.
Contrary to popular perception, it appears that 
capital intensive industries are more reliant 
on contract workers than labour intensive 
industries. Contract workers constituted 37 per 
cent of total workers in Chemicals and 47 per 
cent of total workers in Motor Vehicles while in 
Textiles and Apparel the corresponding figures 
were 20 per cent and 15 per cent respectively 
(Kapoor 2018).
Nagaraj (2018) argues that the current labour 
law regime does not serve the purpose of 
either workers or entrepreneurs. A multitude 
of laws with overlapping jurisdiction give 
the impression of high bargaining strength 
of organised labour. But this in principle 
situation meets the reality of a large pool of 
surplus labour willing to work at subsistence 
wages. This gives power to employers, whose 
interests lie in circumventing the seemingly 
strict labour laws resulting in numerous 
loopholes. The author suggests that a way 
out of the dysfunctional regulatory regime 
is to simplify the laws, along with their strict 
enforcement. But there is very little support for 
such pragmatic reforms because workers and 
employers favour the status quo, as a time-
tested low-level equilibrium.
The new 
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The Bangalore garment industry offers a microcosm 
within which the diverse issues involved in improving job 
quality and quantity can be appreciated. The industry is 
a large employer, employing around 400,000 workers in 
Bangalore alone. But it is also well-known for poor pay 
and working conditions. The average monthly salary after 
provident fund deduction is ₹ 7000 to 9000. Abuse from 
supervisors and other forms of harsh labour control are 
also common. As a result, turnover is high. The owner of 
a large firm employing more than 5000 workers, reported 
an attrition rate of 8-10 per cent a month. That is, almost 
their entire workforce is replaced in a year.
Some pressure on improving job quality comes from 
Karnataka’s state laws on minimum wages as well as 
from multinational garment brands (including fast 
fashion brands like Zara and H&M) who are keen to avoid 
negative publicity. This has meant, for example, that 
migration has not been a major source of labour supply 
because the housing conditions for migrant workers come 
under scrutiny.
Manufacturers are considering relocation, which is 
relatively easy in the industry, given its low levels of capital 
per worker, as a strategy to overcome the problems 
of labour supply, increasing wages and unions. Some 
of Bangalore’s manufacturers have begun to relocate 
their factories to rural areas of Karnataka and also to 
Andhra Pradesh (Hindupur) and Jharkhand. One of 
the manufacturers mentioned that they have begun 
relocating to African countries as well, where the labour 
costs are much lower. This firm has already set up ‘sheds’ 
in Ethiopia.
At the level of trade policy, there has been a sharp 
reduction in the amount of import duty that the 
government waives for export-oriented industries. For the 
apparel industry, this was reduced from 7.3 per cent to 
2 per cent in 2017. Exporters in Bangalore complain that 
the reduction in duty rates has come as a shock when 
they are already facing severe competition from the global 
market. 
A second, expected headwind to job creation is of course, 
automation. One of the manufacturers interviewed 
mentioned that machines could downsize the workforce 
needed to stitch a garment by more than half.
Another possible strategy for the garment manufacturers 
is to produce for the domestic market and develop and 
market their own brands – rather than being suppliers 
to global brands in export markets. By entering into 
marketing of their products, firms get to keep a larger 
share of the value added. However, gaining entry into 
the markets by selling their own brands requires huge 
marketing expenditure, which is difficult for small firms.
Not surprisingly, the study concludes that government 
support is crucial for the future growth and survival of 
the industry. One of the ways in which the government 
can attract investments while ensuring labour welfare is 
by providing wage subsidies. Arvind Limited has recently 
signed an MoU with the Gujarat government to set up 
a mega apparel facility in that State, which will create 
employment for women workers with the help of wage 
subsidies from the government.
Box 3.2 / The Challenge of Job Quantity and Quality- The Case of Bangalore Garments
Sources and notes: Thomas and Johny (2018) and http://www.financialexpress.com/market/commodities/headwinds-hit-readymade-garment-
exports-in-april-september/905317/
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We now go beyond the aggregate trends to 
identify which industries did better at job 
creation. Figure 3.7 shows employment trends 
in the same set of selected industries as Figure 
3.6. The data have been indexed to the first 
year (1983) in order to show the growth rate. 
The apparel, plastics, and footwear industries 
have grown the fastest in terms of employment. 
Focusing on the below-average performers in 
this set, we see that there is substantial diversity 
in their performances. Some, such as furniture, 
have more than doubled their employment 
over the period while others such as textiles 
registered an absolute decline in employment 
(Figure 3.7b).
The next question is how does employment 
growth relate to change in output, and is it 
accompanied by increases in productivity and 
wages? We approach this question in two ways. 
First we take a look at the RBI Capital-Labour-
Energy-Materials-Services (RBI-KLEMS) data on 
the relationship between growth in the value 
added and growth in employment. This data has 
an important limitation that many industries 
that have performed quite differently from one 
another are grouped together. Hence it should 
be interpreted carefully and in combination with 
other more disaggregated sources. To address 
this issue we use ASI data at a finer level (3 digit 
NIC) to ask which industries delivered both job 
growth and wage growth.
Figure 3.8a shows a scatter plot of growth in 
value-added versus growth in employment 
between 2011 and 2015 for various 
manufacturing industries plus construction. 
Each bubble represents an industry and the 
size of the bubble signifies the share of that 
3.3.4 / Better and Worse Performing 
Manufacturing Industries
industry in total employment. The horizontal 
and vertical lines represent median values 
of employment and value-added growth 
respectively. Overall we find weak correlation 
between growth of value-added and 
employment growth over this period.
For example, the construction industry 
accounted for a large share of employment in 
2011 and subsequently grew fast in terms of 
jobs but much more slowly in terms of value 
added, placing it at the top left of the scatter 
diagram. Other large manufacturing employers 
such as Textiles, Garments and Leather (TGL) 
as well as Food, Beverages, and Tobacco (FBT) 
have registered strong output growth but 
weak or even negative employment growth. 
The presence of only two industries in the 
top right quadrant indicates that hardly any 
industries have registered rapid growth along 
both dimensions. The exceptions are rubber 
and plastic products, and machinery, both of 
which posted above median growth on both 
dimensions. Otherwise, industries that have 
shown rapid growth in share of value added 
have not shown high employment growth even 
when they are relatively more employment 
intensive. And those that have shown rapid 
employment growth have shown low growth in 
value added.
As mentioned earlier, the RBI-KLEMS data is 
at a level of aggregation that hides important 
variation. Basole and Narayan (2018) use ASI 
data over a longer period (1982 to 2015) and at 
more disaggregated NIC 3-digit level to classify 
manufacturing industries into better or worse 
performers along two dimensions, employment 
elasticity and wage growth. As noted earlier, 
the period after 2006 stands out as one during 
which organised manufacturing posted much 
faster employment growth than seen in any 
preceding period going back to 1982.
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Figure 3.7 : Employment Growth in the Organised Manufacturing Sector
a) Selected Industries
b) Below-Average Performers among Selected Industries
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2-digit (EPWRFITS), various years.
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Figure 3.8 : Output Has Not Been Correlated with Employment Growth
a) Industry
b) Services
Sources and notes: RBI-KLEMS 2011 and 2015. Compounded annual growth rates are shown. Size of the bubble represents 
employment share in 2011. Lines represent median values. TGL refers to Textiles, Garments and Leather, and FBT refers to Food, 
Beverages and Tobacco.
STATE OF WORKING INDIA 2018
78
Focusing on this most recent ten-year period 
(2006 to 2016) we can categorise industries as 
follows: 
• Type A: Above median wage growth and 
elasticity
• Type B: Above median wage growth and 
below median elasticity
• Type C: Below median wage growth and above 
median elasticity
• Type D: Below median wage growth and 
below median elasticity
These types can be identified in Figure 
3.9 which plots the employment elasticity 
against wage growth. Only industries with an 
employment share greater than the median 
value are shown for clarity. Larger bubbles 
indicate higher employment shares (in 2015). 
Figure 3.9 : Most Industries in Organised Manufacturing Have Experienced Wage Growth or Job Growth over the 
Last Decade. A Few Have Seen Both.
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) 2006 and 2016. Growth rate is calculated by regressing log real wage rate on 
time. Elasticity is calculated by regressing log employment on log output. Size of the bubble represents employment share in 2006. 
Only industries with weight greater than 1% are displayed. Lines represent median values.
Type A Type B Type C Type D
Footwear
Processing of meat, 
fish, fruits and 
vegetables
General purpose 
machinery Tobacco
Plastics Grain, mill products Special purpose machinery Dairy
Knitwear Other food products Basic chemicals
Metal products Apparel Electrical appliances
Textiles Motor vehicle parts and accessories
Paper Beverages
Casting of metals
Table 3.4 : Typology of Manufacturing Industries
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Clearly, several more industries have posted a 
mixed performance than an all-round positive or 
negative one. However, it is worth emphasizing 
that in the 10 year period, large employers 
such as footwear, knitwear, and plastics have 
displayed above median wage growth as 
well as employment growth in the organised 
manufacturing sector. Of course, it is possible that 
this has come at the expense of employment in 
the unorganised sector. The ASI data does not 
allow us to comment on this aspect.
On a more mixed note, employment-intensive 
industries such as food processing, textiles,
and apparel have shown weak capacity for 
employment generation while posting higher than 
median rates of wage growth. The opposite is the 
case for machinery, electrical appliances, vehicle 
parts, basic chemicals, and beverages where job 
creation has been strong but wage growth has 
been low or even negative. 
Note that it is the relatively more capital intensive 
industries that have posted stronger employment 
growth, and the more labour intensive industries 
that have shown stronger wage growth. This is 
a counter-intuitive finding that needs further 
investigation. 
Another related and counter-intuitive finding is 
that apparel and knitwear and footwear were 
also the industries that performed better than 
average in translating productivity growth into 
wage growth. This result is surprising given the 
reputation of these industries for sweat shop 
conditions. We discuss this further in 
Chapter Four.
3.3.5 / The Performance of the 
Unorganised Manufacturing Sector
As noted earlier, until 2005, most manufacturing 
employment growth occurred in the 
unorganised sector. Despite the organised 
sector picking up pace since 2006, the majority 
of the manufacturing workforce remains in the 
unorganised sector. The Lewis process is thus 
far from finished.
Here it is important to distinguish between the 
relatively more modern and profit-oriented 
and the relatively more subsistence-oriented 
parts of the unorganised sector. But empirically 
the distinction between subsistence and profit 
oriented enterprises is not easy to make. 
One way to operationalise the difference 
using NSS data on unorganised enterprises 
is to define necessity-driven or subsistence 
entrepreneurship as own-account enterprises 
operated by a single worker or with the help 
of family labour only. On the other hand, 
enterprises operating with at least one hired 
worker can be considered as opportunity-
based entrepreneurship (Daymard 2015). We 
analyse the performance of the unorganised 
manufacturing sector using this framework.
NSS data reveal an ‘infantilisation’ of the sector 
over time, that is, a process wherein smaller 
firms increase their share in the sector. The 
share of own-account enterprises (OAEs) or 
single-worker firms in total firms went up from 
32 per cent in 1994 to 59 per cent in 2015 (Table 
3.5). This increase has come almost entirely at 
the cost of family-based enterprises while the 
proportion of establishments (enterprises that 
hire at least one wage worker) has not changed 
over the entire period. While a decline in family-
run enterprises may be desirable in so far as 
they may employ unpaid workers and child 
labour, job creation in this sector has mostly 
been in the form of subsistence-oriented rather 
than profit-oriented firms. 
Coming to the share of these enterprises in 
total workers in this sector, once again we see a 
large gain in the share of own-account workers. 
However, establishments have also increased 
their share of workers over the entire period, 
barring the most recent five-year period. Both 
these types of enterprises have gained workers 
at the expense of family enterprises. The fact 
the establishments have increased their share 
of workers without substantially increasing 
their share in firms indicates that there has 
been an increase in the size of the average 
establishment.
Lastly, single-worker firms are much less 
productive than establishments. In 2015, they 
accounted for 35 per cent of workers but 
only 29 per cent of value added in this sector. 
Establishments on the other hand accounted 
for 35 per cent of workers but 54 per cent 
Large 
employers such 
as footwear, 
knitwear, and 
plastics have 
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of value added. Single worker firms are three 
times more likely to be home-based and have 
one-tenth the asset base of establishments. 
Establishments are nearly two times more 
productive in terms of value added per worker 
(Table 3.6). This points to a factor misallocation 
similar to that observed between agriculture and 
the rest of the economy, and is an indicator of the 
presence of surplus labour in the OAE and family-
firm sector.
There is some heterogeneity in the different 
periods as to which type of enterprises created 
more jobs. In the most recent five-year period 
for which data are available (2010 to 2015), 
the output elasticity of employment for OAE 
or single-worker firms was 0.1 while that for 
establishments was -0.63. This period, as noted 
before, has been one where the unorganised 
sector employment has not grown. Thus the low 
numbers are not surprising. But it is certainly a 
matter of concern that the establishment sector 
lost jobs in the period. Unni and Naik (2018) 
find that more than half of the unorganised 
enterprises were contracting for the three years 
prior to 2016.
Given the continued dominance of micro 
enterprises in the unorganised sector, whose 
size lies far below the threshold where labour 
laws apply, an important area of study is what 
constrains the growth of firms in this sector.
Distribution of firms 
across firm types (%)
Distribution of total workers 
across firm types (%)
Distribution of GVA 
across firm types (%)
Year OAE Family Est. OAE Family Est. OAE Family Est.
1994 32 54 14 12 62 26 18 32 50
1999 44 43 13 24 47 28 23 32 45
2005 40 46 14 21 43 36 15 25 60
2010 53 31 16 29 32 40 23 19 58
2015 59 26 15 35 29 35 29 18 54
Sources and notes: NSS Enterprises Survey, various years. Est. refers to Establishment. See Methods chapter for details.
Sources and notes: NSS Enterprises Survey, various years. See Methods chapter for details.
Table 3.5 :  Distribution of Firm Types in the Unorganised Manufacturing Sector 
Table 3.6 :  Employment Elasticities by Firm Type 
Year OAE Family Enterprises Establishments
1994-1999 0.75 -1.25 -0.79
1999-2005 -0.92 1.13 0.63
2005-2010 0.24 -1.20 0.14
2010-2015 0.12 -0.52 -0.64
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3.4 / A Preliminary Analysis 
of the Service Sector
Rapid diffusion of technology as well as 
constraints placed on the manufacturing sector 
by trade (such as having to compete on low unit 
costs) have meant a rapid mechanization or 
increasing capital intensity across industries, as 
we saw earlier. The resulting rise in productivity 
means that fewer and fewer workers are needed 
to produce the same value of goods. As a result, 
India and many other developing countries 
are showing a tendency towards a declining 
importance of manufacturing in employment.
In the past few years there has emerged a 
considerable body of work that argues for 
services as the new engine of structural 
transformation, with India being a leading 
example of this phenomenon. Since 2004 
the share of service sector employment has 
increased from 23.4 per cent to 30.2 per 
cent. Just between 2011 and 2015, absolute 
employment in services jumped from 36 million 
to nearly 52 million for youth, and for all labour 
from 127 to 141 million (Mehrotra 2018). 
Employment elasticities for both agriculture and 
industry were negative in this period but that of 
services was positive at 0.3.
However, before we welcome this development, 
it is necessary to know how much of this 
employment was created in the subsistence 
or informal part of the service sector and how 
much in the organised part. In this respect a 
major problem is a lack of data. The government 
plans to introduce an Annual Survey of Services 
along the lines of the ASI, but this decision is yet 
to be implemented at a national level. Hence, 
the data for this section comes primarily from 
the NSS unorganised sector surveys (conducted 
every five years) and the Labour Bureau’s 
Quarterly Employment Surveys (QES) that 
include a few key service industries.
The RBI-KLEMS data can be used, as in the case 
of manufacturing, to identify service industries 
that have experienced above median value-
added and employment growth (Figure 3.18b). 
The median rate of growth of value added 
is nearly three times that of employment in 
services, as opposed to twice in manufacturing. 
Most service industries have seen robust value-
added growth, but employment growth has 
been much more variable. There are some large 
service sector employers that have performed 
poorly in terms of employment growth, for 
example, public administration and trade. 
Almost all others, with the exception of finance 
and business services (both relatively small 
employers), have shown weak job growth.
As per the most recent available estimates 
from the QES, the major organised service 
industries namely, trade, transport, hotels and 
restaurants, IT/BPO, Education, and Health 
together employed an estimated 10.5 million 
workers. This is a small increase since the first 
quarter of 2016 (the first instalment of the new 
QES series with an enlarged sample), when the 
employment in these industries was at 10.04 
million (Figure 3.10).
Figure 3.10 : Employment in Selected Organised Service Industries
Sources and notes: LB-QES, 2017 3rd quarter report.
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Figure 3.11 :  Share of Organised Employment is Less than a Quarter in All Major Service Industries
Sources and notes: RBI-KLEMS 2016, LB-QES 2016.
As of 2016, the total employment in the 
services sector stood at 140-150 million. Of 
these approximately 26 million were organised 
sector workers. We arrive at this estimate 
based on employment as of the last quarter 
of 2016 in the LB-QES, which covers the 
organised segment of the following service 
industries: trade, transport, accommodation 
and restaurants, IT/BPO, education, and health. 
To this we add the entire employment reported 
in 2015 for public administration, financial 
service, and post and telecommunications 
(from RBI-KLEMS since these are not covered 
in the QES). Thus we estimate that around 20 
per cent of the service sector labour force was 
in the organised sector in 2015. Figure 3.11 
shows per cent organised versus unorganised 
employment in some key service industries 
for which data is available for 2015 from both 
sources. Trade, hotel, transport are the major 
unorganised industries (with over 90 per cent 
of the workforce in the unorganised sector). 
The service sector is large and diverse. It is very 
important to distinguish between service sector 
occupations that are only disguised forms of 
unemployment, and those that offer a pathway 
to a more prosperous future, for the country as 
well as the individual. 
From the perspective of structural change, a 
useful way to categorise the diverse service 
sector activities is into three large types: the 
surplus sector, the social sector, and the new 
service economy. We treat the unorganised 
segments of trade (mostly petty retail), hotel, 
and transport along with all domestic workers 
as constituting the surplus sector. All of health 
and social work, arts, education, and public 
administration make up the social sector. 
The new service economy, largely organised, 
consists of big retail, hospitality, finance, 
information technology and IT enabled services, 
business process outsourcing, and security 
services. This is not an exhaustive classification 
but together these accounted for 93 per cent 
of service sector employment in 2016. An 
important omission is the burgeoning security 
services industry. Nevertheless, it enables us 
to get a sense of the relative importance of 
each sector in services as well as in the total 
workforce.
Figure 3.12 shows the shares of each 
sector in 2011 and 2016. For example, the 
surplus sector accounts for 55 per cent of 
service sector employment and 17 per cent 
of total employment in the country. With 
manufacturing (organised and unorganised) 
at 11 per cent and construction at 10 per cent, 
the surplus service sector is the single largest 
sector of the economy in terms of employment, 
after agriculture. The social services sector 
accounts for around 23 per cent of service 
sector employment and 7 per cent of total 
workforce, while the new service economy is 
around 15 per cent of the service sector and 4.5 
per cent of the workforce. The share of the new 
service economy has increased between 2012 
and 2016, from 11.5 to 15 per cent and the 
share of the social sector has increased from 22 
to 23 per cent, at the cost of the surplus sector 
(59 per cent to 55 per cent).
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Figure 3.12 :  ‘Surplus’ Industries Account for More than 50 per cent of Service Sector Employment
Sources and notes: RBI-KLEMS 2016, LB-QES 2016. ‘Surplus’ industries refer to industries dominated by self-employment and 
petty production. Education, health, and public administration are considered to be ‘Social’ industries. Finance, IT-BPO, and 
organised retail are defined as ‘New’ service industries. Numbers do not sum to 100 due to exclusion of some industries.
Mehrotra (2018) uses a broader category 
of ‘modern services’ which includes sale/
maintenance of motor vehicles, hotels 
and restaurants, air transport, posts and 
telecommunications, financial intermediation, 
insurance and pension funding, computers and 
related activities and research and development 
to find a ‘silver lining’ in the jobs story, namely, 
the rapid growth of these industries between 
2004 and 2015.
The IT-BPO industry deserves special mention. 
As per the LB-QES, this sector had nearly 4 
per cent of firms reporting more than 5000 
employees in 2016. This is far greater than 
any other sector covered (manufacturing is 
a distant second with 0.26 per cent). Thus, 
despite the much smaller size of the sector vis-
a-vis manufacturing, Information Technology 
and Business Process Management (IT-BPM) 
accounts for 48 per cent of establishments 
above 5000 workers, while manufacturing 
accounts for 52 per cent. To the extent that the 
quality of work improves with firm size, either 
via more regulated labour practices, availability 
of benefits, or through higher productivity and 
wages, IT remains a key service sector industry 
for India’s structural transformation. However, 
from a macroeconomic perspective, its share in 
employment is too small to matter by itself. It 
may also be undergoing a structural shift that 
prevents it from being an engine of job creation 
in the near future (see Box 3.4). 
Since reliable, public data on services are scarce, 
we must make use of industry studies, primary 
field studies, and other reports that appear 
periodically. Thus the National Association of 
Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) 
estimates that as of 2012 there were around 
2.77 million workers employed in IT and BPM. 
Of these 1.3 million, were in IT service exports, 
0.87 million in BPO exports, and 0.6 million in 
domestic IT-BPO.1 The sector has seen 9 per 
cent employee growth and 16 per cent revenue 
growth. Disturbingly, net new hiring in the IT 
services industry fell from 230,000 in FY 2012 
to 100,000 in FY 2018. As a result, there has 
been ‘increased decoupling of revenue and 
headcount lead (sic.) by productivity gains, 
automation solutions, efficiency and onshoring.’ 
(NASSCOM 2017) 
Of particular interest from an employment 
perspective are rapidly growing service 
industries such as security services. Here too, 
adequate data is not forthcoming. As per the 
2015 joint report by Grant Thornton and the 
Federation of Indian Chambers Commerce and 
Industry (FICCI) on Private Security Services in 
India, the security industry employed 7 million 
workers, making it larger than healthcare and 
almost as large as public administration. There 
is an urgent need to collect reliable official 
statistics on such industries. This also brings up 
the issue of social usefulness of newly created 
employment. 
1  https://www.slideshare.net/nasscom/itbpo-sector-in-india-strategic-review-2012.
Despite its 
much smaller 
size IT-BPM 
accounts for 
48 per cent of 
establishments 
with more 
than 5000 
workers, while 
manufacturing 
accounts for 52 
per cent.
STATE OF WORKING INDIA 2018
84
With inequality on the rise, forms of ‘guard 
labour’ (Jayadev and Bowles 2006) are becoming 
more important. This is clearly not a desirable 
development from a social perspective.
A second cautionary note is regarding the social 
service sector. Both health and education, large 
employers, have seen a rapid rise in contract 
work even in the public sector. Mondal et al. 
(2018) comment on the fact that wages of 
anganwadi workers and village healthcare 
workers, mostly women, are much lower 
than those received by regular government 
employees.
In January 2015, Tata Consultancy Services, India’s 
largest software services firm fired approximately 
25,000 software engineers (Narayanan 2015). This 
event inaugurated a new trend in India’s globally 
connected IT industry. In 2017, growing layoffs finally 
sparked national debate (Sridhar 2017). News reports 
and interviews with IT employees confirm that leading 
companies, that only a few years ago were aggressively 
recruiting new employees, are not only hiring in 
relatively small numbers but are actively pushing 
employees out (Narayan 2017; Subramanian 2017).  
A drop in the hiring rates will affect the tens of 
thousands of engineering  graduates who aspire to 
enter the IT workforce as they encounter firms that are 
reluctant to hire in the volumes of the preceding two 
decades.  
The claims and findings presented below are based on 
ongoing research that commenced in 2014 and relies 
on over 100 in-depth interviews with middle managers, 
senior executives and employees and founders of 
technology startups. Apart from this, technology 
journalists, trade analysts, head hunters and emerging 
IT union representatives were routinely interviewed.
1.  Downsizing is not a temporary phenomenon  
but reflective of permanent, structural shifts. 
 
The era of labour-intensive growth in IT is over 
and job creation will occur at a decelerated pace. 
The expansion of India’s IT sector has depended 
on the IT investments that large American and 
European companies make into their own IT 
systems. Quantitative and qualitative shifts in the 
“IT spend’ of client corporations instantly affect the 
firms to which IT development and maintenance 
tasks are subcontracted. Simplifications in the way 
enterprises organise, develop and maintain their 
IT infrastructure implies an erosion of back-office 
IT work that typically has been off-shored. 
 
Cloud computing centralises IT infrastructure and 
enables companies to share computing resources 
(Mosco 2015; Kushida, Murray, and Zysman 2015).  
Secondly, new software programmes automate 
certain labour-intensive tasks such as software 
testing and IT helpdesk functions. Given the 
gradual but undeniably steady shifts in the way 
enterprises across the global economy access 
and consume technology, these effects are best 
understood as structural rather than cyclical.  
2. Restructuring of firms is also contributing to 
 job losses. 
 
New employees (1-5 years of experience) do not 
receive the quick promotions and salary hikes that 
have defined the IT industry. However, their jobs 
are (relatively) protected by the fact that to the 
firm they represent cheap labour at the bottom of 
the pyramid. Mid-career professionals who joined 
Box 3.3 / The State of the IT Industry
Devika Narayan
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the industry roughly in the 2000-2010 period 
bear the brunt of the cost-cutting drive that grips 
today’s firms.  
 
Despite the industry’s attempt to cast the 
irrelevance of the middle managers as an issue of 
skill deficiency, the fact is that middle managers 
are expensive in the eyes of the company. 
These are individuals who have moved up the 
corporate ladder rapidly and now earn between 
15-20 lakhs per year. As it turns out they also 
constitute a large segment of the much celebrated 
IT workforce (Alawadhi and Mendonca 2017). In-
depth qualitative interviews reveal that after losing 
their jobs, these employees find it very difficult to 
find re-employment. They either turn to expensive 
certifications in ‘new technologies’, attempt small-
scale entrepreneurial initiatives, rely on broader 
familial networks or sometimes find lower paying 
jobs. Many continue to spend long stretches of 
time without incomes.    
3. The erosion is not just of the number of jobs but 
also the quality of jobs and working conditions. 
 
IT employees at the large firms are under new 
kinds of pressure. The workplace is a high-
stress environment and working hours often 
extend to 13-15 hours per day. ‘Fresher’ salaries 
have been stagnant for a very long time. New 
management practices such as ‘agile strategies’ 
render employees accountable on a daily and 
weekly basis while making project requirements 
ever-changing. Many interviewees discussed the 
dual pressure they face from their clients as well 
as their own managers (who themselves are at risk 
of losing jobs). The pressure, they say, to produce 
‘more from less’ has never been greater.  
 
4. There are new areas of work that are emerging. 
However these are not labour-intensive and will 
not compensate for the number of jobs reduced. 
 
The boom in technology-intensive start-ups (both 
consumer and business facing) has opened up 
a new area of employment for an educated, 
upwardly mobile, young workforce, particularly 
for highly skilled software engineers – but 
also recruits for sales, marketing and product 
management divisions. Large IT companies are 
also looking to make specialised, targeted hires, 
particularly in areas like cloud security and data 
analytics.  
 
With the erosion of labour-intensive tasks of 
software testing, integration and maintenance, 
hiring will always be modest compared to the 
‘golden years’ of expansion. Start-ups are of 
course much smaller (in terms of employees) and 
aim for high labour productivity (revenue per 
employee). Moreover, it is widely acknowledged 
that this is a volatile sector, fueled by venture 
capital and business models that privilege sales 
and user growth over profitability and therefore 
we can presume that many fledgling companies 
will fail, merge or be acquired.  
 
Given the high demand for niche skills and a lack 
of demand for the ‘generic’ skills of the previous 
era, we see an increasing polarisation of the 
labour market. This polarisation occurs not simply 
along the axis of skill and salaries but other social 
markers. Hires on the top-end tend to come from 
elite institutions (such as the IITs) rather than the 
numerous tier two and three institutions that 
the previous era produced. Further the startups 
are much more homogenous and exclusive from 
the perspective of caste and gender than the 
traditional IT workforce. 
Devika Narayan is a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota – Twin Cities. 
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Traditionally, environmental regulation has been 
perceived to restrict economic growth and job 
opportunities. However, more recent studies indicate 
positive relationships between investments in clean 
energy and job growth, including in India. There are 
three ways to reduce carbon emissions per unit of 
output: using those sources which have lower carbon 
emissions among fossil fuels, increasing use of green 
energy sources, and raising the efficiency of energy use. 
Using Input-Output data and the employment-
unemployment surveys for India, Azad and 
Chakraborty (2018) project employment generating 
capacities for fossil-fuel based and renewable energy 
sectors as well as the energy efficiency sector. They 
also study the distribution of employment generated 
by region, gender, caste, and educational status.
The study finds that investments in a green energy 
program would generate on average almost 2.5 times 
the jobs created through the fossil fuels sector. The 
most labour-intensive sector, bio-energy, can generate 
60 jobs per crore rupees of investment compared 
to 5 jobs for the same amount in the coal industry. 
Weatherisation is estimated to generate around 20 
jobs and public transport around 10 jobs per crore of 
investment. 
The study also finds that the composition of the 
jobs generated in the clean energy sector is more 
favourable to women, Scheduled Castes and Tribes, 
unskilled labourers and rural areas compared to that 
generated by investment in the fossil fuels industry. 
Hence investments in clean energy are more inclusive. 
However, the distribution of green jobs is also more 
skewed in favour of the unorganised sector. The 
authors identify this as a challenge to the clean energy 
programme if it is to result in secure livelihoods.
Box 3.4 / Creating Green Jobs
Sources and notes: Azad and Chakraborty (2018)
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The handloom industry continues to be a major 
employer in India. Though recent data are not 
available, as per the 2009-2010 Handloom Census this 
industry employed 4.3 million workers. West Bengal, 
the focus of a three-district study by Bhattacharya 
and Sen (2018) stands out among Indian states with 
the highest number of looms and highest number 
of weaver households engaged in commercial 
production. The study focuses on Hooghly, Nadia and 
Purba Bardhaman districts and draws on interviews 
conducted with a wide variety of industry actors such 
as weavers, master weavers, panchayat officials, 
cooperative societies, traders, and state officials.  
The authors note that the simple story of decline in 
handloom employment and rise of powerlooms is 
not uniform across regions or over time. The total 
volume of cloth production in the powerloom sector 
as well as its share has fallen since 2012-13, while it 
has risen in the handloom sector. West Bengal and 
North-Eastern states of India showed an increase 
in the number of weaver households between the 
second and third Handloom Censuses, conducted in 
1995-96 and 2009-10 respectively. There has been very 
little growth of powerlooms in handloom-major states 
like West Bengal. Thus, it is not surprising that only 
16.2 per cent of handloom worker households in West 
Bengal perceived powerlooms to be a major threat, as 
compared to 84.6 per cent in Andhra Pradesh and 46.5 
per cent in Tamil Nadu. 
But this does not mean handloom weavers want their 
children to continue in the same occupation. Nearly 85 
per cent of those interviewed explained this reluctance 
as being due to the time-consuming, hard and 
un-remunerative nature of work. The Handloom 
Census revealed that the average annual income of 
handloom worker households in West Bengal was 
only around Rs. 27,000 in 2010. Bhattacharya and 
Sen (2018) find that average earnings are less than 
or only somewhat higher than the MNGREGA wages 
for unskilled labourers, and often lower than the 
daily wages of construction workers or auto rickshaw 
drivers. In the sample, the average weekly earnings of 
a weaver household range from Rs. 500 to Rs. 1000.
Interestingly, however, the recent history of this 
industry is not only of exit, but also of entry along 
with acquisition of skills by new entrants. Weaver 
households have tried to compete by moving on 
to the production of finer cloth that machines 
cannot not imitate easily. This has been a common 
competitive strategy in other places also. In all study 
areas, there is a common complaint of skill deficit due 
to a decline in availability of highly skilled weavers, 
whose products can beat powerloom products. This is 
because older workers find it more difficult to adapt 
to new designs, while younger workers have not been 
taking up the trade. 
Box 3.5 / Change and Adaptation in the West Bengal Handloom Industry
Sources and notes: Bhattacharya and Sen (2018)
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3.5 / Conclusion
The Kuznets process remains slow in India 
with just under half of the workforce still 
in agriculture and allied activities. To the 
extent that there has been a transition from 
agriculture, it has largely been to construction 
and not manufacturing. It is possible that the 
period between 2011 and 2015 was the worst 
in recent years in terms of structural change. 
But lack of comparable data makes it hard to be 
definitive on this matter. There is considerable 
state-level variation in the Kuznets process. 
Some large states such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, 
Punjab and West Bengal have diversified 
economies; others such as Bihar, Maharashtra, 
and Andhra Pradesh, much less so.
The organised manufacturing sector has shown 
a strong turnaround in the past decade in 
terms of its employment generation capacity. 
Several large industries such as footwear, 
knitwear, and plastics have shown good 
employment elasticities as well as wage growth. 
Many others have shown employment growth. 
But job growth in this sector has come at the 
cost of unorganised sector employment and 
the overall share of manufacturing in total 
employment has not increased. Declining 
labour intensity is observed in almost every 
manufacturing industry. But it is unlikely that 
labour laws are responsible for the substitution 
of workers by machines. Indeed, there is strong 
evidence that firms have continued to hire 
workers circumventing the laws.
Lack of data on the service sector makes detailed 
analysis difficult. However, available data suggest 
a small decrease in the share of employment 
accounted for by the surplus sector and a small 
increase in the new service economy.
The question, thrown up by the foregoing 
analysis on the quantity of employment created 
in various sectors, is about consequences on 
the quality of jobs. We take up this question in 
the next chapter.
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How Good Is the Work?
Formality, Wages, and Productivity
Chapter 4
Many labour laws have overlapping 
jurisdiction, giving the impression of 
fortifying the bargaining strength of 
the organised labour. But surplus labour 
willing to work at subsistence wages gives 
enormous power to employers, whose 
interests lie in circumventing the laws. A 
way out of the dysfunctional regulatory 
regime is to simplify the laws, along with 
their strict enforcement. 
-Nagaraj (2018)
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T he demographic dividend that is often touted as India’s competitive advantage is critically dependent on meeting the 
growing aspirations of those entering or 
wishing to enter the labour force. To satisfy 
these aspirations, India’s economy needs to 
create more jobs than are currently being 
created, and critically, more ‘good’ jobs.
There is no clear definition as to what a 
‘good’ job is. Broadly, it could be defined to 
mean a job that pays well, is safe, secure, and 
meaningful, helps to improve the skills and 
productivity of the worker, and allows for 
adequate leisure. Given that, for the majority 
of the population, wages and salaries are the 
most important source of income, having a 
remunerative and meaningful job becomes 
very important.
Defining and measuring the quality of work 
is difficult. What is considered a good job 
depends on the level of economic development. 
In a very poor economy, it may be any job that 
pays above subsistence wage. On the other 
hand, a job that can buy amenities, but is not 
secure, could be considered a poor job in richer 
economies. Similarly, the perceived quality of 
jobs is dependent partly on the characteristics 
of the labour force; given the same profile of 
jobs, a less educated labour force may perceive 
a larger number of good jobs than a more 
educated labour force.
In line with ILO guidelines, we can categorise a 
job as ‘good’ if it:
a. generates earnings that are sufficient 
to maintain a decent quality of life and 
which are distributed in a way that broadly 
benefits a large body of the working 
population. 
b. provides security and social protection 
such that the risks of unemployment 
are limited and, in instances where the 
labourer is unable to obtain employment, 
s/he is able to fulfil basic needs through 
elements of social protection such as 
unemployment or pension benefits. 
c. ensures a safe and healthy work 
environment in which other non-wage 
aspects of employment, such as working 
relationships, are suitably desirable. 
d. enables labour to develop its capacities 
on the job, and partake of the fruits of 
technological advancement and more 
efficient production techniques.
Work that adheres to the above conditions 
need not come from any one sector, nor even 
necessarily in the form of wage work. 
Importantly, none of the above are ‘automatic’ 
results of economic growth. Rather, to realise 
them we must invest in a robust set of labour 
market institutions that are sensitive to 
changing economic conditions while reflecting 
core values of social justice and democracy.
 
This chapter examines the quality of jobs in the 
Indian economy mainly through two lenses: 
that of formality or informality, and that of the 
level of remuneration and its growth.
There are significant data challenges in 
measuring the quality of work in the Indian 
economy. The only nationally representative 
data sources going back far enough in time are 
the Employment-Unemployment Surveys of 
the NSS (NSS-EUS). However, this survey has 
not been conducted since 2011−12. For more 
recent statistics, the only available source is the 
Labour Bureau’s EUS (LB-EUS), the most recent 
of which is from 2015−16. In this chapter, we 
rely on both these surveys, supplementing 
with field studies as appropriate. The issue of 
comparability of the LB-EUS with the NSS-EUS 
is discussed in the chapter on Methods. Here, 
we only note that the basic statistics on quality 
of work are very similar in the two surveys, 
strengthening our case for comparability.
In 2015, 
non-regular 
workers 
constituted 80 
per cent of all 
employment. 
This is higher 
than the world 
average of 75 
per cent as per 
ILO estimates.
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4.1 / Formal Employment: 
Definitions, Degrees 
and Trends
The Lewis Process requires a movement of 
workers from the subsistence sector to the 
more productive modern sector. Despite 
maintaining a higher growth rate since the 
mid-1980s than ever before in its independent 
history, India’s record in this regard has 
been poor. In particular, growth has failed to 
generate adequate high-quality employment, 
even as the population and the labour force 
have grown rapidly. Therefore, bringing more 
of the population into the modern, productive 
economy, and improving economic outcomes, 
is critical. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, in 2015, India’s 
workforce, by principal and subsidiary status, 
was estimated to be 467 million. Of this, 47 
per cent were self-employed, 36.5 per cent 
were casual wage workers, while 17 per cent 
were regular wage workers (Figure 4.1). The 
NSS and the Labour Bureau adopt comparable 
definitions of these categories. The ‘self-
employed’ are those workers who operate 
a farm or non-farm business on their own, 
either by themselves or with paid or unpaid 
workers. The distinction between ‘regular’ 
and ‘casual’ workers is blurry. As per the NSS, 
regular workers are those who work for wages 
in someone else’s farm or non-farm enterprise, 
for a salary or wage on a regular basis. The 
key criterion for being considered a regular 
worker is that the work contract should not be 
one that is renewed daily. Casual workers are 
workers employed on a daily or other periodic 
basis, based on the demand for labour. These 
workers do not have long-term arrangements 
with any employer (Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation 2014, p.17). To 
these NSS categories, the Labour Bureau 
has added the category of contract worker 
defined as any worker hired, supervised and 
remunerated through a contractor, who in turn, 
is compensated by the establishment.
In 1987, 55.5 per cent of workers were self-
employed. By 2015, this had fallen to 46.6 
per cent. Correspondingly, the proportion 
of regular wage workers rose from 15.6 per 
cent to 20.6 per cent (Table A4.1 in online 
Appendix). While this constitutes progress, the 
rate could perhaps be much higher. In 2015, 
non-regular workers constituted 80 per cent of 
all employment. This is higher than the world 
average of 75 per cent as per ILO estimates.1 If 
only wage workers are considered and the self-
employed are excluded, then 68 per cent were 
in informal wage employment in 2015.
However, the regular versus casual distinction 
underestimates the extent of informal 
employment. Since 2000, the NSS-EUS has been 
collecting information on the provision of social 
security benefits and availability of written 
contracts. The recent Labour Bureau surveys 
continued to collect this information. As we 
discuss below, if either of these are taken as 
indicators of informality of employment, then 
the share of informality increases considerably. 
In the following section, we focus primarily on 
wage workers. Note that enabling the transition 
from own-account work to wage work that 
comes under the purview of labour legislation, 
is part of the Lewis Process.
Figure 4.1 : Regular Salaried Workers Account for 17 per cent of the Workforce
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015.
1  https://www.ft.com/content/4f2e3516-fd67-11e4-b072-00144feabdc0
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4.1.1 / Organised-Unorganised and 
Formal-Informal
At the outset, it is useful to clarify the 
distinction between two dichotomies in the 
labour market. The first is the division between 
the organised and unorganised parts of the 
economy, defined largely by the size of the 
workplace and accompanying government 
regulations regarding working hours, hiring and 
firing norms, rights of association, minimum 
wages, and other aspects of employment. 
The second is the distinction between formal 
and informal work, defined by the nature of 
the labour contract. The 17th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians defines 
informal employment as those jobs where 
‘…employment relation is, in law or in practice, 
not subject to national labour legislation, 
income taxation, social protection or 
entitlement to certain employment benefits 
(advance notice of dismissal, severance pay, 
paid annual or sick leave, etc.)’ (ILO 2003). 
Table 4.1 displays the two dichotomies. The 
type of enterprise (organised-unorganised) is 
overlaid alongside the type of work (formal-
informal).  This provides a conceptual 
framework for identifying informal employment 
which includes work in unorganised sector, 
as well as in the organised sector that is not 
subject to regulation (Hussmanns 2004). 
Further, the vast self-employed sector, 
consisting of those who work for themselves, is 
also outside the scope of most laws pertaining 
to wages and working conditions.
In India, this framework has been broadly 
adopted in the definition provided by the 
National Commission on Enterprises in the 
Unorganised Sector (Sengupta et al. 2007), 
which identified informal workers as those 
‘working in the unorganised enterprises or 
households, excluding regular workers with 
social security benefits, and the workers in the 
formal sector without any employment/ social 
security benefits provided by the employers’. 
By this definition, which includes the self-
employed, over 80 per cent of the workforce 
would fall into the informal category. 
Table 4.1 : Organised-Unorganised and Formal-Informal Employment
Enterprise Type
Organised Unorganised
Employment 
Type
Formal
Regular salaried work with 
some job security and 
benefits, in enterprises 
employing 10 or more 
workers.
Regular salaried employment 
with some benefits, in 
enterprises employing less 
than 10 workers.
Informal
Various types of contract 
work and employment of 
short duration, without 
job security, in enterprises 
employing 10 or more 
workers
All types of casual work, work 
for daily, weekly, or monthly 
wages, and self-employment 
with no benefits or security, 
in enterprises employing less 
than 10 workers.
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4.1.2 / Degrees of Formality and 
Informality
The actually existing diversity of labour 
contracts makes any clean division between 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ difficult. We find, 
instead, degrees of formality and informality. 
For example, the availability of social security 
benefits alongside employment seems to 
be the overriding identifier of formality of 
employment. However, there have been 
multiple interpretations of what constitutes 
social security benefits and consequently, 
multiple operational definitions of formal 
employment. For instance, studies have taken 
the availability of paid leave (Rani and Unni 
2004), the provision of provident fund (Sastry 
2004), the availability of a written contract 
(Kolli and Sinharay 2014), or a combination 
of indicators (Unni and Naik 2018), to gauge 
formality of employment.
Since information on social security benefits 
has only recently begun to be collected, studies 
have typically used a regular versus casual 
distinction to distinguish formal wage workers 
from informal ones. ‘Regular work’ is an 
expansive definition of formality. For example, 
a worker in a microenterprise who has no 
written contract or benefits, but is being paid 
a monthly salary on a long-term basis, would 
count as a regular worker.
The year 2017-18 has witnessed a controversy 
over the definition of a formal job. There is no 
problem per se in adopting any reasonable 
and consistent definition, but in this instance, 
the controversy over the definition is really a 
debate over job creation. We review this debate 
in Box 4.1. Ultimately, however, the exact 
definition is less important than the trend in 
job creation. The question is, is the economy 
able to create formal jobs (however defined) in 
desired numbers?
The first half of 2018 has seen a controversy about the 
quantity of formal jobs created as well as the definition 
of a ‘formal job’. New analysis of the Employee Provident 
Fund Organisation (EPFO) database suggests that 
household surveys may have underestimated the pace 
of formal job creation (Ghosh and Ghosh 2018). In 
2017, 4 million new employees were added to the EPFO 
database. With an annual increment to the labour force 
of between 6 and 12 million (depending on assumptions 
about what fraction of those entering the working-age 
population is entering the labour force), this constitutes 
between one-third or two-thirds of new jobs. This, in turn, 
suggests that the production of jobs of reasonable quality 
has increased, albeit not at the pace required to absorb 
available labour.
One needs to be cautious, however, in interpreting such 
administrative data. First, the findings run counter to 
the information coming from labour surveys and other 
evidence about falling aggregate employment. Moreover, 
it is unclear whether these are new jobs or simply 
increased numbers arising out of compliance with laws 
for existing jobs, given the incentives advanced to firms 
for enrolling their employees. While such enrolment is to 
be welcomed from the point of view of employee welfare, 
such conversion of informal employment to formal 
employment should not be confused with net new job 
creation. Second, representative household surveys cover 
the entire population and therefore give a net picture 
that takes into account job creation and destruction in 
the entire economy. Analyses based on EPFO numbers 
or other similar sources, on the other hand, only give a 
partial picture of job creation. It is worth remembering 
that the EPFO share of total employment is still only 
around 12.5 per cent.
Also see:
Ninan: https://theprint.in/opinion/epfos-employment-
data-is-very-cheery-but-needs-a-reality-check/55445/
Arun Kumar: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/
columns/narendra-modi-govt-indian-economy-
demonetisation-gst-job-loss-unemployment-5178184/
Box 4.1 / The Debate over ‘Formal’ Jobs
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We develop three increasingly strict definitions 
of formal employment for non-agricultural 
wage workers. The broadest definition is simply 
‘regular worker’ (we call this Formal 1). The 
second definition (Formal 2) is regular work 
with availability of one of the following social 
security benefits: provident fund or pension, 
gratuity, healthcare/maternity benefits, or paid 
leave. The third, and strictest, definition (Formal 
3) is the above plus a written contract. This is 
the strictest because data reveal that workers 
who have a written contract are much more 
likely to satisfy the other two criteria than the 
other way around.
We exclude wage workers in agriculture 
from the analysis because, irrespective of 
the definition used, with the exception of 
some plantation workers, almost the entirety 
of the agricultural workforce is in informal 
employment, working as casual workers, 
without written contracts and social security 
entitlements. 
Successive NSS-EUS rounds reveal that the 
proportion of regular workers among non-
agricultural wage workers has been slowly 
inching upwards, and is now just under 60 per 
cent. However, this number falls to 30 per cent 
if we include access to some kind of benefit as a 
condition of formal employment. If we include 
benefits and a written contract, then a mere 17 
per cent of wage workers in the Indian economy 
had access to formal employment in 2015. 
When one recalls that just under half of the 
workforce is self-employed, and therefore not 
in this system of classification, the full extent of 
precarity in the economy becomes clear.
Delving further into the non-agricultural 
sector, we see major differences between 
manufacturing and services (Figure 4.2). The 
service sector shows a much greater degree of 
formalisation than manufacturing, presumably 
a result of the dominance of the public sector. 
In manufacturing, although the share of regular 
workers increased between 1999 and 2011, it 
has subsequently declined from 68 per cent to 
62 per cent. In services, the share is higher, but 
stagnant at around 87 per cent. 
We see a precipitous drop in the share of 
formal workers if we tighten the definition 
of formality to include some benefits and a 
written contract. In 2015, the share of the 
workforce with a written contract and some 
social security benefits, was 10 per cent in 
manufacturing and 28 per cent in services. 
Figure 4.2 : Levels of Formality in Manufacturing, Construction and Services
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Only wage workers are considered. See text for details on worker categories.
If we include 
benefits and 
a written 
contract, then 
a mere 17 per 
cent of wage 
workers in 
the Indian 
economy 
had access 
to formal 
employment in 
2015.
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Figure 4.3 : Contract Workers Have Increased Sharply in Organised Manufacturing in the Past Two Decades
Sources and notes: ASI factory-level data, various years.
The construction sector is overwhelmingly 
informal. Even by the broadest definition 
of formality, less than 10 per cent of the 
construction workforce can be termed formal. 
This is of concern because, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, construction is now as large 
an employer in absolute terms as the entire 
manufacturing sector. 
One important channel of informalisation of 
work since the early 2000s, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector, has been the gradual 
replacement of workers directly employed 
by organised sector firms, with workers 
hired via third-party contractors (known as 
‘contract workers’). These workers are generally 
not eligible for the range of benefits that 
direct workers receive. They are also more 
easily retrenched than direct workers. This 
phenomenon has been widely commented on 
in the policy and academic literature. See Das, 
Choudhury, and Singh (2015) for a recent review.
Factory-level data from the Annual Survey 
of Industries (ASI) show that, between 2000 
and 2012, such informal work within the 
organised sector grew at 13.8 per cent 
per annum, while overall non-agricultural 
employment, as measured by the NSS-EUS, 
grew at approximately 5 per cent per annum 
in the same period. Figure 4.3 shows the 
informalisation in the organised manufacturing 
sector in terms of the share of contract workers 
in total workers. 
There is very little data available on contract 
workers in the service sector before 2011. 
As mentioned earlier, since 2011−12, the 
Labour Bureau has included contract workers 
as an employment status in its EUS, after 
modifying the NSS-EUS system of classifying 
such workers. While these surveys have now 
been discontinued, we hope that the new PLFS 
being conducted by the NSSO will continue 
this practice. In the absence of such data, it is 
difficult to estimate the extent of informality in 
the organised service sector. 
Interestingly, the increase in contract workers 
in manufacturing has slowed since 2011. 
However, case studies reveal that, at least in 
some industries, contract workers are being 
replaced by newer types of precarious workers 
such as trainees and apprentices. Amit and 
Nayanjyoti (2018) present evidence of this 
from the automobile industry in the Gurgaon-
Manesar belt (see Box 4.2). The conclusion 
that contract workers may be being replaced 
by other forms of precarious labour is also 
supported by the fact that there is no increase 
in the proportion of formal employment 
commensurate with a decline in the  proportion 
of contract workers in organised manufacturing 
as a whole over this period.
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The Gurgaon−Neemrana industrial belt has been 
a prominent centre of most of the militant labour 
unrests in our country during the last two decades. For 
example, the Maruti Manesar plant workers struggle 
in 2011−12 was effectively the first one that seriously 
challenged the contract system and pushed for the 
permanency of contract workers to limit the internal 
segmentation of the workforce. Permanent workers 
struck work and occupied the plant in October 2011 
as 1200 contract workers, who earlier had joined 
the permanent workers in their strike in June and 
September, were not reinstated by the management.
Ultimately, as a result of the protest, the contract 
workers were re-employed. Subsequently, when a 
union was formed in February 2012, the first demand 
that they put forward before the management in 
the Charter of Demands was the permanency of all 
contract workers. When the management refused 
to negotiate on this demand, the bargaining process 
suffered, tension escalated and, finally, on 18 July 2012, 
a clash ensued between workers and management 
and their bouncers, leading to the death of one HR 
manager and the subsequent crackdown on workers. 
A micro study suggests that the factors listed below 
best explain poor employment conditions despite 
rapid growth and the genesis of industrial conflicts.
  
1. Increased mobility of capital and setting up 
multiple units of the same company in the 
industrial belt and the easy shifting of production 
from older to newer units (with more flexible 
labour regimes), and even closure of old units, 
have reduced workers control over production, 
effectiveness of strikes, and bargaining capacity 
of unions in the older units. It has reduced 
associational bargaining power of workers. 
2. New technology has made workers more 
disposable and has given management more 
control over production. Mechanisation and 
automation has made skill and experience 
increasingly redundant and has threatened 
workers’ job security. Intensification of work 
demands a young docile workforce instead of 
older experienced people. Continuous industrial 
restructuring has reduced the structural 
bargaining power of workers. 
3. Crisis of agriculture, jobless growth and India’s 
demographic dividend has created a large pool of 
unemployed youth waiting outside factory gates, 
ready to work even under worsening working 
conditions. 
4. Informalisation of work in formal sectors 
like automobile has shifted the burden of 
production from permanent to various categories 
of temporary workers. Permanent workers 
have become an even smaller minority of the 
workforce. Their union thus has less control 
over production. The new categories of workers 
like diploma trainee, student trainee, diploma 
apprentices are not even recognised as ‘workers’, 
and thus have minimal connection with the union 
process. 
5. The increasing connectivity inside the production 
process under ‘just-in-time’ and ‘lean’ production 
modes and the competitiveness of the auto sector 
cannot contain any form of workers’ subjectivity 
that influences the production process and 
creates uncertainty. It has resulted in projecting 
the union process and ‘collective bargaining’ of 
workers as an ‘act of indiscipline’. Thus labour 
‘dispute’ is now seen as a ‘law and order’ problem. 
It has led to the criminalisation of labour struggles, 
and to repression in place of mechanisms of 
reconciliation and mediation. 
6. The gradual dismantling of labour protections, 
pro-corporate changes in labour law and 
weakening of institutions (such as the labour 
department, labour courts and tribunals) has 
led to the weakening of the process of collective 
bargaining.
Box 4.2 / Organising for Better Work in the Gurgaon-Manesar Industrial Belt
Sources and notes: Amit and Nayanjyoti (2018)
STATE OF WORKING INDIA 2018
98
Mehr is 27, and has worked in sandstone quarries in 
Bijolia for the past 11 years—ever since he was a teenager. 
He joked that when he dropped out of school after class 
six, instead of a regular honours degree, he earned a 
‘bhataa ki degree’— an honours in studying stone!
As per the Rajasthan government notification of January 
2018 on minimum wages in various schedules of 
employment, a ‘stone dresser’ is considered a semi-skilled 
worker, and after three years of work qualifies for a skilled 
work wage. Someone like Mehr, who has done skilled 
work for five years, is considered fit for minimum wages 
in the ‘highly skilled’ category. On the day we interviewed 
him, Mehr had negotiated ₹3 for each foot of sandstone 
he cut. By evening, he had cut 80 feet stone, earning 
₹240—much less than the government minimum wage of 
₹283 a day for ‘highly skilled’ work. 
The negotiation over wage rates varied with the age and 
skill of the workers, and other factors. But several workers 
who had migrated to Bijolia in distress saw little choice in 
the work and how the wages were fixed.
In Nayanagar, Mukesh Chand Jatav, a Dalit, in his mid-
30s, who had migrated to Bijolia earlier that month from 
Karoli, 300 kilometers away, had managed to negotiate 
a higher than average rate for himself, at ₹5 per foot. He 
had done so by offering to work in ‘wastage’ sandstone 
that had been discarded by mine owners as it was harder 
to process. Though  he had managed to chisel and cut  
100 feet sandstone by the end of the day, and negotiated 
a higher wage, he made only ₹500, half of which he would 
split with a co-worker, thereby still not making even a 
minimum wage for the strenuous work.
Jatav said that he had little choice when it came to doing 
the sandstone work as he had no savings, even though he 
had started the annual migration to the quarries in Bijolia 
with his father 21 years ago when he was 15. Now, at 36, 
he had returned to work in the quarries after a gap of five 
years. Ill-health had prevented him from taking up quarry 
work in the gap years. 
He recounted that back home, in Hindon, the family 
had witnessed three of their neighbours, who also 
worked in the quarries, die of tuberculosis. ‘Khoon daal 
daal ke mar gaye (They coughed up blood, and died).’ 
Two of them were his age, and one had been younger 
than him, he said.
‘My father, who has worked as a stone carver and knows 
the conditions of work, warned me “Don’t go back to the 
khadaan (quarry) even if we starve”, but I had to come 
back to earn two rupees...to eat,’ said Jatav. Jatav’s family 
owns no land. The previous year they had sharecropped 
with another Dalit family in Karoli in exchange for one-
fourth share of the wheat and barley crop but the produce 
was already exhausted.
In another part of Bijolia, under a sky laden with monsoon 
clouds, in a field converted into a sandstone ‘stock’ in 
Sukhpura, Madan Lal Bhil, a frail Adivasi farm worker 
who looked older than his 52 years, said that, in the last 
farming season, he had spent ₹13,000 growing wheat as a 
sharecropper with a Gujjar farmer. But the yield had been 
only half of the usual produce, he said, leaving the family 
with just five sacks of grains at the end of the season. Bhil 
had a farm loan of ₹7000 and had sown paddy this time, 
but he, too, felt compelled to work as a quarry labourer till 
the crop was ready for harvesting.
Box 4.3 / Precarity among Mining Workers in Rajasthan
Sources and notes: Excerpted from Yadav (2018)
In general, field studies are far more informative 
regarding conditions of work and new forms of 
precarious labour as compared to secondary 
surveys. In addition to the study of the 
automobile industry, another SWI background 
study by Anumeha Yadav (2018) investigates 
labour relations in Rajasthan’s small-scale 
sandstone mining industry. This is a large export 
industry operating almost entirely on casual 
labour. The author finds that workers with 
several years of experience earn around ₹250 per 
day for strenuous and skilled work. This is not 
only below a decent living wage, but also below 
even the state minimum wage (Box 4.3). Another 
field study by Natarajan and Joseph (2018), on 
domestic workers in Bangalore, also yields rich 
insights into the process of collectivisation among 
this informal workforce (Box 4.4).
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4.1.3 / Variation in Formality 
across States
Indian states also display large variations in the 
degree to which their workers are protected 
or unprotected by labour legislation. The 
north-eastern states show above average 
levels of formalisation (using the definition of 
a regular worker), while states such as Bihar 
and Jharkhand show very low levels. Figure 4.4 
shows the proportion of formal workers based 
on all three definitions across India in 2015. 
There are some noteworthy patterns here. 
Surprisingly, the southern states (with the 
exception of Kerala) are seen to be lagging 
behind states such as Maharashtra and Gujarat 
in degree of formality, especially under the 
stricter definitions. This is possibly due to 
the presence of large public-sector units or 
other large organised sector manufacturing 
plants in the western states. It should also be 
borne in mind that large commercial cities 
such as Mumbai or Surat may bias state-level 
statistics. That said, however, given the general 
impression of the southern states as being 
relatively more progressive, this is a pattern 
worth investigating further.
Figure 4.4 : Levels of Formality across States
Regular workers Regular workers + Benefits
Regular workers + Benefits + Written contract
86 - 95 36 - 45
66 - 75 16 - 25
76 - 85 26 - 35
56 - 65
46 - 55
5 - 15
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Scale indicates per cent workers in a category. See Appendix Table A4.2 online for data.
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Domestic workers (DWs) have emerged as the second 
largest urban informal workforce next only to ‘home 
based workers’. As per NSS-EUS 2011, it is estimated 
that 4.1 million workers work in the households of 
others. Of these 2.8 million are women.
This large and vulnerable workforce presents a 
unique challenge to collective action. DWs are not 
independent producers (like peasants or artisans), but 
neither are they wage-workers in the conventional 
sense. The workplace of DWs is the private home and 
typically one worker has multiple employers. This 
raises fundamental questions over who the union 
faces as the employer of the DWs and whether the 
private home ought to be considered a workplace 
where appropriate laws will apply.
It also has implications for their subjective identities. 
Organizers frequently exhort DWs to think of 
themselves as significant actors in the economy 
telling them, ‘You are playing an important role in the 
economy because the middle class have to go to work. 
If you don’t go [to work] then their productivity and 
income suffers’. Organizers also confront the fact that 
worker consciousness is only one among class, caste, 
gender, ethnicity, and other identities. 
Three kinds of organizations working with DWs can 
be identified – the conventional NGOs, who work 
exclusively for welfare rights for DWs, and focus on 
demands from the state, the older-style trade unions, 
who are less likely to work within the residential areas 
of DWs, preferring instead to facilitate state schemes 
and welfare, and the labour-NGOs. The third variety 
is the focus of this study. Authors find them to be 
creative at organising, combining the nimbleness of an 
NGO with a clarity of the need to foreground the DW 
as a worker with rights.
An interesting finding is that an increasing number 
of DWs prefer apartments and gated communities to 
individual houses. This is partly due to the perception 
that employers in apartments are more affluent 
and willing to pay more. But it is also about respect 
and dignity. ‘We come and go like officers,’ says 
one worker. This has led to a segmentation of the 
workforce with the consequence that it is difficult 
to standardise wages across the sector. Since the 
prevailing wages in apartment complexes are above 
the Karnataka government minimum wages, unions 
have left wage negotiations to the workers.
An interesting aspect of this changing work pattern 
is that apartment entry and exit logs have become 
important as evidence of employment in case of 
disputes. Since almost all apartment and gated 
communities maintain such registers for visitors, the 
apartment gates have now been transformed into 
‘factory gates’ for DWs. Further, as some apartments 
have provided ID cards for all workers working on 
their premises, DWs and their unions have begun to 
use this as collective bargaining tools wherein a local 
Resident Welfare Association (RWA) can be asked to 
form norms of work that apply to all registered DWs in 
an apartment complex.
Box 4.4 / ‘Apartment as Factory Gate’: Challenges to Collective Action among Domestic 
Workers in Bangalore
Sources and notes: Natrajan and Joseph (2018)  
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The regional dimension also brings to attention 
how closely or distantly the three definitions 
vary with each other (see Table A4.2 of Appendix 
online for details). Specifically, while the three 
indices generally move together, there are 
instances of very wide differences. Thus, in 
Chandigarh, for example, there is a sharp 
difference between formalisation by definition 
1 (about 72 per cent of workers) and definition 
3 (around 20 per cent), while for Arunachal 
Pradesh, the corresponding numbers are 86 per 
cent and 56 per cent respectively. 
Tamil Nadu and Kerala perform comparably on 
the first two indices, but Kerala has twice the 
frequency of workers with written contracts. 
Maharashtra vastly outperforms West Bengal 
on the first two indices, but the two are much 
more closely matched on the third criterion. 
Once again, these patterns do not always 
conform to our preconceived notions of the 
status of labour in different states. Valuable 
lessons may lie in such diversity when it comes 
to learning what works and what does not in 
protecting labour rights.
The state-level variation in informality also 
reveals another intriguing relationship. Figure 
4.5 shows the change in proportion of formal 
Figure 4.5 : Formality Convergence? Level of Formalisation across States in 2011 versus Change between 2011 
and 2015
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2011, LB-EUS 2015. Refer list of state codes.
4.2 / An Overview of 
Wage Trends
workers between 2011 and 2015 against the 
initial level of formality (Formal 1). The negative 
relationship provides some indication that 
we may be observing formality ‘convergence’ 
between states. Those states with below-
average formalisation rates initially are seeing 
greater formalisation and vice versa. Note 
that this does not necessarily imply an overall 
increase in formality of the workforce at the all-
India level, which, as we saw earlier, is mostly 
stagnant. Rather, it implies a redistribution 
of the formal workforce between states. This 
question, too, needs further investigation.
The key measure of the quality of jobs is, 
perhaps, how remunerative they are. Broadly 
speaking, wage levels have remained low and 
have grown slowly over the last three decades, 
especially compared to the rates of GDP growth. 
In this chapter, we are concerned mainly with 
trends seen since the last NSS-EUS in 2011−12. 
For a comprehensive review of wage trends until 
2011, as well as an overview of the literature on 
wage rate, see Papola and Kannan (2017) and 
the related report by ILO (2018).
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2   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/government-mulls-launching-annual-survey-of-services-in-july/
articleshow/51002521.cms
Several formidable challenges confront an 
analysis of wages in India. First, Indian labour 
statistics, especially in recent years, do not 
provide comparably collected wage data for 
every sub-sector of the economy. Departing 
from the NSS practice of collecting rupee 
amounts for wages, the LB-EUS categorised 
earnings instead. In any case, it is likely that 
household surveys under-sample the rich, 
leading to underestimates of average wage 
levels as well as wage growth. On the other 
hand, administrative sources, such as income 
tax data, leave out a large number of wage 
earners who earn too little to be in the tax net.  
When it comes to firms, while there are 
enterprise or factory surveys for the 
manufacturing sector as well as for unorganised 
services, we have no standard source of wage 
data for the organised services sector.  This 
is a key lacuna that needs urgent attention. It 
is reported that the Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation is working on an 
Annual Survey of Services2.
In addition to the LB-EUS, we use data from 
the ASI, the NSS unorganised enterprise 
surveys, and the RBI’s rural wage rates series 
to summarise features of wage distribution 
in the organised manufacturing, unorganised 
manufacturing and services, and agriculture 
sectors respectively. 
The headline statistic from the LB-EUS is that, 
nationally, 67 per cent of households reported 
monthly earnings of up to ₹10,000 in 2015. 
In total, 98 per cent earned less than ₹50,000 
per month (Table 4.2). In the age of corporate 
compensation packages exceeding ₹20 lakh a 
year, it is sobering to learn that earning over ₹1 
lakh per month puts a household in the top 0.2 
per cent of income earners in the country.
Even among regular wage workers, more than 
half (57 per cent) have monthly average earnings 
of ₹10,000 or less, well under the Seventh 
Central Pay Commission (CPC) minimum 
stipulated salary of ₹18,000 per month. As 
for casual workers, 59 per cent have monthly 
earnings of up to ₹5,000. If we assign the mid-
point of a category as the approximate rupee 
amount earned, we find that regular workers 
report monthly earnings of ₹13,562, while non-
regular workers earn ₹5,853 per month.
To take the analysis forward, we use the current 
lowest wage recommended by the Seventh CPC, 
namely, ₹18,000 per month, as the standard for a 
‘decent wage’. Our justification for this is that this 
wage is carefully calculated by the basic needs 
approach (Annexure Table on page 65 of Ministry 
of Finance 2015). It has also figured prominently in 
the Swaminathan Commission recommendations 
for agriculture, as well as among the demands of 
several national trade unions.
Self Employed (%) Regular Wage/Salaried (%)
Contract 
Workers (%)
Casual 
Labour (%)
Up to ₹5000 41.3 18.7 38.5 59.3
₹5001 to ₹7500 26.2 19.5 27.9 25
₹7501 to ₹10,000 17.4 19 20.3 12
₹10,001 to ₹20,000 11.1 23.6 11 3.5
₹20,001 to ₹50,000 3.5 17.7 2.1 0.3
₹50,001 to ₹1,00,000 0.4 1.4 0.1 0
Above ₹1,00,000 0.1 0.2 0 0
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015
Table 4.2 : Average Monthly Earnings by Employment Status, 2015−16
Nationally, 
67 per cent of 
households 
reported 
monthly 
earnings of 
₹10,000 or less 
in 2015. 98 per 
cent earned 
less than 
₹50,000 per 
month.
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4.2.1 / Recent Wage Trends 
across Sectors
Table 4.3 gives real annual wage rates (in 2015 
rupee values) by sector over a 15-year period for 
the years that data are available. A key caveat is 
that, for agriculture, we report annualised daily 
wage rates assuming employment is available 
for 25 days of the month, and 12 months of the 
year, at that rate. However, this is mostly not the 
case in practice. Hence, these numbers should be 
treated as an upper bound. The most one can say 
is that, if work was available all year round, then 
earnings in agriculture would be comparable to 
earnings in the rest of the unorganised sector.
Between 2000 and 2015, real wages grew in 
every sector. In agriculture and in unorganised 
manufacturing and services, the compounded 
annual growth rate (CAGR) was roughly 3 per 
cent. For comparison, Papola and Kannan (2017) 
find that between 1994 and 2011, real wages for 
regular workers grew at 3 per cent per annum, 
and for casual workers at 3.85 per cent (see Table 
4.18 in their study).  
In the most recent period, from 2010 to 
2015, real wages grew faster, at a CAGR of  2 
per cent for organised manufacturing, 4 per 
cent for unorganised manufacturing, 5 per 
cent for unorganised services, and 7 per cent 
for agriculture. However, the high figure for 
agriculture is anomalous and not the general 
trend, as we discuss later. Papola and Kannan 
report that wages (across all sectors) grew at an 
annual rate of 6.15 per cent for casual workers 
and 4 per cent for regular workers between 2004 
and 2011. 
Thus, overall, it appears that real wages have 
been growing at around 4−6 per cent per annum 
over the past decade.
Note that these data exclude the organised 
services sector, where anecdotal evidence 
suggests that industries such as Information 
Technology, Telecommunications, and Finance 
have experienced much higher rates of wage 
growth.
Interestingly, wage growth in organised 
manufacturing has been slower than that in 
the unorganised sector — at 0.8 per cent over 
the whole period since 1999, and 1.7 per cent 
in the most recent period. As a result, the wage 
gap between the organised and unorganised 
manufacturing sectors has narrowed. 
Unorganised sector wages were 37 per cent of 
organised sector wages in 2000, but 50 per cent 
in 2015.
It is worth investigating the performance of 
the organised manufacturing sector a little 
further. Data on wages for this sector are also 
available at a higher frequency. Since this 
sector consists of relatively larger factories, it 
is also important to distinguish between wages 
of production workers (the majority) and the 
wages of supervisors, managers, and other 
administrative staff. In the early 2000s, when 
the real wage rate for production workers 
entered a period of stagnation, compensation 
continued to rise steadily. The gap between 
the two has grown since then, even after the 
wage rate started rising post 2006 (Figure 
4.6). To the extent that managerial staff, 
especially at the top levels, received non-wage 
Year Agriculture (₹) Organised Manufacturing (₹)
Unorganised 
Manufacturing (₹)
Unorganised
Services (₹)
1999 49,014 1,22,118 45,227 46,027
2005 47,781 1,20,760 50,488  - 
2010 55,491 1,28,173 57,928 56,150
2015 77,571 1,39,576 70,848 71,776
Sources and notes: Agriculture – Rural Wage Rates for Men (daily) from RBI Database on Indian Economy, Organised 
Manufacturing – ASI various years, Unorganised Manufacturing and Unorganised Services – NSS enterprise surveys, various 
years.
Table 4.3 : Annual Real Wage Rates per Annum across Sectors (2015 Prices)
From 2010 
to 2015, real 
wages grew 
at a CAGR 
of 2 per cent 
for organised 
manufacturing, 
4 per cent for 
unorganised 
manufacturing, 
5 per cent for 
unorganised 
services, and 
7 per cent for 
agriculture.
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compensation, such as stock options, this gap 
may be an underestimate. This divergence has 
not received much attention in the literature. 
We discuss the divergence between wages and 
productivity in the next section.  
A possible factor contributing to keeping 
wages down in this sector is the rise in the 
proportion of contract workers. Field studies 
reveal that contract workers are paid a fraction 
of permanent worker wages, often for similar 
work (see Box 4.2) (Amit and Nayanjyoti 2018). 
Comparing wage earnings of contract versus 
direct workers in secondary data, such as 
ASI, also shows that contract workers earn 
considerably less (Kapoor and Krishnapriya 
2017). In fact, comparison of ASI data with 
NSS unorganised manufacturing data shows 
that contract worker wages lie somewhere 
between the wages of direct workers and their 
unorganised sector counterparts (Table 4.4).
The rise in the proportion of workers employed 
via third-party contractors, reported earlier, 
together with the lower wage rates for these 
workers, has important implications for both 
quality of work as well as the share of labour in 
value added. We address this issue later in this 
chapter.
Year
Organised 
Manufacturing, 
Non-Contract (₹)
Organised 
Manufacturing, 
Contract (₹)
Unorganised 
Manufacturing (₹)
1999 3,53,724 65,129            45,226.71 
2006 3,40,652 72,894            50,488.10 
2011 3,42,425 77,355            57,927.59 
2015 3,91,013* 1,06,621*            70,848.24 
Sources and notes: Organised Manufacturing – ASI various years; Unorganised Manufacturing – NSS Enterprise Surveys 
various year. Nominal wages have been deflated by CPI-IW (base 2015). * Due to data availability, organised manufacturing 
wages reported are for 2014.
Table 4.4 : Annual Real Wages for Different Types of Workers in the Manufacturing Sector
Figure 4.6 : Productivity and Managerial Compensation Have Risen Much Faster than Workers’ Wages in 
Organised Manufacturing
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years. Wages and salaries deflated by CPI-IW and GVA deflated by WPI
(manufactured products). Managers’ compensation is calculated as the difference between “emoluments” and “wages to workers”.
Labour productivity is ratio of real GVA to all employees.
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4.2.2 / Recent Wage Trends 
across States
There are large variations between states in 
wage rates. Figure 4.7 shows annual wage 
rates in three sectors for selected major states. 
Several points are worth emphasising. First, in 
every state shown, wage rates in unorganised 
services are higher than in unorganised 
manufacturing. Second, the organised−
unorganised wage gap in manufacturing 
varies widely across states. Unorganised 
manufacturing wage rates are 68 per cent 
of organised rates in Assam, but only 22 per 
cent in Odisha. Note that this way of defining 
the gap means that the gap is larger when 
the number is smaller. In general, the wage 
gap appears to be higher for states in which 
Figure 4.7 : Annual Wage Rates in Various Sectors across States
Figure 4.8 : The Gap between Organised and Unorganised Wages Grows with Organised Sector Wages
Sources and notes: ASI Principal Characteristics 2015, NSS Unincorporated Enterprises Survey 73rd Round, 2015
Sources and notes: ASI Principal Characteristics 2015, NSS Unincorporated Enterprises Survey 73 Round 2015. Refer list of state 
codes.
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Figure 4.9 : Weak Evidence of Wage Convergence across States
Sources and notes: NSS Unincorporated Enterprises Survey, 67 th Round (2010) and 73 rd Round (2015). All wages are deflated 
using state-level CPI (rural and urban combined), base year 2015. Refer list of state codes. Union Territories have been excluded. 
The relationship is statistically significant only for unorganized services.
organised sector wages are high (Figure 4.8). 
Another way to understand this relationship 
is by hypothesising that unorganised sector 
wages are uncorrelated with organised sector 
wages. It is worth investigating the role played 
by differences in labour productivity as well 
as labour market institutions across states in 
driving this difference.
A third interesting aspect is the differences 
across states in the nature of the unorganised 
sector labour market. This is manifested in the 
variation across the trend line in Figure 4.8. 
For example, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala are 
very similar in terms of the level of organised 
manufacturing wage rate, but the wage gap is 
much worse in MP compared to Kerala. 
a) Unorganised Manufacturing
b) Unorganised Services
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Given such variation in the level of wages 
(in all three sectors), a question of interest 
is whether states with lower wage rates in 
2011 experienced faster rates of growth 
in the subsequent years, resulting in wage 
convergence between states. Once again, this 
can be tested by plotting the initial level of 
the wage rate against the subsequent rate of 
growth. Figure 4.9 shows three different graphs 
for the three sectors. There is some evidence 
that states with lower initial levels of wage rate 
displayed a higher rate of growth in subsequent 
years. But the relationship is statistically 
significant only for unorganised services (see 
Table A4.3 of online Appendix for data). 
Of course, this analysis does not tell us 
whether this is due to faster growth of wages 
in existing industries or changes in the 
industrial composition of a state as wages vary 
significantly across industries. But regardless, 
this issue is worth investigating further. 
The 2016−17 Economic Survey reported 
divergence between states on the basis of per 
capita GDP for the period 2004 to 2014. While 
the two analyses are not comparable due to 
different variables and time periods, it is worth 
asking if the story of divergence would change 
if we examine the period after 2011 separately.
c) Organised Manufacturing
Sources and notes: ASI Principal Characteristics 2010 and 2015. All wages are deflated using state-level CPI (rural and urban 
combined), base year 2015. Refer list of state codes. Union Territories have been excluded. The relationship is not statistically 
significant.
4.3 / Sectoral Analysis of 
Wage Rates
In this section, we delve deeper into each 
sector. We report industry-level wages for 2011 
and 2015 together with the share of workers 
accounted for by that industry, for three 
sectors: organised manufacturing, unorganised 
manufacturing, and unorganised services. As 
mentioned earlier, there is no national-level 
official data on the organised services sector. 
Here we present highlights from the data. The 
complete data are available in Table A4.4 to 
A4.6 of the online data Appendix.
4.3.1 / Manufacturing
As we saw earlier, at the all-India level the 
annual real wages for all workers in organised 
manufacturing have risen at a CAGR of around 
2 per cent. To place this in a historical context, it 
should be noted that, since 2007, a long period 
of stagnation in wage rates of production 
workers has been reversed. However, there is 
significant variability across industries, in terms 
of the quality as well as quantity of employment 
they support. 
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Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years. Nominal values are deflated by CPI-IW (base 2015). Lines 
represent the minimum annual salary recommended by the 7th Central Pay Commission (Rs. 18000 per month x 12). Fd-Food, 
Bv-Beverages, To-Tobacco, Tx-Textiles, Ga- Garments, Lh-Leather, Wo-Wood, Pa-Paper, Md-Media, Ch-Chem, Ph-Pharma, Pl-
Plastics, Nm-Non-Metal, Mt-Metal, Fm-Fab. Metal, Ce-Comp-Electronics, El-Electrical, Mc-Machinery nec, Mo-Motor vehicles, 
Tr-Transport, Fn-Furniture, Ot-Other Manu, Rp-Repair, Pb-Publishing.
Figure 4.10 : Real Wages Have Grown in Most Organised Industries but Are Still Well Below Minimum Salary 
Recommendation of the Central Pay Commission
Figure 4.10 compares real wages in major 
manufacturing industries in 2011 and 2015.3 
Most of the points lie above the diagonal 
showing that most industries have posted 
real wage increases in this period. However, 
despite sustained growth, especially since 
2008, wages are significantly below what 
the government stipulates as the lowest 
acceptable wage, namely the seventh CPC 
Group D salary of ₹18,000 per month (Ministry 
of Finance 2015). This is so for almost all 
industries with the exception of metals, repair, 
and publishing. Overall, even in 2016, 90 per 
cent of the industries did not provide wages 
sufficient to cover the need-based minimum 
for all its workers. On the other hand, wage 
rates for supervisors uniformly exceed the CPC 
threshold (data not shown).
The situation is worse for the unorganised 
sector. Around two-thirds of the workers in 
unorganised manufacturing are concentrated 
in five industries: food products, textiles, 
wearing apparel, non-metallic minerals, and 
fabricated metal products. In most of these 
industries, wages are lower than the overall 
average. Wage rates differ extensively across 
industries from a low of ₹53,415 per year in 
tobacco (a heavily female-dominated industry, 
see Chapter Five) to a high of ₹1,07,511 per 
year in other transport equipment (both rates 
are in 2015 prices). 
Wages have grown at faster rates in almost all 
unorganised industries, compared to organised 
industries. In aggregate, overall wages in 
unorganised industries grew by 4 per cent 
annually from ₹57,928 to ₹70,848. Despite this, 
in almost all industries, mean yearly wage rates 
are less than half the CPC minimum. In fact 
99.97 per cent of workers earn less than the 
stipulated wage (data not shown).
3   Note that our definition of the wage rate is wages per worker. The ASI data also allow the calculation of wages per person per day 
worked. A comparison of the two can give insights into prevalence of overtime in this sector, but this is not examined here.
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Here the question arises whether relatively 
lower paying industries have experienced faster 
rates of wage growth, resulting in convergence 
in manufacturing wages. Figure 4.11 shows 
initial wages in 2011 plotted against the CAGR 
between 2011 and 2015 for various industries 
in the organised (red) and unorganised (blue) 
sectors. As expected, unorganised wages are 
lower. But two points are worth noting. First, 
the spread in organised sector wages is much 
greater than unorganised sector wages. Second, 
and even more interestingly, there is evidence 
for convergence in both sectors, albeit stronger 
in the unorganised than the organised.
We can therefore conclude that, overall, there is 
both a narrowing of the wage gap between the 
organised and unorganised sectors (as reported 
in the previous section), as well as a convergence 
across industries within each sector.
Sources and notes: ASI NIC 2 digit (EPWRFITS) various years, NSS Unincorporated Enterprises Survey 67th Round (2010) and 
73rd Round (2015). NIC (2008) 2-digit Industries. Nominal wages are deflated using CPI-IW (base 2015).
Figure 4.11 : Wage Convergence across Industries in the Manufacturing Sector
4.3.2 / Services
Based on the data supplied by the NSS 
enterprise surveys, we are able to offer our 
analysis of only the unorganised part of the 
service sector. We find that wage rates have 
grown in most industries, but are still far 
below what is considered desirable. In this 
sector, employment is dominated by retail and 
wholesale trade, food and beverage services, 
and education, which together account for 
over 60 per cent of employment. Given that 
the sector often acts as a sink for employment 
and is the largest source of employment after 
agriculture, the rate of wage growth is of special 
interest from a welfare perspective.
Overall the sector experienced a 5 per cent 
CAGR for wages between 2011 and 2015, 
higher than unorganised manufacturing. 
Despite sustained growth, however, once again, 
what is striking is the extent to which these 
wages fall below the CPC Group D salary. In 
almost all industries, mean yearly wage rates 
are less than half or even quarter the suggested 
minimal wage, with around 99.5 per cent of the 
workers earning below the mandatory wage 
(see Table A4.6 in online Appendix for details).  
Taken together, we see that wage rates lie far 
below the CPC minimum in all the three sectors 
studied here. This can probably account for 
the extremely high demand for government 
employment seen all over the country.
Finally, we reiterate that there is no recent 
nationally representative data on wage rates in 
the organised services sector. This is a matter 
of concern since industries such as finance, 
insurance, IT, and others, have experienced 
very rapid growth in value-added in the past 
few years. The employment and wage effects 
of this growth are, however, much less known. 
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Sources and notes: RBI Database on the Indian Economy. Year-on-year growth rates are shown. Nominal values are deflated 
using CPI-AL (base 2005).
Figure 4.12 : Growth Rate of Real Wages for Selected Occupations for Men in Rural India
4.3.3 / Agriculture
Despite the prevalence of self-employment in 
agriculture, wages have increasingly become 
an important source of income for farm 
households also. The NSS Situation Assessment 
of Farmers Survey (Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation 2014) showed that 
for households with 2.5 acres of land or less (75 
per cent of all households), 20 per cent report 
wages as their primary income source. This 
number goes up to 35 per cent for households 
For corporate India, in general, analysis of the 
CMIE data suggests that wage growth has been 
declining since 2006 (Vyas 2017), which, in turn, 
suggests a general weakness in employment 
generation.
owning an acre or less. Wages also constitute 
an important secondary income source for 
those farm households whose primary income 
comes from own cultivation. 
In the past few years, the lack of wage growth 
is seen most acutely in rural areas, where the 
period since 2014 has seen dramatically lower 
growth than the preceding period. From 2010 
to 2014, rural wage growth was 8 per cent per 
annum in real terms, very close to the growth 
rate of GDP during the period. But this was, 
it seems, an exceptional period since growth 
was far slower both before and since. The 
rate of rural wage growth (in agriculture and 
non-agricultural occupations) collapsed in 2014 
and is still far below the desired rate as per the 
most recent data (February 2018) (Figure 4.12).  
The rate of 
rural wage 
growth 
collapsed in 
2014.
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What is a ‘desired’ rate? Recall that rural 
wages, like wages in many urban informal 
activities, are very low. For an income of 
around ₹7,000 a month to reach the CPC 
minimum, it would have to more than double. 
Indeed, doubling of farm incomes by 2022 has 
been one of the key promises of the current 
NDA government. Even at the rate of 10 per 
cent growth per year, incomes double only 
every seven years. Thus, either doubling of 
incomes, or fulfilling the recommendations 
of the Swaminathan Commission that the 
net take home income of farmers should be 
comparable to those of government servants, 
would require sustained growth of wages for 
several years at very high rates.
But there is another issue to consider when 
discussing agricultural wages, which applies 
to an extent to the unorganised sector in 
general. Employers generally cope with 
higher labour costs by raising prices. But the 
structure of agricultural markets is such that 
producers have almost no price setting power. 
All available data indicate that farmers are 
increasingly buying more expensive inputs 
while having to sell their output for low prices, 
often at less than the cost of production. This 
is because markets are monopsonistic, the 
product is perishable, and transaction costs of 
transportation and storage are high. So selling 
at the price being offered by a trader at the 
local market is the only option for the farmer. 
This has resulted in country-wide agitations by 
farmers for higher minimum support prices. 
It appears that small and marginal farmers (the 
majority of farmers) are caught in a double 
bind. As wage-earners, their wage growth 
has collapsed. As employers, when wages are 
growing strongly, they do not get a high enough 
price to recover the costs of production.
Finally, because food prices are linked 
directly to urban wages, an increase in the 
agricultural wage rate is viewed with concern 
in policy circles as an indicator of inflationary 
pressures to come. It is worth pointing out 
here that reforming the political economy of 
the agricultural supply chain and ensuring 
adequate storage and transportation facilities 
can both reduce the pressure on wages and 
also bring down food prices. 
4.4 / Wage-Productivity 
Divergence and Labour Share
The Indian economy has experienced 
significant changes in production techniques 
in every sector over the past few decades. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, production has 
become more capital intensive or less labour 
intensive in nearly every manufacturing 
industry in the organised and unorganised 
sectors. This is true, if to a lesser extent, for 
agriculture and services as well. Technical 
change and increased use of machinery in 
production generally raises the productivity of 
labour, a development to be welcomed in the 
process of structural change.
However, increases in the productivity of 
labour do not translate automatically into 
higher wages and improved standards of living 
for the majority of workers. Particularly for 
labour surplus economies like India, wages 
tend to remain depressed even as productivity 
rises. This tends to increase inequality in 
the economy, at least for a period of time 
until surplus labour supplies are exhausted. 
But simply waiting for growth to eventually 
deliver higher wages is not a feasible option 
in a democracy. Further, if growth is relatively 
‘jobless’, then absorption of surplus labour and 
increase in wage rates is further delayed. 
A second key variable in determining the link 
between productivity and wages is the quality 
of labour market institutions. These include 
the regulatory framework of labour laws 
and collective bargaining institutions. In this 
respect, the Indian scenario leaves much to 
be desired. While, on paper, India possesses 
strong laws to protect the interests of labour, 
in practice, these are rarely binding (Nagaraj 
2018). The vast majority of the unorganised 
sector workforce is already outside the scope 
of these institutions. But unfortunately, even in 
the organised sector, labour market institutions 
have eroded in strength over the years.
As a consequence, we see a large divergence 
between wages and productivity. In organised 
manufacturing, between 1982 and 2015, labour 
productivity, as measured by real gross value 
added per employee went up by six times. 
But how were the productivity gains shared 
Between 1982 
and 2015, the 
real wage rate 
grew at 1.4 
per cent per 
year while 
productivity 
grew at 5.5 per 
cent per year 
in real terms. 
This points to 
a large shift 
in favour of 
capital.
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between labour and capital? On average, the 
real wage rate grew at 1.4 per cent per year 
over the entire period, while productivity grew 
at 5.5 per cent per year in real terms. This 
points to a large shift in distribution in favour of 
capital (Figure 4.6).
Taken together, these trends, namely, rising 
capital intensity and growing divergence between 
productivity and wages, are expected to cause a 
fall in the share of value-added going to workers 
in the form of wages and emoluments, with the 
bulk going to owners of capital.
Figure 4.13 : Falling Labour Share in Organised Manufacturing
Sources and notes: Nominal emoluments have been deflated by CPI(IW), base= 2015.
Sources and notes: Nominal wages have been deflated by CPI(IW), base= 2015.
a) Wages
b) Emoluments
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Indeed, in nominal terms, from the early 1980s 
until 2007, the share of wages in organised 
manufacturing fell steadily from a high of just 
over 35 per cent to a low of just under 10 per 
cent, a very large drop (Figure 4.13a). Since 
then, in nominal terms, there has been a small 
improvement in the wage share, driven largely 
by more rapidly rising wages as well as falling 
capital productivity, possibly resulting from 
excess capacity following the investment boom 
of the mid-2000s (Basole and Narayan 2018). 
In real terms, due to the divergence between 
price indices for consumers (CPI) and producers 
(WPI), the wage share does not rise post-2007, 
but plateaus and stops falling. The trends 
are the same for emoluments (which include 
managerial compensation) but the levels are 
higher as expected (Fgure 4.13b). 
Trends aside, however, the salient fact is that 
the share of labour in Indian manufacturing 
is very low today. Three recent studies have 
taken a closer look at the falling wage share 
and tried to identify its determinants (Kapoor 
2016; Abraham and Sasikumar 2017; Jayadev 
and Narayan 2018). The first study shows 
that contractualisation, increasing number 
of female (and hence relatively lower paid) 
permanent workers, and intensification of work 
(more days of work in place of more workers) 
have contributed to the falling wage share. 
In this respect, it is worth pointing out that 
the average annual work hours in India are 
among the highest in our cohort of comparison 
countries, exceeded only by Pakistan.4 
Analyses by Jayadev and Narayan (2018) and 
Kapoor (2016) suggest that capital intensive 
technology, a shift in industrial organisation 
towards more output being produced by low 
labour cost firms, and the reduction in the 
bargaining strength of labour are all robust 
correlates of this decline. In addition, Ahsan 
and Mitra (2014) use CMIE data to suggest that 
trade liberalisation has been another cause of 
the general decline.
The decline in India’s labour share runs counter 
to the typical trajectory with development 
first noted by Kravis (1962) and Kuznets and 
Murphy (1966), who suggested that the process 
of development and the attendant structural 
change, as labour moved out of agriculture 
into organised wage labour, urbanisation and 
demographic changes, would serve to increase 
the labour share. Indeed, Rodriguez and Ortega 
(2001) find that, in general, manufacturing 
labour shares increase with the level of income 
of a country, while Jayadev (2007) finds that 
labour shares economy-wide do so as well. 
India’s decreasing labour share during a period 
of very rapid growth is then a serious anomaly.
It should be remembered that here we are 
talking about a small part of India’s labour 
force, and, indeed, a small part of India’s 
industrial labour force. The clear majority of 
workers, even in industry, are not captured 
by these surveys. However, given that these 
data are from the organised sector, they are 
likely to reflect that part of the industry where 
the conditions of work and labour-capital 
bargain are most favourable for workers. In 
this respect, a steadily falling labour share goes 
contrary to the narrative of strong labour laws.
Das, Choudhury, and Singh (2015) note that the 
strict provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 
regarding the hiring and firing of labour have, 
over the years, been increasingly circumvented 
by employers via the use of various forms of 
temporary and contract workers. Nagaraj (2018) 
similarly notes that proponents of the labour 
market rigidity hypothesis have mostly relied on 
the textual reading of the regulatory process, 
and not its outcome. He asks instead: if the 
laws are so stringent, why is there such a large 
divergence between wages and productivity? 
The answer: ineffectiveness of the laws.
While the divergence between wages and 
productivity in the organised sector has been 
noted earlier, we also report here, for the 
first time, an equivalent divergence as well 
as declining wage share in the unorganised 
manufacturing sector. Strikingly, wages per 
worker and value-added per worker are almost 
the same until 2005, indicating very little 
surplus or capital share in this sector (Figure 
4.14). Subsequently, productivity has doubled 
in the next ten years, while wages have grown 
by around 50 per cent creating a substantial 
4  (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AVHWPEINA065NRUG)
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Figure 4.14 : Wage-Productivity Divergence in the Unorganised Manufacturing Sector
Sources and notes: NSS informal and Unincorporated Enterprise Surveys, various rounds (see Methods for details). Nominal 
values deflated by CPI-IW (base 2015).
4.5 / Conclusion
The Indian economy remains largely an 
informal economy. The tendency towards 
formalisation exists, but is weak. Even today, 
less than 20 per cent of the total workforce 
consists of regular wage workers. And, within 
the universe of wage workers, less than 20 
per cent have access to some social security 
benefits and a written contract.
State-level analysis reveals some unexpected 
findings in need of further investigation. For 
example, Gujarat and Maharashtra display 
greater levels of formalisation than the 
southern states. There is also evidence for a 
‘convergence’ in formality across states.
Wages rates have grown consistently 
across different sectors with the exception 
of agriculture. In the non-farm sector, 
unorganised sector wages have grown faster, 
closing the gap with the organised sector. But 
the level of wages in every sector studied, is 
still far below a ‘decent wage’, where the latter 
is defined as the minimum group D salary 
of ₹18,000 per month recommended by the 
seventh CPC. This can account for both the 
vastly over-subscribed nature of public sector 
employment and the social movements in 
favour of expansion of job quotas.
Finally, wage growth, particularly in the 
organised manufacturing sector, is dwarfed by 
a much larger increase in labour productivity, 
with a resulting collapse in the labour share 
of income in this sector. Moreover, wage-
productivity divergence and falling wage share 
are also seen in unorganised manufacturing, 
albeit to a lesser extent. 
surplus. Correspondingly, however, the wage 
share has declined from 65 per cent in 2005 to 
45 per cent in 2016.
The level of 
wages, in every 
sector studied, 
is still far 
below a ‘decent 
wage’ where 
the latter is 
defined as 
the minimum 
salary of 
₹18,000 
per month 
recommended 
by the seventh 
CPC.
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Who Does the Work?
Gender and Caste in the Indian Workforce
Chapter 5
In a field survey in rural West Bengal, the 
most commonly cited reason by women not 
engaged in paid work was that there was 
no work available in the area. Resistance 
from the family was not such an important 
reason. Nor was the fact that women did 
not feel the need to work because their 
needs were being provided for already.
 - Talwar (2018)
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Social identities such as caste, gender, and religion continue to play an important role in the Indian labour market. This 
chapter investigates the extent to which 
occupational and industrial segregation as 
well as identity-based income gaps have 
declined with economic growth. Several recent 
studies have addressed this question (Das 
and Dutta 2007; Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan 
2013; Agrawal 2016; Deshpande, Goel, and 
Khanna 2018). A recent survey of the literature 
examining both caste and gender dimensions 
of the Indian labour market is found in Papola 
and Kannan (2017).
5.1 / Measuring Caste and 
Gender Disparities
There are significant data constraints in 
addressing this question. Firstly, wage and 
income data are sparse. The quinquennial 
(‘thick round’) employment−unemployment 
surveys (EUS) conducted by the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) provide 
wage information for those employed in 
casual and regular wage work. These surveys 
do not provide data on earnings from self-
employment, which is a major omission given 
that nearly 50 per cent of the workforce is 
self-employed. Further, no data is available 
from this survey after 2011. Two rounds 
of the India Human Development Survey 
(IHDS) do provide wage and income data 
for all workers in the sample, including the 
self-employed. However, this data is also not 
available after 2011. The only recent nationally 
representative large sample survey of incomes 
is the employment−unemployment survey 
conducted by the Labour Bureau in 2015−16. 
But this survey did not collect data on exact 
rupee amounts and instead asked respondents 
to choose an income category. Usefully, it 
provides such information for self-employed 
workers as well as wage workers. 
Secondly, in most surveys, ‘caste’ is categorised 
into large sub-groups such as scheduled tribes 
(ST), scheduled castes (SC), other backward 
classes (OBC), and ‘Others’, the last one usually 
taken as a proxy for upper castes. Recent 
research confirms that such categories can 
hide important variation between jatis that 
constitute the broad official categories 
(Joshi et al 2018).
Thirdly, the LB-EUS does not include 
information on religious identity. This is a very 
important omission that does not allow us to 
examine the state of religious discrimination 
and segregation in the past few years. Absence 
of data compels us to focus only on caste and 
gender in this chapter. We emphasise, however, 
the need to study religious dimensions of the 
Indian labour market, which have, generally, 
been less well explored than caste and gender.
Household surveys can be supplemented with 
enterprise surveys at least for gender analyses. 
As we saw in Chapter Four, wage and income 
data are also available in enterprise surveys 
such as the ASI and the NSS establishment 
surveys for the unorganised sector. These 
surveys usually do not report on the caste of 
workers, but the ASI reports the gender of the 
worker, and NSS surveys report the gender 
of the working owner or entrepreneur in the 
unorganised sector.
We use all the above sources to construct 
a picture of occupational and industrial 
segregation as well as earnings gaps. The data 
for our analysis comes from LB-EUS (2015), 
NSS-EUS (2004 and 2011), ASI (2000 to 2014) 
and NSS enterprise surveys (1994, 2000, 2005, 
2010, 2015). 
We adopt two different methods to measure 
segregation. First, we look at the level of 
occupations or industries. There are two 
simple ways to measure the degree of gender 
segregation here: the share of men versus 
women within an industry or occupation 
as compared to the gender’s share in the 
workforce, or the percentage of men or women 
in each industry/occupation as compared to the 
share of the total workforce in that industry or 
occupation. 
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5.2 / Gender Disparities in 
the Indian Economy
By the first measure, women are 
over-represented in those occupations or 
industries where their share is higher than their 
share in the overall workforce. And vice-versa 
for under-representation. Note, of course, that 
this measure does not take into account the low 
participation of women in the workforce as such. 
By the second measure women are 
over-represented if the proportion of women in 
a particular occupation or industry is larger than 
the proportion of the entire workforce found 
in that occupation or industry. The situation 
is conceptually identical for caste or religion, 
with the difference that more than two groups 
are involved. For example, as per the second 
measure SC groups are over-represented in a 
particular industry if their proportion in that 
industry exceeds the percentage of the overall 
workforce in that industry. 
A second approach we take is to calculate 
a summary index of segregation called the 
Duncan Index of Dissimilarity (Duncan and 
Duncan 1955). Duncan Index is a measure of 
nominal segregation that provides estimates of 
the extent to which the distribution of men and 
women differ across industries (or other units of 
choice such as sectors, occupations and so on). 
The index does not depend on the ranking of the 
units. It measures the extent to which there is 
a larger or smaller than expected proportion of 
one group over another in a given occupation or 
industry. Thus the index will take the value zero 
when the share of a given group in an industry 
is equal to the group’s share of employment 
as a whole; and it will take the value one for 
the case of complete segregation. The index 
can be interpreted as the percentage of either 
men or women who would have to move from 
their current industry so that the two groups 
have an identical distribution across industries. 
For example, a dissimilarity index of 0.2 for the 
distribution of women against the distribution 
of men would indicate that 20 per cent of the 
women would need to be redistributed across 
industries to equalise the distribution of men 
and women in all industries. 
Before we discuss patterns of segregation as 
well as earnings gaps, it is important to flag 
one key issue. Women’s work in the economy 
is generally rendered invisible through male-
biased concepts and definitions. Housework, 
care-work, and unpaid subsistence activities, 
such as collecting fuelwood and water, and 
growing produce for home consumption, 
are generally performed by women. If these 
activities are included in the definition of 
work on par with paid work, women put in far 
more hours of work per day than men. This 
also changes our perceptions of labour force 
participation and related concepts (Mondal et 
al. 2018). 
Another caveat is that our analysis here is based 
mostly on secondary datasets. These have the 
advantage of being nationally representative. 
But detailed field studies can reveal important 
insights not always available from the secondary 
data. In the case of women’s work, this becomes 
especially critical since much of their work is 
invisible to standard surveys. Field studies such 
as the one by Talwar (2018) in rural West Bengal 
reveal changes in women’s work and women’s 
time-use as well as connections that can be hard 
to spot in secondary data. For example, among 
the women in this survey who reported not 
doing paid work, opposition by the family was a 
distant fourth reason behind lack of work nearby 
(36 per cent), illness or disability (21 per cent), 
and other reasons (18 per cent). The author 
noted that, at least in this case, the lack of 
suitable employment opportunities compatible 
with responsibilities of unpaid work lies behind 
lack of labour force participation rather than 
improved rural incomes or social restrictions 
and honour of the family (see Box 5.1).
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While in many states female labour force participation 
rates have been falling (see Chapter Two), in West 
Bengal, they have been rising. The Shramjivi Mahila 
Samiti (SMS) is a mass organisation of rural working 
women that has been actively involved in issues facing 
rural working women since its inception in 1990. SMS 
collected data on women’s work and time-use in a 
survey covering about 692 respondents in four villages 
in four districts, Nadia, North 24 Parganas, South 24 
Parganas and Paschim Midnapore. Purposive and 
snowball sampling techniques were used. The cohort 
was split evenly between women who undertook paid 
work (387) and those who did not (305).
Focus group discussions and interviews with 
employers and political leaders in rural communities 
revealed that more and more women were coming 
into paid work as men migrated out of the region. 
Among those who did not do paid work, lack of 
opportunities was the most common reason (36 per 
cent), while family opposition was a distant fourth (11 
per cent) behind illness or disability (21 per cent), and 
other reasons (18 per cent).
 
Such micro studies help in a more nuanced 
interpretation of analyses of female labour participation 
rates based on NSS data. Recall that improved rural 
incomes and the resulting desire of men that their 
women withdraw from the workforce for the honour 
of the family has been cited as an important reason 
behind falling LFPRs (see Chapter Two).
The SMS study finds that the most common demand 
women have from the government after a better 
public distribution system (PDS) and closing of 
liquor shops, is creation of work opportunities, fixing 
minimum wages, and increasing MGNREGA work.  
Time-use analysis shows that of the 387 women who 
reported that they were involved in paid work, the 
maximum (161) reported working for 8 to 10 hours 
a day. Of the women who do paid work, 64 per cent 
spend somewhere between 4 to 8 hours on unpaid 
housework. Case studies and focus groups reveal that 
men help with the housework only in a few instances. 
And, even in these cases, the women reported that 
they extended help as and when it pleased them. So, 
the women could not count on their help.
Earnings were very low. 92 per cent of women earned 
less than ₹3000 per month. Low earnings are as much 
a function of non-availability of work as of low wages. 
Wages ranged from ₹70 per day for vegetable picking 
to ₹360 per day for working in a brick field. Even 
government programmes like mid-day meals only pay 
₹300 to ₹450 per day to the cooks, and that too not for 
the whole year. Other occupations such as domestic 
work and Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) work 
offer more regular employment throughout the year, 
but pay only ₹1000−1500 per month.
Since no one occupation provides women with 
either full-time employment or a living wage, it is not 
uncommon for them to be working at multiple jobs. 
The survey revealed that 40 per cent of the women 
had two paid occupations and 22.5 per cent had 
three. The most frequently found occupations were 
daily labour and MGNREGA work, followed by animal 
husbandry, agricultural labour, and domestic work. 
Other occupations included work such as zari work, 
weaving, mid-day meal cooking, fishing, petty retailing, 
running tea shops, and so forth.  A few examples 
of the actual mix of occupations that the survey 
discovered are as follows:
a. Selling second-hand clothes and  
agricultural work (₹3000)
b. Fritters shop, MGNREGA, and selling rice (₹2000)
c. MGNREGA and daily labour (₹800)
d. MGNREGA and handloom (₹1500)
e. Brick kiln work, daily labour, sand mining, 
agricultural work (₹6800)
f. Tailoring, brick kiln work, daily labour, cooking  
mid-day meal (₹2700) 
‘Daily labour’ is really a set of occupations that vary 
depending on availability. This involves taking up 
whatever work is available on a given day: agricultural 
labour, paddy processing or making puffed rice, 
carrying bricks during construction work, clearing the 
jungle in someone’s garden, collecting firewood for 
another household, or road work for a contractor.
Box 5.1 / Women’s Work in Rural West Bengal
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In the study, the worker in the second to last category 
(e) was an eight standard pass Adivasi woman from 
Paschim Midnapore district, who was a single mother 
with three daughters. 
When asked about social restrictions she noted:
I don’t care about social restrictions. I have to 
earn at any rate, because now the whole family’s 
responsibility is on my shoulders. Now my family is 
female headed, and completely controlled by me 
alone. There is no one left from whom I have to take 
permission. Adivasi women are generally free from 
these kind of restrictions.
Sources and notes: Talwar (2018)
5.2.1 / Occupational and Industrial 
Segregation
Broadly speaking, economic growth in India has 
still not generated a process of employment 
diversification, especially for women. Women 
workers remain highly over-represented in 
the low value-added industries as well as 
occupations, such as agriculture, textiles, and 
domestic service. 
Here we present data on the gender distribution 
within and across occupations as well as 
industries over the past ten years using the 
NSS-EUS and the LB-EUS. As we have noted 
before, these two surveys are sufficiently 
similar in the sampling method to warrant a 
comparison. We refer the interested reader to 
the chapter on Methods for details.
The online Data Appendix gives detailed 
tables for both occupations as well as for all 
manufacturing and service industries. Here we 
discuss the highlights.
We start with an analysis of occupational 
segregation at the one-digit level of the 
National Classification of Occupations (2004). 
The occupations are legislators and general 
and corporate managers, professionals in 
various services, associate-level professionals, 
clerks, service and sales workers, skilled 
agricultural workers, craft and tradespeople, 
plant and machinery workers, and elementary 
occupations, which consist of daily labour 
in various service, agriculture, and mining 
operations. The full distribution of male and 
female workers across different occupations is 
given in online Appendix Table A5.1.
The Duncan Index of Dissimilarity does not 
indicate a high level of occupational segregation 
of gender in India. The value of the index in 2015 
was 0.17. This means that around 17 per cent of 
the workers would need to change occupations 
to gain gender parity. Compared to industrial 
segregation (discussed later), this is a low 
number. However, two caveats are important. 
First, the occupational categories are very broad, 
and two, the index does not take into account 
the overall low level of women’s participation 
in the economy. While women comprise 50 
per cent of the population, they are only 22 
per cent of the workforce. In other words, the 
segregation measures are premised on most 
occupations being heavily male-dominated. 
Figure 5.1 shows the range of female 
representation across occupations and 
how it has changed from 2011 to 2015. The 
occupations are ordered from low to high 
representation in 2015. The reference line 
shows the overall share of women in the 
workforce (22 per cent). 
The picture is a mixed one. Women continue 
to be heavily under-represented among senior 
officers, legislators and managers. That is, 
the female share of such occupations is lower 
than even the low overall female share in 
employment. The situation worsened during the 
time period shown, with the proportion falling 
from 13 per cent in 2011 to 7 per cent in 2015. 
Also, on a negative note, women continue to be 
Women 
continue to be 
heavily under-
represented 
among senior 
officers, 
legislators 
and managers, 
and over-
represented 
in elementary 
occupations.
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over-represented in elementary occupations, 
which are among the least well-paid. That is, 
their share in these occupations (29 per cent) 
exceeds their share in the overall workforce 
(22 per cent). There is also a shift in women’s 
representation away from skilled agricultural 
work towards elementary occupations, which 
are generally less skilled. These shifts have 
obvious implications for the gender earnings 
gap, which we will explore in the next section.  
On the other hand, female representation 
is on par with their overall presence in the 
workforce in relatively high-paying professional 
jobs. Women are even over-represented 
among associate-level professionals. Further, 
the share of women working in these well-
paying occupations has increased steadily 
since 1994 (data not shown). The caveat is that 
this has mostly been a result of increases in 
their participation in activities related to health 
and education (Mondal et al. 2018). The other 
observation is that women tend to occupy lower 
levels and hence less paid sub-occupations 
within a broad occupational category, for 
example, primary school instead of secondary 
school teachers, college instead of university 
lecturers, and so on (see Box 5.2). 
Figure 5.1 : Share of Women in Various Occupations
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2011, LB-EUS 2015. Reference line indicates overall share of women in the workforce in 2015.
A closer look at the changing occupational and 
industrial profile of women workers reveals some 
interesting trends. Traditionally, secondary education 
has had a higher absolute number of male teachers, 
while women have dominated primary level teaching. 
This is still the case, but recent increases in female 
teaching professionals have been led by secondary and 
higher secondary teachers. This has led to an increase 
in the female-male ratio for secondary teachers over 
the period. However, this period also saw the rapid 
rise of private education facilities and contract work, 
offering much lower pay than public sector teaching 
jobs.
A second transformation of the labour market has been 
an increase in the absolute number of women, female 
shares, and female-male ratios of accountants, auditors, 
market research analysts, public relations officers, 
Box 5.2 / Changing Patterns of Women’s Employment
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personnel specialists, and financial analysts. Expectedly, 
though, these gains were confined to a small section of 
educated workers.
Among less skilled and unskilled women workers in 
urban areas, most were wage workers employed in 
sales, services, manufacturing, mining and construction 
sectors. Women working as salespersons dominated 
this category. Within personal services, the dominant 
occupations were of hairdressers, personal care, 
housekeeping and restaurant service workers and 
travel and tourism related work. The big increase (more 
than fivefold) was in the number of hairdressers and 
beauticians, of whom there were nearly a quarter of a 
million women workers in 2011, with the female-male 
ratio in this occupation increasing from 10.6 in 1993 to 
47.3 in 2011. 
Similar trends were evident for women in semi-skilled 
housekeeping and personal care, especially for janitors, 
cooks, home stewards, babysitters and governesses, 
tutoring services and other educational services, 
restaurant and cafeteria workers, catering services, 
and women working in hostels, boarding houses, and 
correctional homes. Such employment does not break 
the stereotypes associated with women’s work as most 
of these services are extensions of care work, which 
women have been performing historically, and, in fact, 
reinforces the gender stereotypes in occupations in 
altered, more commercialised contexts.
In the rural areas, women’s employment in teaching 
in both primary and secondary levels more than 
doubled over this period to reach nearly two million 
women workers in 2011. As in urban areas, women 
are, relatively, more frequently found among primary 
rather than secondary teachers. The female-male ratio 
in primary teaching rose from 23.5 per cent to 51.3 per 
cent and from 13.6 per cent to 33.3 per cent between 
1993 and 2011. From the job creation point of view, 
it is worth pointing out that this coincided with the 
implementation of government flagship schemes for 
improving school enrolment and education outcomes. 
While this greatly increased the demand for teachers, 
a large number were on contract and not regular 
employees of the government.
As with teaching, there were large increases in the 
number of women professionals in health, with a 
doubling in the number to 2.88 lakh workers in 2011. 
Once again, it had important implications for job quantity 
and quality. A large number of jobs were created as 
a result of public programmes in health, such as the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) that relied on 
ASHA health workers. But these were volunteers who 
were again paid stipends well below minimum wages. 
Thus government expansion in public services in health 
and education without an increase in public spending 
to fund regular salaried jobs has created a vast rural 
workforce of women possessing a basic level of skills. In 
the concluding chapter we have offered some thoughts 
on how future policy can build on this workforce.
As we have noted before in this report, the largest non-
farm employer in rural areas for both men and women 
is the construction sector. This has again partly been a 
consequence of public policy (in this case MGNREGA). 
Almost 5.8 million women workers were added to the 
rural construction sector over the period 2004 to 2011, 
out of which more than 50 per cent were in public 
construction work. There were also increases in women 
workers as head-loaders in brick kilns and wholesale 
markets. Note that many of these activities are an 
extension of what are seen as women’s traditional 
household chores, which include teaching children, 
taking care of the sick, cooking, fetching water and fuel, 
and so forth.
Thus, whatever occupational dynamism did occur for 
women workers in rural areas was primarily created by 
the government, both directly and indirectly. MGNREGA 
resulted in women workers in rural areas venturing 
into construction, albeit in unskilled activities, while the 
use of low-paid women workers in public health and 
education services meant an increase in supposedly 
high-skilled activities that were nevertheless poorly 
remunerated. However, a large middle segment of 
occupations requiring medium skills, that engaged 
a substantial share of non-farm women workers, 
continued to reflect segregated occupational patterns, 
with negligible changes over almost two decades.
Sources and notes: Mondal et al. (2018)
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Important changes, with respect to gender, 
have also been occuring across the three 
major sectors of the economy. As of 2015, 60 
per cent of women workers are in agriculture 
as opposed to only 42 per cent of male 
workers. The sector-wise share of women 
shows an over-representation in agriculture, 
representation proportional to their share in 
the workforce for manufacturing, and under-
representation in construction and services 
(Figure 5.2). Recall that the overall share of 
women in the workforce is 22 per cent.
Interestingly, in the decade between 2004 and 
2015, the declining participation of women in 
the labour force (discussed in Chapter Two) has 
resulted in a lower representation of women in 
both agriculture and manufacturing, while the 
share of women in construction and services 
has remained the same (though, of course, it is 
much lower than their share in the other two 
sectors). This means that the experience of 
structural change has been markedly different 
for women as compared to men. While they 
have shifted away from agriculture (slower than 
men), they have not moved into construction; 
rather, they have withdrawn from paid 
employment.
When we delve further into the manufacturing 
and service sectors at the NIC two-digit level, 
we find that both sectors remain heavily gender 
segregated. For example, while only 5.4 per 
cent of the overall manufacturing workforce 
is in the tobacco industry, nearly 20 per cent 
of women are employed there. Similarly, the 
overall share of apparel in manufacturing 
employment is 18.2 per cent, but it accounts 
for 31.5 per cent of women workers. In 2015, 
only tobacco, textiles, and apparel had a higher 
female share of employment than the overall 
manufacturing average (22.2 per cent). There 
is also evidence that the segregation may be 
increasing.
Figure 5.3 reports the share of women workers 
within each manufacturing industry over a 
ten-year period. Most industries are very 
heavily male-dominated (>80 per cent male 
workers), while in those industries that have a 
sizeable share of women workers, this share 
tends to be not more than 50 per cent (with the 
exception of tobacco). Additionally, industries 
with a high initial share of female workers are 
the ones in which the share has increased even 
further. On the other hand, in generally male-
dominated industries such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, non-metallic minerals, and 
computers and electronics, the share of women 
in the workforce has declined. Once again, 
the online Appendix provides detailed data on 
share of male and female workers (Table A5.2). 
Figure 5.2 : Share of Women in Various Sectors
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004, LB-EUS 2015
While women 
have shifted 
away from 
agriculture, 
they have not 
moved into 
construction; 
rather, 
they have 
withdrawn 
from paid 
employment.
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Figure 5.3 : Share of Women in Various Industries
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004, LB-EUS 2015. Reference line indicates overall share of women in the manufacturing or 
services workforce respectively, in 2015.
a) Manufacturing
b) Services
125
WHO DOES THE WORK?
While women constituted just over 22 per cent 
of the manufacturing workforce in 2015, they 
made up only 16 per cent of the service sector 
workers. Women’s share in a service industry 
substantially exceeds this number in only three 
industries: education (39 per cent), health (46 
per cent), and domestic service (59 per cent). 
However, it must be noted that the degree of 
over-representation of women in domestic 
services has steadily fallen. While in 2004 around 
70 per cent of the domestic workers were 
women, this had fallen to 59 per cent by 2015. 
Further, women are very poorly represented 
in well-paying industries such as finance, 
insurance, and real estate (FIRE), professional 
and technical services, and public 
administration, and one must keep in mind 
that their participation in services is already 
low. Thus, while the overall share of women 
in the service sector in 2015 was 16 per cent, 
their share in the above three industries was 
just 10 per cent. The years between 2005 and 
2011 saw some improvement but, since then, 
the trend has reversed. Once again, the online 
Appendix gives a comprehensive picture of 
the distribution of men and women across all 
service industries (Table A5.3).
The data suggest that overall gender 
segregation in the Indian economy may have 
worsened over the past few years. This can be 
measured directly with the Duncan Segregation 
Index, which represents the overall level of 
group segregation across any relevant unit 
(occupations, industries, neighbourhoods 
and so on). 
In 2015, the index was 0.4 in manufacturing and 
0.38 in services. That is, around 40 per cent of 
women would have to change their industries so 
that gender parity could be achieved. As noted 
earlier, compared to segregation in services or 
manufacturing, the level of occupational gender 
segregation is relatively low at 0.17. Segregation 
has increased substantially over time in 
manufacturing from 0.3 in 2005 to 0.4 in 2015 
and declined marginally in the service sector 
from 0.4 to 0.38.
The summary measure is also useful for 
direct comparisons of the degree of gender 
segregation across Indian states. Figure 5.4 
shows maps of the Duncan Index in 2015. As 
noted before, the overall level of segregation 
is higher in manufacturing than in services. 
However, there are large variations across 
Figure 5.4 : Gender-Based Segregation across States
0.86 - 0.95 0.76 - 0.85 0.66 - 0.75 0.56 - 0.65
0.46 - 0.55 0.36 - 0.45 0.26 - 0.35 0.15 - 0.25
Manufacturing Services
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Scale indicates the Duncan index of segregation. See text for description. See Appendix Table 
A5.4 online for data.
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states, from values as high as 0.7 for services 
in Punjab, Haryana, and some north-eastern 
states, and even 0.8 for manufacturing in 
Himachal Pradesh, to as low as 0.2 in Tamil 
Nadu (for both manufacturing and services). 
Recall that a value of 0.8 means that 80 per cent 
of women would have to change the industry 
they work in to achieve gender parity.
Interestingly, it is not necessary that states with 
high female labour force participation rates 
(LFPRs) also show low levels of segregation. For 
example, the southern and north-eastern states 
generally have higher female LFPRs than the 
northern and western states (see Chapter Two). 
But they also have higher levels of segregation 
in their manufacturing industries, indicating 
that women participate to a greater extent 
in the workforce, but in a gender-segregated 
way. The exception is Tamil Nadu which 
shows a high LFPR for women alongside a low 
segregation index. 
For the service industries though, the pattern is 
somewhat different. Here, the southern states 
are generally less segregated than the northern 
states.
The foregoing analysis suggests that it may be 
worthwhile to think of a composite measure of 
the status of women in the workforce that takes 
into account both the overall LFPR and the level 
of gender segregation across industries.
5.2.2 / Earnings Gaps
It is well known that women earn a fraction of 
what men earn almost everywhere in the world. 
The extent to which female earnings fall short 
of male earnings is conventionally referred to as 
an ‘earnings gap’. That is, the lower the female 
to male earning ratio, the higher the ‘gap’. In a 
detailed analysis of the gender wage gap in their 
SWI background paper, Mondal et al. (2018) use 
NSS-EUS data to show an increase in real wages 
for both regular and casual workers, with the 
rate of increase being faster among women. 
As a result, the aggregate gender wage gap has 
declined in both rural and urban areas for casual 
as well as regular workers. 
It is, however, still large in size. As of 2011, the 
gap stood at 80 per cent for urban regular 
workers and at 61 per cent, for urban casual 
workers. That is, women in the urban regular 
wage market earned 80 per cent of what 
men earned, while in the casual wage market 
they earned 61 per cent of male wages. The 
corresponding gaps in rural areas were 62.5 and 
61 respectively. Deshpande, Goel, and Khanna 
(2018) report similar values for 2010. 
Delving further into various occupations and 
industries, Mondal et al. (2018) show that women 
were paid 60 to 70 per cent of male wages 
across most agricultural occupations. This is the 
case even for tasks conventionally carried out 
by women such as transplanting, weeding, and 
harvesting. Though these gaps have declined for 
several tasks, there are important exceptions 
such as ploughing, a traditionally male 
occupation.
The gender wage gap has also declined across 
all occupations in general, but remained high 
among service and domestic workers as of 
2011. There was a significant reduction in the 
gap when it came to factory and home-based 
workers in female-dominated industries like 
food, tobacco, textiles, and wearing apparel, and 
for construction labourers.
Labour economists usually think of earnings gaps 
as being composed of two distinct components. 
Part of the gap is accounted for by differences 
in endowments or characteristics of workers. 
These include skills, education, and experience. 
The rest of the gap that is not explained by these 
observable characteristics is often thought of 
as resulting from discrimination. Mondal et 
al. (2018) show that gender wage gaps were 
explained primarily by the discrimination 
component, which steadily increased over 1993 
to 2011. The unexplained part of the gap was 
larger than the endowment component in both 
rural and urban areas. In fact, there has been 
a sharp decline in endowment effect because 
of increasing educational attainment among 
women. While this has led to a decline in the 
gap, a significant proportion of the wage gap still 
remains unexplained. This suggests that gender 
wage discrimination is high and persistent.
It is not 
necessary that 
states with 
high female 
labour force 
participation 
rates (LFPRs) 
also show 
low levels of 
segregation.
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Deshpande, Goel, and Khanna (2018) similarly 
find that an overwhelming part of the wage gap 
for regular wage or salaried workers cannot be 
explained by worker characteristics. Further, 
consistent with the findings of Mondal et al. 
(2018), they also find that the discriminatory part 
of the average wage gap has increased between 
2000 and 2010. The authors conclude that, given 
the improvement in endowments (especially 
education levels) over the decade, if women’s 
endowments had been valued at the same 
rate as men, they would have earned a higher 
average wage than men.
In the previous section, we have described 
trends in the Indian economy towards greater 
segregation, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector. However, this is balanced by decreasing 
segregation in services. There is also an increase 
in the representation of women in some 
relatively highly paid occupations and a decrease 
in over-representation of women in poorly paid 
occupations such as domestic service. What 
is the impact of these trends on the gender 
earnings gap? 
Since NSS-EUS data are only available until 2011, 
we cannot use it for more recent estimates. 
The more recent LB-EUS only gives monthly 
earnings of workers (self-employed as well as 
wage workers) by broad categories, and so, is not 
comparable with NSS wage data. However, the 
gender penalty clearly shows up as a leftward 
shift in the distribution of women’s earnings. In 
2015, the percentage of men reporting earnings 
up to ₹5000 or less was 43 per cent, far less than 
the 71 per cent of women whose earnings fell in 
the same bracket. 82 per cent of male and 92 per 
cent of female workers earned less than ₹10,000 
a month (Figure 5.5).
It is possible to provide some rough estimates 
of the gender gap if we approximate monthly 
earnings by assigning the mid-point value of an 
income range to every worker in that category. 
While it is not comparable to earlier estimates 
using NSS data, it nevertheless allows us to see 
that, at the aggregate, all-India level, monthly 
earnings for women workers were 65 per cent of 
male earnings (₹5212 versus ₹8000 per month) 
in 2015. 
The aggregate gender gap varies across types 
of work, level of education, occupation, as well 
as industry. Figure 5.6 shows the female-to-
male earnings ratio across type of employment. 
While the gap was the largest among employers 
(that is, self-employed workers hiring other 
workers), it was almost absent for agricultural 
workers. The high gender penalty among self-
employed workers is consistent with data from 
the unorganised enterprise sector discussed 
Figure 5.5 : 82 per cent of Male and 92 per cent of Female Workers Earn Less than Rs. 10,000 a Month
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015.
The percentage 
of men 
reporting 
earnings up 
to ₹5000 or 
less was 43 per 
cent, far less 
than the 71 per 
cent of women 
whose earnings 
fell in the same 
bracket.
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Figure 5.6 : Women Earn 50 to 80 per cent of Men’s Earnings across Employment Types
Figure 5.7 : The Gender Earnings Gap Narrows Significantly with Education beyond the Higher Secondary Level
later in the chapter. One possible explanation 
for this is that, unlike wage-workers who face 
discrimination only in the labour market, self-
employed women may be disadvantaged in the 
markets for capital and land, and in product 
markets as well.
The low level of gender penalty for casual 
agricultural workers is likely to be a ‘floor effect’ 
in that monthly earnings for casual agricultural 
workers were ₹3535 for men and ₹3030 for 
women, and perhaps cannot fall much lower. 
The gap for regular workers (0.8) is comparable 
to that found by Mondal et al. (2018) as well as 
Deshpande, Goel, and Khanna (2018). 
Figure 5.7 shows the same ratio by educational 
qualification. Interestingly, a U-shaped pattern 
is observed, wherein the gender penalty is most 
severe for intermediate levels of education. If 
we consider the relatively lower levels of the 
gap in the case of poorly educated workers as a 
floor effect, as in the case of casual agricultural 
workers, then it seems that the gap reduces with 
level of education from secondary schooling 
onwards. 
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. The earnings gap is defined as the ratio of female to male earnings. A higher ratio indicates a 
smaller gap.
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. The earnings gap is defined as the ratio of female to male earnings. A higher ratio indicates a 
smaller gap.
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Corroborative evidence on gender earnings 
gaps can be obtained from enterprise or 
firm-level and factory-level data from the NSS 
and ASI respectively. While the ASI collects 
data on the gender of the wage worker in its 
factory surveys, the NSS does not do so in its 
enterprise surveys. However, it does report the 
gender of the entrepreneur or working owner. 
Since the vast majority of the ‘firms’ in this data 
are tiny (with zero or at most one to two wage 
workers) it is a good source of data on earnings 
from self-employment. 
We can use gross value added (GVA) per 
worker, which is revenues minus non-wage 
costs divided by number of workers in the firm, 
as a measure of earnings in the unorganised 
sector. Comparing the performance of male 
versus female owned businesses then gives 
us an estimate of the gender penalty. For 
own-account enterprises (OAEs) which are 
operated only by a single working owner, the 
GVA per worker is equivalent to the mixed 
income of the working owner (that is, income 
from labour as well as returns to enterprise). 
For a business run with only unpaid family 
labour, the GVA is equivalent to the family’s 
mixed income. For establishments that hire 
at least one wage worker, the GVA per worker 
is no longer a proxy for earnings, but can still 
provide information on the gender penalty of 
entrepreneurship if we compare male versus 
female entrepreneurs.
In the unorganised manufacturing sector, we 
find that the earnings gap is very large for 
own-account enterprises and has not narrowed 
much over the last decade (Figure 5.8). In 2005, 
female-operated OAEs earned 34 per cent of 
what male-operated ones earned. In 2015, this 
number was 36 per cent. This clearly indicates 
that self-employed women who work for their 
own enterprises are at a large disadvantage in 
the unorganised sector. 
The gap was narrower for family enterprises 
at 56 per cent in 2005 and has narrowed 
further over time to 71 per cent in 2015. For 
establishments (that is, unorganised sector 
firms that hire at least one wage worker), in 
2005 and 2010, it was comparable to the salary 
gap for regular workers at around 82−84 per 
cent. But it has widened in recent years and, 
in 2015, the GVA per worker in female-owned 
establishments was 73 per cent of that in 
male-owned ones. 
Figure 5.8 : Own Account Women Workers Earn 30 per cent of Their Male Counterparts but the Gap Narrows 
Significantly to 80 per cent for Employers
Sources and notes: NSS informal and unincorporated enterprise surveys, various rounds (see Methods for details). Nominal 
values deflated by CPI-IW (base 2015). OAE - own account enterprise or single person firm. Family - enterprises operating only 
with unpaid labour. Establishment - enterprises hiring at least one wage worker. The earnings gap is defined as the ratio of 
female to male earnings. Earnings are defined as GVA/worker for male and female owned firms.
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Figure 5.9 : Gender Wage Gap in Organised Manufacturing is High but Has Been Declining
Sources and notes: ASI factory level data, various years. Wage gap is defined as the ratio of female to male wage rates weighted 
by size of the factory. See text for weighting details.
Note that there is a discrepancy between these 
data and the LB-EUS results reported earlier 
in Figure 5.6, where the gap was larger for 
employers than for own-account workers. The 
size of the gap measured in the two surveys 
is also very different, 0.6 in LB-EUS and 0.36 
in NSS. But since the LB-EUS data allows only 
an approximation of earnings from large 
categories, the NSS estimates may be taken to 
be more reliable.
Evidence on the manufacturing wage gap in 
the organised sector comes from ASI. This data 
gives factory-level information on the number 
of male and female workers as well as total 
wages paid to both. Thus we can calculate the 
total male and female wage bill as well as total 
male and female workers across all factories, 
and then calculate the wage rates as well as the 
male to female ratio of the wage rates. Note 
that this method assigns greater weights to 
factories with a greater number of workers.
Figure 5.9 shows the trends in the female to 
male wage ratio for size weighted estimates 
from 2000 to 2014 (the most recent year that 
factory-level data was available). The wage gap 
reduced from around 34 per cent in 2000 to 
46 per cent in 2013. In 2014, the gap was 40 
per cent. 
The foregoing analyses from diverse secondary 
data sources as well as field studies clearly 
show that gender equity in the structural 
change process remains unachieved. Some of 
the findings regarding increased segregation 
are even more worrying. Deliberate policy 
measures are required to ensure that equity 
becomes possible in the near future. 
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5.3 / Caste Disparities in the 
Indian Economy
Alongside gender, caste continues to be 
an important factor in determining labour 
market outcome in India. Papola and Kannan 
(2017) have reviewed the recent literature 
on caste discrimination in the labour market. 
Caste effects manifest in type of employment 
(regular, casual, and so on), industrial 
segregation, as well as earnings. 
NSS data have been used to show that upper 
caste Hindus have a higher chance of securing 
regular employment than SC and ST groups 
(Das and Dutta 2007). Thorat and Attewell 
(2007) conducted a study of call-backs to job 
applications analogous to the one by Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2004) that showed racial 
discrimination in the US labour market. The 
US study used identical resumes randomly 
assigned to African-American and white 
sounding names. In the Indian case, otherwise 
identical resumes had names assigned to them 
that were easily identifiable as Hindu upper-
caste, Hindu Dalit, or Muslim. These were sent 
in response to job advertisements by domestic 
and multi-national companies in New Delhi 
(2005−06). The authors found higher call-back 
rates for the first category compared to the 
other two.
  
Chakravarty and Somanathan (2008) find that 
SC and ST MBA graduates from the Indian 
Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad, 
get significantly lower wages than those in the 
general category. But the difference disappears 
after taking Grade Point Averages into account. 
Recent work by Joshi and Malghan (2017) shows 
that faculty at IIMs are themselves drawn 
largely from upper-castes. There is almost no 
representation of SC and ST groups. Thus caste 
discrimination in the Indian labour market 
cannot be viewed separately from that in the 
educational system.
We now undertake an exploration of 
caste-based occupational and industrial 
segregation as well as earnings gaps since 
2011. As indicated earlier, caste data is usually 
available only at a high level of aggregation 
with categories such as SC, OBC, and Others. 
These categories average together very 
different communities with diverse socio-
economic opportunities as well as outcomes. 
For example, traditionally dominant landed 
castes such as Jats or Marathas are clubbed 
together with more underprivileged castes 
such as Mauryas or Kunbis under an omnibus 
OBC category. Similarly, even within the SC 
category, there is diversity of opportunities 
and outcomes as well as social status. Further, 
different states of India follow different 
schedules such that the same community 
found in two states may be classified as SC in 
one and ST in another. This means that results 
are likely to be underestimated in some cases 
and overestimated in others. 
5.3.1 / Occupational and Industrial 
Segregation
We follow the same pattern as with gender 
in looking at segregation across occupations 
and industries over time using the one-digit 
NCO 2004 system and the NIC two-digit 
manufacturing and services classification 
harmonised across three rounds (1998, 
2004, and 2008). We have comparable data 
on occupations for 2011 and 2015, and 
on industries for 2005, 2012, and 2016. 
However, the same caveats as before apply for 
conclusions based on a comparison of NSS-EUS 
and LB-EUS data. 
Since there are four major caste groups 
as opposed to two gender groups, instead 
of showing the share of each caste in an 
occupation or industry, we instead show the 
degree of over- or under-representation of 
a particular caste group. Another reason for 
The percentage 
of SC 
individuals 
among 
professionals 
and managers 
is half their 
representation 
in the 
population. 
The situation 
is even worse 
for ST groups.
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focusing on representation in a particular 
occupation or industry compared to the overall 
share in the workforce in the case of caste is 
that no caste category is under-represented in 
the workforce as a whole, as was the case with 
women. 
A representation index can be calculated as 
the ratio of the share of that caste group in an 
occupation divided by the share of that caste 
in the entire workforce. Thus a value of one 
indicates proportional representation, a value 
less than one indicates under-representation, 
and a value greater than one indicates over-
representation. For example, if SC groups 
comprise 20 per cent of the workforce but 
only 10 per cent of professionals, the under-
representation index will be 0.5. 
Figure 5.10 shows these values for all caste 
groups and occupations for 2015. Note that 
occupations are arranged from left to right in 
order of increasing average remuneration or 
earnings. The detailed distribution tables are 
Figure 5.10 : SC and ST Groups Are Over-Represented in Poorly Paid Occupations while Upper Castes are 
Over-Represented in Well-Paid Ones
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Representation Index = (% in occupation/% in workforce). Numbers indicate average monthly 
earnings for a given occupation.
given in the online Appendix (Tables A5.1, A5.2 
and A5.3).
The pattern is very clear. In 2015, SC as well as 
ST groups were over-represented in low paying 
occupations and severely under-represented in 
the high paying occupations. Especially among 
professionals and managers, a value of 0.5 
indicates that the percentage of SC individuals 
is half their representation in the general 
population. The situation is even worse among 
ST groups (0.4). 
Conversely, as expected, representation 
of upper caste groups steadily increases 
with earnings, and they are generally over-
represented among professionals, managers, 
and clerks, that is, occupations requiring 
higher levels of formal education. Their over-
representation is as high as 1.8 in these 
occupations. OBC groups are generally 
represented in proportion to their population 
share across all occupations. The above 
situation has not substantially altered since 
2011 (data not shown).
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Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004 and 2011, and LB-EUS 2015
Table 5.1 : Caste Composition of the Principal Sectors of the Economy
SC (%) ST (%) OBC (%) Others (%)
For the year 2004:
Agriculture 20.7 14.4 42.5 22.4
Mining 26.1 16.5 38.0 19.5
Manufacturing 17.7 3.9 45.9 32.5
Construction 31.4 10.1 38.7 19.8
Services 15.9 3.9 37.7 42.5
Total 19.9 10.3 41.5 28.4
For the year 2011:
Agriculture 18.8 15.2 45.0 21.0
Mining 26.8 11.1 41.6 20.6
Manufacturing 16.2 4.0 46.0 33.8
Construction 32.0 10.9 39.5 17.6
Services 15.3 4.4 41.6 38.6
Total 19.0 10.2 43.5 27.3
For the year 2015:
Agriculture 22.5 14.9 39.4 23.3
Mining 23.9 15.3 36.5 24.4
Manufacturing 18.6 5.0 46.3 30.1
Construction 31.1 11.3 39.0 18.6
Services 15.8 6.1 39.9 38.2
Total 20.9 10.6 40.2 28.2
Before delving into the industrial segregation 
data, let us examine the broad sector-level 
shares of the four groups. Table 5.1 shows the 
caste composition of each major sector of the 
economy over the past decade. Agriculture is 
the only sector that displays shares close to the 
overall workforce shares. ST groups are over-
represented in mining, SC groups in construction 
as well as mining, and upper-castes in the 
service sector. We do not see a tendency for 
these disparities to reduce over this period.
Next, we look at industrial segregation within 
the manufacturing and service sectors. We focus 
on SC and ST groups since segregation is low or 
absent for OBC and upper castes. The caveat is 
that coarse categories may hide actually existing 
segregation. Figures 5.11a and 5.11b show the 
representation index (share in a given industry 
divided by the share in the total workforce) for 
both groups. Recall that an index of one means 
representation proportionate to that in the 
workforce. The wide range of the index going 
from 0.5 (or even lower in the case of ST groups) 
to 2.5 or 3 indicates a high level of caste-based 
segregation in the manufacturing sector.
A few things stand out. First, SC workers are 
vastly over-represented in the leather industry. 
46 per cent of leather industry workers belong 
to this category, while their proportion in the 
overall workforce is only 18.5 per cent, a clear 
indication of the enduring power of caste-
based segregation in India. Second, between 
2004 and 2011, there was a reduction in SC 
representation in industries such as computers, 
wood, and other manufacturing. The reasons 
behind this cannot be determined from these 
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data, but the question needs to be pursued. The 
ST manufacturing profile, though even more 
segregated than the SC case, has shown greater 
dynamism over this period. Several industries 
such as textiles, furniture, rubber and plastics, 
and paper, saw greater ST representation. On 
the other hand, some traditionally ST-heavy 
industries, such as wood, registered a decrease.
Figure 5.11 : Caste Representation across Manufacturing Industries
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004, LB-EUS 2015. Representation Index = (% in industry/% in workforce). Bars are ordered by 
increasing SC/ST representation in 2015
a) SC
b) ST
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Figure 5.12 : Caste Representation across Service Industries
Sources and notes: NSS-EUS 2004, LB-EUS 2015. Representation Index = (% in industry/% in workforce). Bars are ordered in 
increasing order of SC/ST representation in 2015.
a) SC
b) ST
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In the service sector, the range of over and 
under-representation is narrower than in 
manufacturing, as seen in the smaller range 
of the representation index. Figure 5.12 shows 
the data organised in increasing order of 
representation in 2015. There are some expected 
findings such as the under-representation of both 
groups (albeit more severe in the case of STs) in 
information and communication services and 
FIRE (index of 0.5 or 0.6). 
On the other hand, both SC and ST groups are 
much better represented (in some cases even 
over-represented) in public administration. This 
may indicate the success of reservation policies 
over the years. In this respect, Borooah, Dubey, 
and Iyer (2007) have found that reservation 
policies increase the representation of SC and 
ST groups in regular salaried employment by 
around 5 percentage points. One can thus 
speculate that lack of reservation policies 
in the private sector is the reason why well-
paying industries such as information and 
communication, FIRE, and professional and 
technical activities continue to be relative 
preserves of the upper-castes. Indeed, 
Madheswaran and Singhari (2016) argue that 
unequal access to high paying occupations is 
more important than wage discrimination within 
occupations in explaining the raw caste earnings 
gap in NSS data. On the basis of this, they 
advocate reservations in the private sector.
The final change to take note of is the reduction 
in ST representation in domestic services 
between 2004 and 2015, and an increase in 
both SC and ST shares in administration and 
support activities.
The secondary data cannot reveal much more 
than these overall trends. More fine-grained 
field studies and surveys are needed to identify 
the exact nature of these changes as well as 
their economic and social significance.
5.3.2 / Caste Earnings Gaps
above to have a strong effect on the caste 
earnings gap. 
Using the same approximation method on 
LB-EUS income data, described earlier in the 
section on gender, we find that the aggregate 
raw earnings gap between scheduled castes 
and upper castes in 2015 was 0.56. That is, 
average SC earnings were 56 per cent of upper 
caste earnings. The figure is 55 per cent for ST 
groups and 72 per cent for OBC.
There is a large variation in the raw gap averages 
across types of employment (Figure 5.13). 
As reported for gender, the gap is widest for 
own-account workers and employers, possibly 
indicating the combined deleterious effects of 
caste discrimination in multiple markets (labour, 
land, capital, and product). SC and ST own-
account workers report earnings that are only 46 
per cent of the earnings of upper-caste workers. 
OBC workers fare better but are still far behind 
upper castes, at 69 per cent.
The gap narrows substantially for regular 
workers from all caste groups. It is 0.9 for SC, 
0.8 for ST, and 1.05 for OBC, the last figure 
indicating parity with upper-caste workers. 
The gap is also very low for casual agricultural 
workers, though the reasons for the narrowing 
are probably quite distinct in both cases. The 
narrow gap among regular workers may indicate 
the effectiveness of relatively more formal work 
in reducing overt caste discrimination. The 
narrow gap among casual agricultural workers, 
on the other hand, may represent a floor effect 
due to very low wages. 
A surprising result is the relatively large gap 
observed among casual workers in public 
works such as MGNREGA, compared to private 
casual labour. This is the case for SC as well as 
OBC groups. Further investigation is required to 
see if caste discrimination is somehow playing 
a role in payments made to casual workers in 
public works. It should be noted, however, that 
despite the larger caste gap, workers of any 
caste in public works earn three to four times 
more than those in private casual work (see 
online Appendix Table A5.6 for details). 
As in the case of gender-based segregation, we 
expect the caste-based segregation described 
Higher 
representation 
of SC and 
ST groups 
in public 
administration 
and education 
could indicate 
the success of 
reservation 
policies over 
the years.
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Figure 5.13 : Caste Earnings Gaps Are Largest for Self-Employed Workers and Smallest for Regular Workers
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Earnings gap = Ratio of SC, ST or OBC earnings to Others earnings. A larger ratio indicates a 
smaller gap. Bars are ordered by increasing SC to Others ratio.
Once we control for level of education, the raw 
caste gap narrows considerably and varies much 
less across education categories than it does 
across types of employment (Figure 5.14). For 
SCs, the largest gap is 0.69 for certificate and 
diploma holders, and the smallest is 0.84 for 
those with less than primary level schooling. 
For graduates and post-graduates, the gap is 
0.77 and 0.74 respectively. Since 50 per cent of 
graduates and post-graduates are upper-caste, 
and only 11 per cent are from SC groups, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the reason 
for high raw caste disparity is due to the relative 
preponderance of upper castes among the 
higher educated. Thus, the data offer a clear 
indication of the benefits of increasing the 
representation of lower caste groups in higher 
education. 
In this regard, it is worth stating that the 
aforementioned study by Madheswaran and 
Singhari (2016) also finds that endowment 
differences matter more than discrimination for 
regular salaried workers.
In general, across all three groups, there is 
a U-shaped pattern, with gaps being low at 
the two ends of the educational spectrum 
and highest in the middle. It is possible that 
this is due to floor effects at the lower end 
and regulated or formal employment at the 
upper end. But this hypothesis needs further 
investigation. Finally, note that the earnings gap 
is lower for ST workers with higher educational 
qualification than SC workers with the same 
qualification. 
Our final piece of data on caste gaps is the 2015 
NSS unorganised sector enterprise survey. 
We used this source earlier to estimate the 
penalty paid by women entrepreneurs in the 
unorganised manufacturing sector. Figure 5.15 
shows the same for caste groups. As before, 
‘earnings gaps’ here are approximated by the 
gross value added per worker by a firm operated 
by SC, ST, or OBC entrepreneurs, compared to 
firms operated by upper-caste ones.
OBC entrepreneurs, whether they are operating 
own-account enterprises, family firms, or 
establishments with hired workers, perform 
better than SC or ST entrepreneurs, as seen 
in the lower earnings gap. SC and ST firms are 
comparable to each other, both earning 50 
to 60 per cent of what upper-caste firms do, 
depending on firm type. The gap is the largest 
for firms that run with only family labour, and 
the least for firms that hire wage workers 
In the 
unorganised 
sector, SC 
and ST 
entrepreneurs 
earn only 
around 50 to 
60 percent of 
what upper-
caste ones do.
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Figure 5.14 : Taking Education Level into Account Reduces the Caste Earnings Gap
Figure 5.15 : Caste Earnings Gap across Firm Types in the Unorganised Manufacturing Sector
Sources and notes: LB-EUS 2015. Earnings gap = Ratio of SC, ST or OBC earnings to Other earnings. A larger ratio indicates a 
smaller gap. Bars are ordered by increasing SC to Other ratio.
Sources and notes: NSS informal and unincorporated enterprise surveys, various rounds (see Methods for details). OAE - own 
account enterprise or single person firm. Family - enterprises operating only with unpaid labour. Establishment - enterprises 
hiring at least one wage worker. The earnings gap is defined as the ratio of lower caste to ‘other’ earnings. Earnings are defined as 
GVA/worker.
(establishments). Another indicator of caste-
based disparity in the data is the proportion of 
own-account enterprises owned by members 
of various caste groups. While 77 per cent of 
upper-caste-owned enterprises were of the 
OAE type, 92 per cent of SC and ST-owned 
enterprises fall under this category. OBC-
owned firms fall in between, with 85 per cent. 
In other words, lower-caste entrepreneurs 
seem to find it much more difficult than upper-
caste entrepreneurs to hire workers in the 
unorganised sector.
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5.4 / Conclusion
Despite very high rates of economic growth and 
ongoing structural change in the economy, it 
is clear that the Indian labour market suffers 
from large and persistent gender and caste 
disparities. The raw gender and caste earnings 
gaps have declined over time, but are still large 
at 65 per cent and 56 per cent respectively. 
The gaps vary considerably across types of 
employment, levels of education, and sectors. 
In general, they are larger in the self-employed 
category, for intermediate levels of education, 
and in the unorganised sector. But even where 
women or scheduled caste workers earn close to 
male or upper-caste workers, they rarely exceed 
80 per cent of the dominant groups’ earnings. 
Gender and caste discrimination as measured 
by industrial and occupational segregation 
shows a more complex pattern. When it comes 
to gender segregation, some industries such as 
finance and professional services are over 90 
per cent male. Many manufacturing industries 
are also over 80 per cent male, and segregation 
has actually worsened in the past ten years 
in this sector. However, overall segregation 
has reduced in services, and female over-
representation in poorly paid industries such 
as domestic work has reduced somewhat. Of 
course, it is possible that this reduction in 
over-representation is a result of women 
dropping out of the labour force altogether 
rather than shifting to other industries.
At this point, we would also like to reiterate 
that segregation measured by indices such as 
the Duncan Index of Dissimilarity is contingent 
on a given overall level of participation in the 
workforce. India thus has two distinct problems, 
both severe: first, the overall low participation 
of women in the paid workforce, and second, a 
segregated industrial and services workforce.
On the caste dimension, reservation 
or affirmative action policies in public 
administration and education seem to have had 
the desired effect of reducing caste segregation. 
The large caste-based movements for job quotas 
currently underway all across the country need 
to be seen in the context of this achievement.
With regard to gender, both the principal lessons 
from the literature as well as the analyses 
presented here—lack of decline in occupational 
and industrial segregation and of reduction 
in gender earnings gaps—are consistent with 
international findings (ILO 2016). Much remains 
to be done in building equity more effectively 
into the Lewis-Kuznets process.
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Chapter 6
India’s challenge is completing a dual 
structural transformation, from an 
agrarian to an industrial, and from an 
informal to a formal economy, under 
significant constraints of equity 
and ecology. Employment policy can 
contribute to all dimensions of this 
process.
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The creation of adequate, high quality employment is one of the most formidable challenges for economic 
policy in India today. This requires imaginative 
thinking based on reliable data and thorough 
analyses.
This report on the State of Working India has 
been prepared with the aim of sharing such 
information and analyses. In this concluding 
chapter, we first summarise some of the key 
findings. We then discuss each of the three 
major sectors in the context of employment 
policy. We end with reflections on the place of 
work in the twenty-first century.
6.1 / Key Findings
In the Indian 
context, skill 
without formal 
education 
and formal 
education 
without skill 
are both 
realities to be 
dealt with.
The analysis presented in Chapter Two 
underlines a significant new development in the 
Indian labour market: an increase in the rate 
of open unemployment. The principal status 
unemployment rate touched 5 per cent in 2015, 
which is high by historical standards. Further, 
the headline national rate hides large variations 
across states as well as age groups, reaching 
as high as 8 per cent in some northern states 
and up to 15 per cent for the youth and the 
higher educated. This is partly to be expected 
with an increase in the level of education, but 
is also worrying since it indicates an inability 
of the economy to create jobs commensurate 
with the expectations of educated youth. New 
employment data to be released later this year 
should be watched keenly to see if this is the 
‘new normal’ for the labour market.
There has been a controversy over the number 
of new entrants into the labour force each 
year. Mehrotra (2018) points out that the actual 
number after 2004 has been much lower than 
12 million a year, the latter frequently cited in 
the popular press. Notwithstanding this, as per 
the estimates of Ghose (2016), the economy 
still needs to generate 16 million new jobs 
annually to accommodate surplus workers and 
reach the ‘Lewis Turning Point’ in 15 years. This 
consists of around eight million new entrants 
every year (though this changes depending 
on the LFPR and may be less), seven million 
workers out of the pool of surplus labour, 
and part of the unemployed (0.9 million). Our 
analysis shows that, far from generating the 
required employment, the economy may have 
experienced a net destruction of jobs between 
2013 and 2017.
Finally, we point to the need to rethink skill 
policy. The Indian labour force is becoming 
increasingly more educated. However, this 
does not mean an increase in skill. In the Indian 
context, skill without formal education and 
formal education without skill are both realities 
to be dealt with. The government has correctly 
identified skilling of the labour force as a 
priority area. However, not enough attention 
has been paid to upgrading existing skills 
acquired informally on the job. Such skills exist 
in abundance and should be the central focus 
of any skill policy.
Nature of the Labour Force and the New 
Challenge of Open Unemployment
The Kuznets Process: Sectoral 
Performance
The absolute reduction in the size of the 
agricultural workforce, which started in 2004, 
continues to be a reality. These workers, 
together with the new entrants into the labour 
force, need to be accommodated in the non-
farm economy. Thus far, the destination of 
workers leaving agriculture seems to be largely 
construction and not manufacturing. Nationally, 
construction now employs 50 million workers—
as much as manufacturing. Its share in rural 
employment has gone from 1.4 per cent in 
1972 to 10.7 per cent in 2011, and it is the 
largest rural employer after agriculture.
With respect to manufacturing, the most 
salient point to note, from an employment 
perspective, is that this sector has failed to 
expand its employment share significantly over 
the past 25 years, remaining in the range of 
10−13 per cent of the workforce. The last few 
years have seen rapid growth in employment 
in the organised manufacturing sector, but this 
has come at the expense of employment in the 
unorganised sector.
Increasing capital intensity in both labour and 
capital intensive industries has meant low 
elasticity of employment in general. That said, 
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Wage growth 
has been 
occurring 
consistently, 
except for the 
agricultural 
sector, even if 
at only half the 
rate of GDP 
growth.
The Nature of the Lewis Transition
Labour Market Segregation and 
Its Effects
some success stories do exist in the form of 
industries such as knitwear, plastics, footwear, 
and metal products, which have delivered 
stronger than average job growth as well as 
wage growth.
The labour law regime does not seem to be a 
constraint on job creation as such, but rather 
on good job creation, having the perverse 
effect of incentivising firms to hire off-the-book 
and contract workers to escape regulation. 
The current strong de jure and weak de facto 
regime seems to be a lose−lose situation, in 
need of reform. However, a simple elimination 
or relaxing of laws without an increase in 
regulatory capacity will be counter-productive, 
making job quality even worse.
The long-run transition from informal to formal 
work has been slower than desired or expected 
in India. In 1987, 55.5 per cent of workers were 
self-employed. By 2015, this had fallen to 46.6 
per cent. Correspondingly, the proportion of 
regular wage workers rose from 15.6 per cent 
to 20.6 per cent.
The proportion of formal workers among non-
agricultural wage workers has been inching up 
slowly and is now just under 60 per cent as per 
the broadest definition of formality (‘regular 
workers’). However, if access to at least one 
social security benefit (such as paid leave, 
provident fund, or pension) is included in the 
criterion, this number falls by half to 30 per 
cent. A mere 17 per cent of non-agricultural 
wage workers in the Indian economy have 
access to regular employment with some 
benefits and a written contract. It must also be 
borne in mind that the most rapidly growing 
sector, construction, is also the most informal.
Wage growth has been occurring consistently, 
except for the agricultural sector, even if at 
only half the rate of GDP growth. The recent 
India Wage Report finds that, between 1994 
and 2011, real wages for regular workers grew 
at 3 per cent per annum and those for casual 
workers at 3.85 per cent (Papola and Kannan 
2017; ILO 2018). Interestingly, we find that 
wage growth in the unorganised manufacturing 
sector has been faster than in the organised 
sector at least since 2000. The weak growth of 
wages in organised manufacturing, combined 
with large increases in labour productivity 
occurring on the back of rising capital intensity, 
has meant a striking divergence between wages 
of production workers and labour productivity 
in this sector, and a collapse of the labour 
share. At its lowest point, around 2008, the 
share of wages in value-added was less than 
10 per cent. It has since increased to around 14 
per cent. Further, despite growth, wage levels 
have remained low, with the vast majority 
of the workforce earning half the lowest 
recommended salary by the seventh CPC. The 
Lewisian surplus thus seems to be manifested 
via continued low wage levels and 
wage-productivity divergence rather than 
stagnant wage growth.
With respect to gender and the labour market, 
India has two distinct problems: first, the 
overall low participation of women in the paid 
workforce and second, a segregated industrial 
and services workforce. Manufacturing remains 
overwhelmingly male, and segregation has 
actually worsened in the past ten years in 
this sector. On the other hand, agriculture 
is increasingly feminised. Segregation has 
reduced in services, but, even here, in some 
industries such as finance and professional 
services, males continue to dominate at over 
90 per cent.
When it comes to caste segregation, 
it continues to be persistent in both 
manufacturing and services. However, 
in services, reservation policies in public 
administration and education seem to have had 
the desired effect of reducing segregation. The 
large caste-based movements for job quotas 
currently underway all across the country need 
to be seen in the context of this achievement.
Finally, raw gender and caste gaps have 
declined over time, but are still large at 65 per 
cent and 56 per cent respectively.
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6.2.1 / Sectoral Considerations
A failure 
of public 
investment to 
complement 
private efforts 
means a failure 
to convert the 
latter into 
higher incomes 
and output.
6.2 / Towards a National 
Employment Policy
In the Introduction, we formulated India’s 
challenge as one of completing a dual 
structural transformation, from an agrarian 
to an industrial economy, and from a largely 
informal to a formal economy, under significant 
constraints of equity and ecology. Employment 
policy can contribute to all dimensions of this 
process. Where, for whom, and how good the 
jobs are, together determine the nature of the 
transformation that the economy undergoes.
A National Employment Policy can take the 
necessary broad and comprehensive approach 
needed. Here we discuss what each of the 
principal sectors needs and can offer. It should 
be emphasised that our focus is on the question 
of employment and structural change, not on 
sectoral policies or reform in general. We also 
discuss the attendant question of fiscal policy.
1  https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/agrarian-crisis-farmer-protests-rural-distress-surplus-production-crop-
procurement-the-age-of-surplus-5213499/
Agriculture
The problems of the agricultural sector are 
manifold and complex. This year’s SWI does 
not address the issues facing this sector. But 
the centrality of this sector cannot be over-
emphasised. What happens in agriculture 
directly impacts job creation as well as the 
quality of work in the rest of the economy. 
The experience of late industrialisers in East 
Asia shows that comprehensive agricultural 
reforms lies behind the subsequent success of 
industrial policy. Conversely, to ‘get agriculture 
wrong’ is to reduce the likelihood of good job 
creation in other sectors.
Raising incomes and productivity in agriculture 
has three important effects: first, a direct 
impact on the welfare of nearly half the 
country’s workforce and an increase in 
domestic demand; second, to the extent that 
the rural-urban earnings gap reduces, a decline 
in migration, informality and unemployment, 
and therefore better working conditions in the 
cities; and third, a fall in commodity prices and 
hence reduced inflationary pressures and more 
room for industrial growth.
Raising productivity has long been a central 
focus of agricultural policy, but more emphasis 
has been placed on private investment by 
farmers in the form of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides, tubewells and machinery. Public 
investment in irrigation and electricity, local 
storage and value-addition capacity as well as 
better transport are all crucial to convert private 
investment into higher returns. Conversely, 
a failure of public investment to complement 
private efforts means a failure to convert the 
latter into higher incomes and output.
Hence the problem of low productivity of 
Indian agriculture compared to other large 
Asian economies like China, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam persists. But the situation is different 
for different major crops. For example, India 
lags behind all three countries in output 
per hectare of rice but only behind China in 
wheat. Wheat output per hectare in India is 
comparable to that in the United States (NITI 
Aayog 2015). Indeed, some have argued that 
Indian agriculture seems to have entered an 
era of ‘permanent surpluses’.1
But rather than enhancing farm income, this 
has given rise to the phenomenon of frequent 
gluts and resulting collapse of incomes. 
Further increases in productivity have come 
with rising costs of cultivation, and there is 
continuing market power of intermediaries in 
the agricultural supply chain. The result is a 
perennial situation of farm distress.
The solutions are as well-known as the 
problems. Increased public investment in 
the form of irrigation, extension services, 
local storage and value-addition capacity, 
and better transport; increased outlays for 
MGNREGA, making it a truly demand-led 
programme; direct income subsidies and 
more social infrastructural investment in rural 
areas, to name a few. The recommendations 
of the National Commission on Farmers 
(‘Swaminathan Commission’) constitute a 
comprehensive basis for redesigning policy 
(Swaminathan 2006).
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The question 
is not whether 
industrial 
policy should 
exist, but 
rather what 
form it should 
take to enable 
growth in 
employment, 
labour 
productivity, 
and wages.
2  https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/why-alarmists-must-not-derail-policy-direction-if-they-want-a-better-
india-118022601027_1.html
3  https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india-govt-to-bring-employees-of-apparel-garment-and-textile-sectors-under-epfo-pension-
scheme-by-bearing-12-of-employers-contribution-434943, see https://www.jobs.gov.au/wage-subsidies for the Australian case
Manufacturing
A recent, thorough analysis of the need for 
manufacturing-led growth is available in 
Ghose (2016). The author responds to the 
‘manufacturing pessimism’ in the literature. 
This pessimism has drawn on the empirical 
fact of ‘premature deindustrialisation’ (Rodrik 
2016). The decline in the capacity of this sector 
to create jobs is seen in the fact that the same 
share in output is associated with far smaller 
shares in employment for industrialisers today.
Ghose makes three points. First, among a 
cohort of Asian countries, India has the lowest 
manufacturing share of employment. Thus, 
it is possible that peak levels have not been 
reached. Second, in the past, a substantial 
part of employment in services such as design, 
marketing, finance, transport, health, and so 
on would have registered as ‘manufacturing’ 
employment because these services were 
supplied in-house by firms. They are now 
increasingly outsourced. This simply means 
that such allied employment will appear as 
service sector jobs today. Lastly, the author 
shows that setting aside social and personal 
services, the organised service sector is actually 
less employment intensive than organised 
manufacturing.
The policy conclusion is that India should not 
give up on manufacturing-led employment 
growth quite yet. Rather, as Santosh Mehrotra 
has argued, there is a need to bring back 
coordinated industrial and trade policies.2
‘Industrial policy’ has a bad reputation in some 
circles in India, calling to mind the ‘permit raj’. 
The policies of the pre-liberalisation period 
have been criticised for disregarding India’s 
comparative advantage in labour intensive 
manufacturing. The result is that a 
labour-abundant economy has diversified 
into skill-intensive and capital-intensive 
sectors. But another way of looking at the 
same problem is that even the relatively small 
manufacturing sector is more diversified and 
sophisticated than comparable countries 
(Felipe et al 2013). The question is, can this 
diversified manufacturing base be leveraged 
as India tries to expand into relatively more 
labour absorbing industries? For example, by 
ensuring domestic supply of capital equipment 
at competitive prices thereby helping the trade 
deficit. Secondly, note that industrial policy 
never went away. It merely morphed into 
more acceptable forms such as tax incentives, 
FDI, special economic zones, and change in 
labour regulation regimes. The question thus, 
is not whether industrial policy should exist, 
but rather what particular form it should 
take to enable growth in employment, labour 
productivity, and wages.
One interesting policy receiving attention 
currently is a wage subsidy. For example, 
the Odisha Apparel Policy promises ₹1000 
per worker per month for 36 months, for 
units employing a minimum of 200 workers 
(Government of Odisha 2016). Similarly, 
the Gujarat Apparel Policy has a provision 
whereby the state government will provide 
50 per cent of the wages, ₹4000 for female 
employees and ₹3200 for male employees per 
month for a period of five years. The subsidy 
is for new enterprises with minimum scale 
(150 machines) and generating at least 300 
domicile jobs (Government of Gujarat 2017). 
At the national level, the Government of India 
has already implemented policies wherein it 
bears the entire 12 per cent of the employers’ 
contribution to the Employee Provident Fund 
Scheme for new employees of the garment 
industry. This is for the first three years on 
the job for those who earn less than ₹15,000 
per month. Such policies are also being 
implemented in other countries.3
Industrial craft clusters are major employers 
in their own right, with over 500 officially 
listed arts and crafts and millions of jobs at 
stake.4 In addition, they are incubators for skill 
development and manufacturers of products 
with cultural value. They deserve much more 
attention in the employment 
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policy (Shrivastava 2018). The crafts sector 
has suffered from a schizophrenic attitude, 
extolled on the one hand for cultural and 
heritage value, and neglected on the other for 
being a ‘sunset’ industry. This sector must be 
viewed as a dynamic industrial sector rather 
than a dying one in need of preservation 
(Bhattacharya and Sen 2018). Case studies 
indicate that intellectual property rights such 
as Geographical Indications can, to an extent, 
if they are designed sensitively taking into 
account technical change in craft industries, 
enhance incomes by reducing imitation and 
counterfeiting. But they cannot substitute for 
adequate infrastructure, credit, and market 
access that can only be delivered by an 
industrial policy (Basole 2015a).
Connected to the question of crafts is the 
link in the policy imagination that equates 
manufacturing with cities. Several craft clusters 
are rural. Structural change must not be 
equated with a movement of the workforce 
from the rural to the urban areas. Only then 
can the crucial role of the rural non-farm sector 
be appreciated. This sector is vital for many 
reasons. First, a healthy and expanding rural 
non-farm sector contributes to job creation and 
increased productivity. Second, by employment 
creation in the rural areas, it alleviates the 
pressure on cities. Third, it can provide a more 
sustainable model of development.
Services
Tradable services such as IT/BPM have received 
a lot of attention in India’s growth story. 
However, the non-tradable service sector, in 
particular the social segment consisting of 
education, health, transportation and other 
public services, and hospitality, has significant 
potential for job creation as well as the capacity 
to deliver equitable and green growth. A 
‘universal basic services’ (UBS) approach can be 
imagined that delivers human capital advances 
alongside job growth.
The UBS can be seen as an alternative to 
the Universal Basic Income (UBI), which 
has recently gained a significant amount 
of attention and support from academic as 
well as policy circles. UBI, a cash transfer to 
everyone in the population, is a response to 
the concern that rising automation will lead 
to increasing productivity with fewer jobs. A 
redistribution of these productivity gains will 
offset the otherwise increasing inequality that 
may result from such technological changes. 
The UBI, being a cash transfer is also thought to 
be free of leakages and hence a more efficient 
way of providing social welfare, while allowing 
households the freedom to choose what they 
want to spend the money on. Some trials of UBI 
schemes are happening in developed countries, 
and, increasingly, it is also being proposed for 
developing countries (Ministry of Finance 2017).
But if the objective is to ensure that the poorest 
families can maintain a decent standard of 
living, then the amount transferred has to be 
enough to cover costs of basic needs that are 
either not publicly provided or are provided 
but not at an acceptable level of quality. 
This necessitates some sort of indexing that 
accounts for the changes in market prices of 
these requirements, leaving open the possibility 
that if the government comes under some fiscal 
pressure, it can run down the real value of the 
transfer. We can already see this happening 
in the case of MGNREGA, where the increase 
in nominal wage rates has been lower than 
the inflation in some states. Additionally, in a 
patriarchal society, household power dynamics 
will dictate what the cash is used for, and it may 
not be used in the interest of all members of 
the household. Finally, there are formidable 
technical and infrastructural problems in timely 
delivery of cash transfers.
Keeping these problems in mind, we believe it 
is worth investing in UBS instead of UBI. A key 
condition for this is an investment in improved 
and increased public provision of healthcare, 
education, housing, security, transport, and 
utilities. This will have multiple positive effects. 
Some of these services like healthcare and 
education have large potential for creating 
good jobs, which would be the immediate effect 
of an expansion in these sectors. Additionally, 
providing these services publicly and 
universally and ensuring that they are of good 
quality is likely to improve social cohesion as 
4  https://www.mospi.gov.in/list-handicrafts-craft-maps-states-uts
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5  http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/india-needs-1-5-trillion-for-infrastructure-arun-jaitley/
articleshow/52922015.cms
6  https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Volume%201%20FRBM%20Review%20Committee%20Report.pdf
affluent sections of the society would also start 
using them. Many of these services also have 
clear economies of scale or network effects, 
which would lead to efficiency gains that come 
with scaling up. Most importantly, the services 
would ensure a basic minimum quality of life 
for everybody regardless of their social or 
economic location. A well-executed UBS would 
go a long way in restoring public goods to their 
rightful place in society.
Many problems can, of course, be anticipated 
in implementing such an ambitious scheme 
in a country with low state-capacity and high 
social stratification. But the UBI is also equally 
ambitious, with none of the accompanying 
direct effects on social infrastructure and 
human capital. If a big policy is being imagined, 
it is worth exploring UBS since it would be 
far better on multiple dimensions, including 
creation of jobs and reduction of inequality, 
than UBI.
6.2.2 / Macroeconomic Considerations
Currently, there is a wide consensus in policy-
making circles that the government must create 
‘enabling conditions’ for private industry to be 
the key generator of employment (hence, for 
example, the Make in India programme). In 
this regard, creating supply-side reforms may 
improve conditions for private industry-led 
employment generation. But this is insufficient 
and one needs to pay far more attention to the 
demand side.
The patterns of demand that exist are worrying. 
Apart from the reduction in external demand 
in terms of exports. India’s long-standing 
investment slowdown remains a major cause 
of concern. Given the peak of 35 per cent of 
GDP over a decade ago to less than 30 per 
cent today, it suggests that the working out 
of the balance sheet issues requires more 
time (despite very recent modest increases in 
capital expenditure from the sector). The main 
increases in demand have come from increases 
in private (household) and government 
consumption, which do not necessarily add to 
the productive stock of capital in the country.
At the same time, there is clear evidence of 
underinvestment in social and physical assets 
like health, education and infrastructure, which 
are essential for growth, employment and 
welfare A recent estimate suggests that the 
country faces a 1.5 trillion dollar infrastructural 
gap, which is unlikely to be covered by private 
investment.5
Concerted efforts are necessary to envision 
alternative macroeconomic and fiscal priorities 
that deliver the needed employment in a 
reasonable time frame.
Most importantly, the concerns of debt 
management and stabilisation appear to be 
overemphasised. There is very little evidence 
that fiscal deficits have been inflationary or 
that they have seriously crowded out private 
borrowing. Nor is there any merit to the concern 
that current levels of debt (60−80 per cent of 
GDP) will have deleterious effects on growth. 
As the then Chief Economic Advisor, Arvind 
Subramanian, pointed out in his note on the 
N.K Singh committee report, debt levels were 
highest precisely during India’s dream run.6
The case for additional government spending, 
particularly in areas where it adds to the 
productive stock of assets, is very strong. The 
government could identify a slightly higher debt 
ratio for a period of 10 years and, with favourable 
debt dynamics (the real growth rate exceeds the 
real interest rate, which has the effect of reducing 
the debt ratio), could provide a useful stimulus 
that would crowd in private players.
At the same time, industrial policies that target 
employment-intensive sectors should not be 
off the table. The historical experience of now 
more advanced industrial countries suggest 
that these policies, perhaps more accurately 
labelled as learning, industrial and technology 
(LIT) policies, have been a central part of such 
transformation. At the current juncture, the 
fruitful question to be asked is not whether 
but which combination of fiscal and industrial 
policies are most likely to succeed in achieving 
the aims of growth and quality employment.
There is 
very little 
evidence that 
fiscal deficits 
have been 
inflationary 
or that they 
have seriously 
crowded 
out private 
borrowing.
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Finally, there is a need to consider whether 
governments in countries like India have 
willingly constrained themselves from adopting 
strategic trade and industrial policies for 
fear of being labelled protectionist or anti-
globalisation. In fact, a large economy like India 
should have significant leeway in policy-making 
to suit its own priorities. After all, the true test 
of a well-functioning economy is whether it 
makes life better for all its citizens, not merely 
whether it is open to trade. 
6.3 / The Future of Work
Since the nineteenth century, thinkers have 
speculated on the future of work under 
capitalism, from utopian as well as dystopian 
perspectives. One example of the former 
is John Maynard Keynes’ thesis that since 
technological progress makes output grow 
rapidly per hour of work, people’s needs will 
be satisfied with ever lesser amounts of work, 
and the human question of survival would 
eventually be abolished (Keynes 1963). This 
would free up more time for creative pursuits 
and enjoyment of life. Before Keynes, Karl 
Marx had advanced similar views albeit with 
a crucial caveat. Driven by the profit motive 
and supported by alienated labour, capitalism 
could not deliver such a society. But socialism 
or communism could. The experience of the 
twentieth century would seem to vindicate at 
least half of Marx’s thesis. Several decades of 
growth and large increases in productivity have 
not reduced toil.
On the dystopian front, the spectre of machines 
making people redundant, causing mass 
unemployment has also been repeatedly 
raised since the nineteenth century. Its 
latest incarnation is the current debate over 
Artificial Intelligence and automation. In reality, 
however, rather than the disappearance of 
work, we seem to have a proliferation of work 
that people find meaningless and unfulfilling 
(Graeber 2018). This is over and above the 
trend in industrialised countries, especially 
in the Anglo-American economies, of work 
becoming less stable and remuneration more 
tenuous. While in countries such as India, 
structural transformation proceeds haltingly 
and employment is often unstable and certainly 
not adequately remunerative.
Finally, in addition to the usual considerations 
of security, safety, and remuneration, any 
discussion of employment must ask what work 
is for and how to make it meaningful for those 
who do it. Work should not simply be seen as 
a disutility to bear in order to have access to 
income. The need to be doing productive work 
that provides utility and meaning for both 
oneself as well as others is one of the most 
fundamental human drives. If we consider work 
the basis of human civilization and of human 
creativity, employment policy cannot simply 
valorise the labour intensity of any form of 
production. We must also ask about the quality 
of a work life as well as the ways in which work 
disrupts as well as enables life.
If we consider 
work the basis 
of human 
creativity, 
employment 
policy cannot 
simply valorise 
the labour 
intensity of 
production.
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The challenge is to imagine a path in which the 
fruits of technological progress are more widely 
enjoyed and in which the economy provides 
remunerative, stable and meaningful work 
that allows human capacities to flourish. This 
requires both destroying ‘bad jobs’ and creating 
‘good jobs.’ In turn this process demands large 
transformations in the way our society and 
economy are organised.
The first five decades of India's independent 
existence saw some concerted effort to push 
such an imaginative transformation. The 
purpose of several of India's major economic 
initiatives (small scale industry protection, 
credit policies, and public sector expansion) 
was at least in part to aid in the Lewis-Kuznets 
transformation in such a way as to minimize 
the wholesale uprooting and social dislocations 
that come from industrialization and structural 
change. These policies, however, ran aground 
and had some limited success at best in 
generating large scale and meaningful growth 
and employment. Unfortunately, India's move 
to a more market oriented economy, while 
tremendously successful at generating more 
sustained growth has not done any better in 
terms of widespread employment generation. 
At the same time, with the demographic 
changes that are underway and with the 
aspirational sentiments of an emergent middle 
class, the need for such solutions has become 
more pronounced.
Fortunately, there is a rich intellectual and 
practical heritage to draw on for charting a 
path. In India, two influential figures of the early 
twentieth century, Mahatma Gandhi and 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar thought deeply on the social, 
ethical, and economic significance of work. 
They challenged three hierarchies that have 
plagued the world of work, namely, head versus 
hand, caste, and colonial versus indigenous. 
The feminist and ecological movements of the 
latter half of the century add to this formidable 
heritage. Taken together, these constitute 
a large social archive of ideas and practices 
that is available to us to reimagine work in the 
twenty-first century.
Gandhi’s work on labour was central to his 
economic thought. It elevated the status 
of craft as well as indigenous knowledge 
traditions to be on par with that accorded to 
intellectual labour and modern knowledge. 
Ambedkar’s challenge to caste was also 
centered on work. Ending degrading forms of 
labour and embracing modern knowledge as 
well as modern forms of work were central to 
his programme. The modern Indian feminist 
movement also made work, specifically 
unpaid work, a central aspect of its analysis 
of patriarchy. Finally, the new ecological 
movements, in the spirit of ‘environmentalism 
of the poor’ have foregrounded the 
relationship between livelihoods and ecological 
consciousness.
Contemporary Indian reality demands a 
contribution from each of these streams. None 
of them are complete in themselves. Borrowing 
from them creatively and selectively constitutes 
the task of our times.
Mahatma 
Gandhi and Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar, 
both thought 
deeply on the 
social, ethical, 
and economic 
significance of 
work.
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In the Introduction, we formulated India’s 
challenge as one of completing a dual structural 
transformation, from agrarian to an industrial 
economy, and from a largely informal to a 
formal economy, under significant constraints 
of equity and ecology. Employment policy can 
contribute to all dimensions of this process. 
Where, for whom, and how good the jobs 
are, together determine the nature of the 
transformation that the economy undergoes.
A National Employment Policy can take the 
necessary broad and comprehensive approach 
needed. Here we discuss what each of the 
principal sectors needs and can offer. It should 
be emphasised that our focus is on the question 
of employment and structural change, not on 
sectoral policies or reform in general. We also 
discuss the attendant question of fiscal policy.
Data
Table 1 gives details of all surveys from which 
unit-level data have been used. In the report 
text, we refer to surveys conducted over a 
fiscal year by the first of the two calendar 
years for ease of reading. For example, a 
survey conducted in 2011-12 is referred to by 
the year 2011.
In addition to unit-level data, we have also 
drawn upon several published reports from 
different sources. 
• The partial, high frequency, establishment 
surveys conducted by the Labour Bureau, 
known as the Quarterly Employment 
Surveys (QES) cover establishments with 
more than 10 workers. Thus these are 
mainly used for estimates of organised 
employment. We use these surveys 
to supplement our estimates for the 
most recent two years, particularly for 
the organised service sector industries, 
for which other data sources at the 
establishment level are not available. The 
most recent series of the QES which starts 
in 2016 covers 10,600 units and 8 sectors 
covering all the States/UTs in the country. 
The eight selected sectors constitute 
around 81 per cent of the total employment 
of units with 10 or more workers. The 
sampling frame is from the 2013 Economic 
Census. The reports are available at http://
labourbureaunew.gov.in.
• The Reserve Bank of India publishes 
monthly data on rural wage rates for men. 
These are collated from reports submitted 
by various state-level Ministries of Labour. 
They are available at http://dbie.rbi.org.in/.
• The Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE) along with the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE) have been conducting 
large sample employment surveys 
since 2016. The results of these surveys 
are available as a set of reports titled 
‘Unemployment in India: A Statistical Profile’ 
at https://unemploymentinindia.cmie.com/.
• Internationally comparable industry level 
data for India on employment, output, and 
productivity are available via the RBI-KLEMS 
database at https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_
PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=43504
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Table 1 : Details of Surveys Used in the Analysis
Employment Surveys NSS Unorganised Enterprises Surveys
ASI Organised Enterprises 
Surveys
Unit of analysis Household Enterprise
Factory (manufacturing 
industries) , workshop 
(repair services),  
undertaking or a licensee 
(electricity, gas and water 
supply), establishment in 
the case of bidi and cigar 
industries
Survey Rounds & Years
NSS-EUS 61st Round (2004-
05), 68th Round (2011-12) 
and LB-EUS 5th Round 
(2015-16)
NSS 51st Round (1994-95) 
55th Round (1999-2000), 
62nd Round (2005-06)  67th 
Round  (2010-2011) and 73rd 
Round (2015-16)
1983 to 2016 for NIC-3 digit 
data, 2000-2014 for factory 
data
Sectoral Coverage All sectors
NSS 51st Round – 
unorganised manufacturing 
enterprises
NSS 55th Round – non-
agricultural informal sector
NSS 62nd Round – 
unorganised manufacturing 
enterprises 
NSS 67nd Round and 
73rd Round surveys 
– unincorporated 
manufacturing and services
Factories registered under 
Factories Act, 1948, Bidi 
and cigar manufacturing 
establishments registered 
under the Bidi and Cigar 
Workers (Conditions of 
Employment) Act 1966,  
Electricity undertakings not 
registered with the Central 
Electricity Authority (CEA)
Geographic coverage National National National
Exclusions N.A.
Organised enterprises in 
manufacturing and services, 
Construction (included only 
in 55th  Round), agricultural 
enterprises.
Defence establishments, 
oil storage and distribution 
depots, departmental units 
such as railway workshops, 
Road Transport Corporation 
workshops, sanitary, water 
supply, gas storage etc
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METHODS
Comparability of Recent 
Labour Bureau Surveys 
with NSS 
The National Sample Survey (NSS), under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Statistics and 
Program Implementation, has conducted nine 
comprehensive quinquennial household-level 
surveys from 1972-73 to 2011-12 with the 
objective of generating national and state-level 
estimates of aspects relating to employment 
and unemployment. The most recent one was 
conducted in 2011-12.
From 2009-10, the Labour Bureau, under the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment, has been 
conducting similar surveys, although some of 
the earlier surveys have been limited in their 
coverage.  There have been five such surveys 
(2009-10, 2011-12, 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2015-
16). Of these, unit-level data is available only 
for the fourth (2013-14) and fifth (2015-16) 
rounds. Therefore, LB-EUS fifth round provides 
the most recent, nationally representative 
employment-related information. 
Since the LB-EUS and the NSS-EUS are 
conducted by different organisations and 
based on different questionnaires, the issue 
of comparability naturally arises. Here we 
describe some differences in the two surveys 
and provide a justification for comparability. 
The fieldwork for NSS surveys typically runs 
over a one-year duration. For example, during 
the 68th (2011-12) Round, fieldwork started on 
1st July, 2011 and ended on 30th June 2012. 
The LB-EUS fieldwork is shorter in duration. 
For example, LB EUS 2011-12 started in August 
2011 and was completed by January 2012. This 
change in time period has implications for the 
collection of employment data, particularly for 
casual and seasonal workers. 
The schedules of the two surveys also have 
some notable differences. Firstly, the Labour 
Bureau EUS collects activity status information 
only for individuals aged 15 years and above, 
while the NSS EUS collects this information for 
all individuals in the household. Therefore, data 
on children’s activity statuses, particularly child 
labour cannot be gleaned from the LB-EUS.
Secondly, the Labour Bureau schedule has 
a few changes specifically in the economic 
activity statuses. The category of “contract 
worker” has been introduced. The Labour 
Bureau schedule also distinguishes casual 
workers by their enterprise/industry – public/
private/agriculture. Finally, the LB has only one 
category for domestic duties, whereas NSS-EUS 
differentiates between domestic duties and 
subsistence activities. 
Thirdly, with respect to earnings information, 
the NSS-EUS collects monthly per capita 
expenditure data via an abridged version of 
the consumption expenditure schedule. The 
Labour Bureau schedule however, assigns 
households to a broad income category with 
categories ranging from ‘Upto ₹ 5000’ to ‘above 
₹ 1,00,000.  Wage earnings have also been 
reduced to a similar discrete categorization 
in the LB. However, unlike in the NSS-EUS, 
earnings information (although categorical) is 
available for the self-employed workers as well.
In terms of sample design, both the surveys 
adopted a stratified multi-stage design. The 
selection process of FSUs are based on the 
2011 census villages for the rural areas and the 
urban frame survey (UFS) for urban areas in 
both surveys. The only other minor difference 
in methodology between both the surveys is 
in terms of sub-stratification. At the broader 
level, both the surveys categorize their sample 
as urban or rural. The LB-EUS report does 
not explain the further stratifications that 
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they have conducted. In terms of sample size, 
allocation of sample to states/UTs, selection 
and formation of hamlet groups and second 
stage strata and so on, both the surveys have 
followed the same procedure. 
We can directly check the comparability issue 
for the year 2011-12 since both surveys were 
conducted in this year. Table 2 shows that the 
distribution of activity statuses are broadly 
similar across the two surveys.  
The NSS-EUS 2011 estimates female LFPR 
(principal status) at 23.4 and male at 79. The 
comparable numbers for LB EUS are female 
LFPR of 25.3, and male, 77.2. 
The distribution of employment type is also 
broadly similar across surveys with NSS 
reporting 38.9 per cent men as self-employed, 
15.5 per cent as regular workers, 22.8 per 
cent as casual workers, and the LB reporting 
37.3, 15.4 (including contract workers) and 22 
respectively.  
Lastly, in classifying workers in formal versus 
informal activity also both surveys are within 
one or two percentage points of each other.
Since the LB-EUS method has not changed in its 
subsequent iterations, we feel that comparing 
the estimates of the 2011-12 NSS-EUS with 
those of the 2015-16 LB-EUS is justified.
NSS 2011-12 LB 2011-12
Men Women Men Women
Own Account Worker 29.55 3.98 Home-based worker 30.1 4.5
OAW other than  
home-based 1 0.9
Employer 1.41 0.11 Employer 0.5 0.1
Unpaid Worker 7.97 7.09 Unpaid Worker 5.7 5
Regular Salaried 15.45 3.78 Regular Salaried 11.6 2.9
Contract 3.8 1
Casual – public 0.59 0.3 Casual - public 1.5 0.5
Casual – other 22.21 7.23 Casual - other 20.8 8.7
Seeking Work 1.9 0.86 Seeking Work 2.2 1.7
Attending educational 
institution 13.94 9.81
Education, Domestic, 
all other non-economic 
activities
22.6 74.6
Domestic Duties 0.23 32.74
Domestic Duties & free 
collection 0.24 28.18
Rentier, pensioners etc 2.68 1.52
Not able to work 1.63 1.59
Others 2.21 2.81
Table 2 : Detailed Activity Status, NSS EUS 2011-12 and LB EUS 2011-12
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METHODS
Estimating Absolute Size 
of the Labour Force and 
Workforce 
Deflators
Industry and Occupation 
Codes
Absolute numbers are generated by applying 
the shares estimated from the surveys on 
absolute population totals based on census 
projections.  
For example, for 2015 all-India and state-level 
estimates of total working age population are 
derived from population projections based on 
Census 2011 available in available in LB-EUS 
2015 Report (Volume 1, Annexure III) .  The 
labour force participation rate derived from 
unit-level data is then applied on the total 
working age population numbers to arrive at 
the absolute size of the labour force. Other 
statistics such as unemployment and workforce 
at the all-India level are computed similarly.  
At the state-level, state-level absolute numbers 
of labour force are generated by first estimating 
the states’ share in all-India labour force from 
the unit-level data. This share is then applied on 
the all-India labour force number to derive the 
state-wise absolute labour force numbers. This 
ensures that all absolute estimates of labour 
force are internally consistent.  Other state-
level absolute numbers such as unemployed 
workers and workforce are derived similarly.
For 2011-12, the total all-India working age 
population is derived by extrapolating from 
the Census working age population for 2011, 
assuming a constant rate of growth. The 
numbers thus estimated are similar to the 
estimates of Ghose (2016). The labour force 
participation rate, estimated from the NSS EUS 
2011-12, is applied on the absolute working-
age population to arrive at the absolute labour 
force. The other absolute numbers and state-
level estimates are derived using the same 
methods as for the 2015 data.
All rupee amounts are quoted in lakhs and 
crores. Real values are reported in 2015 rupees, 
unless otherwise specified. Deflators used at 
the all-India level are CPI-Agricultural Labourers 
and CPI-Industrial Workers for wages, WPI-
Manufactured Products for value-added and 
WPI-Machines and Machinery for capital.  The 
indices are sourced from the RBI Handbook 
of Statistics on the Indian Economy and are 
rebased to 2015 prices using a linking factor. 
State-level wages are deflated using the 
combined CPI (Rural and Urban combined) 
index, available from the RBI Database on 
Indian Economy.  CPI (base-2010) extends from 
2011 to 2014. CPI (base – 2012) extends from 
2013 to 2016. The two series are linked using 
a common year (2013) and subsequently, a 
continuous CPI series going from 2011 to 2016 
with the base year 2013 is created. This series is 
then rebased to 2015.
For occupations, the 2004 National 
Classification of Occupations (NCO) is used at 
the most aggregated one-digit level. We only 
analyse occupational distributions for 2011-12 
and 2015-16.
The National Industrial Classification (NIC) 2008 
is used for analysis of the post 2008 period. 
For analyses that require a longer, comparable 
time series, the Economic and Political Weekly 
Research Foundation’s harmonised 3-digit NICs 
are used.
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